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Lawful Response to Attacks on Space Systems
James D. Rendleman
Colonel, USAF (Ret.), Colorado Springs, Colorado

What means may a nation lawfully employ to
respond to and to defeat threats and attacks on
its space systems? Treaties and customary law
provide a strong incentive to limit space
activities to non-aggressive “peaceful
purposes.” They do not, however, proscribe
space warfare or preparation for such conflict.
Space system components are thus at risk, and
can be attacked, degraded, or destroyed,
simultaneously or each in detail. The use of
force is allowed only in self-defense against
an “armed attack” or in accord with
authorization of the United Nations (UN).
Kinetic, electromagnetic, or information
operation attacks against space systems are
each an “armed attack” to which the use of
force is permitted. The right of self-defense is
subject to the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)
and other treaties and agreements. Even if
lawful means and methods are employed and
targets
engaged,
physical,
technical,
environmental, political realities, and their
risks and benefits limit options to defend and
fight space systems. Decades of senior policymakers have recognized the importance of the
space domain, assessed the risks in their
context, and provided measured and calm
global leadership to preserve access to it.
The United States (U.S.) utilizes space more
than any other nation, not only for national
security, but in the private sector as well. The
complete mix of civil, military, national, and
multinational commercial space capabilities
are important enablers for successful 21st
Century militaries, economies, information
transfer, diplomatic communications, and
collaboration. Space-based capabilities –
precision-navigation-timing (PNT), battlefield

and battlespace characterization, missile
warning
and
defense,
weather,
communications, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance – enable the U.S. and its
allies to reach out, shape, support, and control
events in any part of the globe.
Taking down space capabilities offers a means
by which adversaries can degrade the
significant asymmetric advantages offered.
Consequently, the recent 11 January 2007 test
of a Chinese ground-based, direct-ascent antisatellite (ASAT) interceptor against one of
their own defunct Feng Yun-1C weather
satellites generated considerable concern
across the U.S. and international space and
related defense communities.
How should capabilities presented by space
systems be protected? The U.S. approach to
securing and protecting the space domain has
been and will continue to be rooted in rational
policy making and municipal (i.e., domestic,
national) and international law. Long-standing
treaties and policy support the peaceful uses of
space for civil, commercial, and military
purposes. Yet, these may fail in times of
conflict. Accordingly, the U.S. cannot wholly
depend on passive defensive capabilities, or
diplomatic engagement and awareness, to
secure itself.
Recognizing the importance of protecting
satellites as strategic assets, the U.S. has
employed a comprehensive strategy to
accomplish this objective since the inception
of the Space Age. During the Cold War,
hardening military satellites against potential
destruction was commonplace, though
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“development of specific weapons to target
hostile satellites or threats to U.S. satellites
was politically eschewed. The U.S. desire to
protect its satellites was overridden by
wanting to avoid what were considered
potentially destabilizing efforts, and what
seemed as an inevitable arms race in space.” 1
Contemporary and emerging capabilities
posed by hostile states and non-state actors
now serve as a catalyst for a reappraisal of
tools one might employ to achieve deterrence
and even defeat such threats.
Considering the complexities of the threat
environment, the strategy to assure the U.S.
and its allies have access to space capabilities
depends on four mutually supportive elements
or pillars: 2
•
•
•
•

Global Engagement.
Space Situational Awareness (SSA).
Responsive Infrastructure.
Deterrence and Defense.

Global engagement leverages long-standing
approaches to securing and protecting the
space
domain
through
recognized
international law, policy, and diplomacy. SSA
enables the monitoring of environmental
factors and prediction of threats essential to
decision-making to assure mission success.
This allows a policy-maker or commander to
differentiate between purposeful attacks and
natural environmental hazards; to anticipate
space events and clarify intentions; this, in
turn, reduces the potential for misperception
or miscalculation. SSA also enhances
opportunities to avoid disruptive or destructive
events. A robust and responsive infrastructure
1

Joan Johnson-Freese, “The Viability of U.S. Anti-Satellite
(ASAT) Policy: Moving Toward Space Control, INSS
Occasional Paper 30, U.S. Air Force Institute for National
Security Studies (INSS), January 2000, p. 1.
2
The four pillars of space assurance are more fully discussed
in James Rendleman, “Space Assurance for the 21st Century,”
High Frontier 5: 2 (February 2009): 46-53.

enables a spacefaring nation with the abilities
to present agile responses to changes and
threats in the space environment to assure
viability of systems. Deterrence strategies and
approaches are important and inhibit potential
attacks by adversaries; however, they do not
fully assure access to space. A variety of
defenses can complement deterrence by giving
tools needed to respond to human-made and
environmental threats. In sum, employing
these four pillars have in the past and will in
the future enable U.S. and friendly space
systems to continue to perform their missions
for the short and long terms.
With the possibility of space conflict and
combat, policy-makers and commanders must
balance the benefits with the risks. Decisions
to employ this conflict/combat aspect of the
fourth pillar of space assurance, deterrence
and defense, must not be taken lightly. Given
their diversity, deterring, defeating, or
eliminating human-made threats will be
difficult to achieve. This is the case even
though a myriad of combat tactics can be
employed against those who attempt to deny
access to space capabilities.
When planning to employ space defense
strategies and respond to attacks on space
systems, decision-makers must consider a
particularly important factor – the law. Some
rail against any use of force to protect access
to space, unmindful of the risk, suggesting
such actions could somehow constitute
violations of treaty, custom, domestic law,
policy, or LOAC. Granted, those who argue
against “any use of force” are in a minority,
but many do make earnest arguments for
significant limitations to space warfare. In
contrast, in the military space field only a
decade or so ago people talked about Space
Control. In fact, Space Control is still one of
the four space mission areas discussed in Joint
Publication 3-14, Space Operations (6 January
2009), and Counterspace Operations, Air
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Force Doctrine Document 2-2 (2 August
2004). Proponents have been arguing that the
U.S. should prepare for winning in a contested
space domain, a concept described as “space
dominance;” this objective has been
broadened by advocates to “full spectrum
dominance.” 3 The current 2006 U.S. National
Space Policy precepts and space control
doctrine suggest the U.S. should proactively
control the environment – to assure access by
U.S. and allied systems, defeat threats, and
deny adversaries access to their own space
capabilities if required. 4 There must be a
proper balance of all these divergent interests.
Assuming the U.S. or any other nation
believes it is compelled to use force to
respond to threats or attacks on its space
systems and/or those of its allies, the
proposition to be surveyed and examined in
this paper is: what means may a nation
lawfully employ to respond to and defeat
threats to and attacks on its space systems?
This paper will examine how relevant treaties,
customary law, LOAC, and other legal
principles substantially restrict space warfare
options, but also reduce the potential for
conflict among law-abiding spacefaring
nations. We will identify legal principles
supporting the right to defend a national or
allied space system. Following this, we will
apply these principles with a dose of
engineering and policy concerns to discuss
lawful and unlawful means and methods to
prosecute the right of self-defense and to
defeat threats to space systems.

3
Dwayne Day, “Space Policy 101,” The Space Review 15
June 2009, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1397/1
(accessed January 2010).
4
Fact Sheet on U.S. National Space Policy, National Security
Presidential Directive 49, 31 August 2006.

5

Space Capabilities and Threats
Because the complexities of space combat
pose significant legal issues, the technical,
historical, and policy taxonomies of potential
threats and attacks on space systems that could
initiate such conflict must be fully understood.
A satellite system consists not only of
spacecraft, but supporting infrastructure,
including ground stations, tracking and control
links – commonly referred to as the tracking,
telemetry, and control (TT&C) – and data
links;
launch
facilities,
supporting
infrastructures and the industrial base are also
vital. These components are all at risk to
threats of physical and cyber attack and
sabotage, and can be attacked, disrupted,
degraded, or destroyed, simultaneously or
each in detail.
Space-based threats to satellites are
proliferating as a result of the ever-growing
global availability of space technology; states
can reach out to space and “touch” satellite
payloads and their supporting buses through a
variety of kinetic and non-kinetic means; even
non-state actors could potentially access some
of these technologies and space systems and
cause problems. It takes little imagination to
envision multiple means by which a satellite
payload and/or its bus can be disrupted,
degraded, destroyed, or otherwise disabled. 5
Spacecraft are vulnerable to direct ascent
weapons as demonstrated by the Chinese
ASAT test and also to a variety of other
ground-based, airborne, and space-based
ASAT systems. These require sophisticated
boosters, launch facilities, and high-tech
terminal guidance capabilities; this is not an
easy system to generate and field without state
sponsorship. Direct-ascent launched or orbit5

Every satellite has a “payload” and a “bus.” The payload
contains all the equipment a satellite needs to perform its
mission functions. The bus supports the payload and provides
electrical power, computers, and propulsion for the entire
spacecraft.

6

James D. Rendleman/Lawful Response to Attacks on Space Systems

based nuclear devices can be detonated,
generating energetic electrons and other
particles, radiation belts, and other effects that
can fry unshielded satellite circuitry over a
wide lethal range. Space mines can be
deployed in close proximity to satellites or be
employed to generate debris clouds that
destructively engage whole classes of low
Earth orbit (LEO) satellites in the same orbital
plane or in crossing orbits, or to create
problems among satellites in geosynchronous
orbits (GEO). Ground, space-based, or
airborne lasers could wreak havoc upon
satellite components. Blinding operations
could be employed and achieve a variety of
effects from a temporary “dazzling” with a
laser to permanent burnout of optical or other
sensors with an otherwise intense energy
burst.
Vital
command
and
control
and
communications stations, and their links to
satellites and each other are also at risk. 6 At a
fundamental level, they are vulnerable to
classically accepted terrestrial land, sea, or air
kinetic attacks, including sabotage. 7 Some
unprotected stations, links, and user segments
are susceptible to electronic attack that can
degrade, neutralize, or destroy their
capabilities. These threats and attacks
encompass jamming and electromagnetic
deception techniques. Jammers disable the
means of command and control and data
communications, and in this manner render
6

Control stations track and control satellites to ensure they
remain in proper orbits and properly perform their missions.
Communications ground stations process satellite mission
data and link that data to ground-based networks and users.
TT&C links exchange commands and status information
between control ground stations and satellites. Data links
exchange mission data between communications ground
stations and satellites. These links may pass through ground
stations or satellites and relayed as appropriate.
7
Ground stations are often located in remote and hard to get to
places. Orchestrating an attack on them is feasible, though
perhaps impractical. Most sites are well protected and the
logistics needed to achieve a successful attack could be
difficult to assemble.

satellites inoperable or unavailable. A variety
of jammers emit signals that mask or prevent
reception of desired signals; these methods
can disrupt unprotected uplinks, downlinks,
and even cross-links. Electromagnetic
deception and spoofing techniques can be
employed to confuse unprepared and
unprotected systems; this could include
sending false, but deceptively plausible,
commands that cause spacecraft to perform
damaging or wasteful maneuvers, modify
databases or configuration changes, or
otherwise destroy it. Similarly, supporting
terrestrial ground stations, computer networks,
and links are vulnerable to information
operation attacks. This could involve
executing denial of service tasks, injection of
fake commands, malicious software and
viruses,
unauthorized
monitoring
and
disclosure of sensitive information (data
interception), and unauthorized modification
or deliberate corruption of network
information, services, and databases.
While achieving success would be difficult to
achieve and is unlikely, offensive information
operations can be undertaken against on-orbit
satellites seeking to effect shutdown
operations, where an adversary gains access to
a satellite’s control program and directs it to
cease functioning for some length of time.
This could be orchestrated to coincide during
the initial critical moments of a simultaneous
and parallel terrestrial attack, or involve a
permanent command to never resume
operations. While not physically damaging the
satellite, the result would be the same. It
would deprive the owner/operator of its use
precisely when the system is most needed.
Directing a permanent shutdown could cause
total loss of for any owner not able to reaccess
the platform and override the command.
Similarly, an attitude movement could be
directed by accessing the satellite’s control
program, ordering the satellite platform to
rotate on its axis, or pointing the mission
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among various parts of the Chinese
government, with the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) carrying out
the test without the knowledge of the
Chinese Foreign Ministry or other
parts of the governmnt. “Put bluntly,
Beijing’s right hand may not have
known what its left hand was doing,”
writes Bates Gill and Martin
Kleiber… “This may be a more
troubling prospect than anything the
test might have revealed about
China’s military ambitions or arms
control objectives.” 9

sensor, communications antennae, receiver,
solar cells, or any other directionallydependant system in the wrong direction. Such
an attack would be effective against a satellite
whose effectiveness depends on payload and
commucication systems pointing at precise
transponder and receiver targets, or sensors
aimed at a particular area of interest.
A translation movement attack involves
directing the activation of a satellite’s
thrusters and sending the platform into a new
orbit. This could also cause loss of the satellite
or require the system to expend vital on-orbit
resources to correct its position; the
expenditure of resources to correct the
satellite’s orbit or orientation could
significantly limit the system’s life. The
destruction of the satellite could be
accomplished by issuing damaging commands
to its control program, e.g., to mismanage
propellant temperature controls to the point of
tank or propellant line rupture.
Lastly, an appropriation or impressment attack
involves transfer of control of the satellite
system to an adversary. The satellite’s control
program is accessed and altered, denying the
launching state use of its own platform. Worse
than mere destruction, the satellite’s
capabilities are then placed at the disposal of
an attacking state. 8

Moreover, Chinese military strategist, Wang
Fa’an, has proposed the PLA set up its own
space forces in the future to protect China’s
growing space assets. 10 However, Chinese
capabilities do not pose the only concerns.
There have been attacks on space systems by
other actors and the U.S. and the global space
community have had good reason to take
notice. Given the proliferation and diversity of
other global threats, China’s ASAT test only
served to provide an important exclamation
point on the specter of space conflict. As
observed by retired Congressman Terry
Everett in his Fall 2007 article written for
Strategic Studies Quarterly:
…In the past few years, we have seen
a handful of global positioning
system (GPS) and increasing numbers
of
satellite
communications
(SATCOM) jamming incidents. In
the early stages of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, U.S. forces encountered a
GPS jamming situation. In this case,
precision munitions were used to hit
these jamming sources, which
allowed our forces to quickly resume
operations. We have seen several
SATCOM
jamming
incidents,
including Iranian jamming of a U.S.

Given these threats, the 2007 Chinese ASAT
test stoked the fires of a long-running debate
over whether and how the U.S. and its allies
should prepare for space conflict. More
terrifying:
Some have argued that the test is
evidence of a lack of communication
8

For a worthwhile overview of potential attacks on space
systems, see Thomas C. Wingfield, Legal Aspects of Offensive
Information Operations in Space, 23 March 2000, pp. 3-4
[unpublished
manuscript],
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/
awcgate/dod-io-legal/wingfield.doc (accessed January 2010).

7

9

Jeff Foust, “The Chinese ASAT enigma, The Space Review 7
May 2007, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/864/1
(accessed June 2009).
10
Peng Kuang and Cui Xiaohuo, “PLA Should Play Role in
Space: Strategist,” China Daily, 16 June 2009.

8
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satellite from Cuba in July 2003;
ongoing jamming by Iran against
PanAmSat Corporation, Asia Satellite
Telecommunications Co. Ltd., Arab
Satellite
Communications
Organization, and Eutelsat S.A. from
June 1997 to July 2005; and Libyan
jamming of two international
SATCOM systems in December
2005. Last fall it was reported that a
Chinese
ground-based
laser
illuminated
a
National
Reconnaissance Office intelligencegathering satellite. What is most
troubling is that these attacks are
coming during a period of widespread
use of GPS, satellite communications,
and space-based imagery.
…There is a spectrum of
potential threat capabilities looming
on the horizon to include electronic
jamming, low-power laser blinding,
high-energy lasers, microsatellites,
direct-ascent ASATs, cyber attacks,
physical attacks to ground stations,
and possibly even a nuclear
explosion. These threats can target
satellites
in
orbit;
their
communications links to and from the
ground; and their ground-based
command, control, and receive
stations. All produce the same general
result – they render our space
capabilities
temporarily
or
permanently useless. Many of these
anti-satellite technologies exist today,
and many are dual-use in nature,
including a microsatellite that could
be used as an experimental spacecraft
or, with a simple command, could
shadow or collide with another
satellite.
Space is no longer a sanctuary.
Those who wish to challenge
America’s role in the world
increasingly recognized the strategic
importance of space and are more
willing to deny us freedom of action
in space by employing a wide range
of methods. 11
11

Terry Everett, “Arguing for a Comprehensive Space
Protection Strategy,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Fall 2007):
23-24, citing Jim Garamone, “CENTCOM Charts Operation
Iraqi Freedom Progress,” American Forces Press Service, 25

In sum, the contemporary, emerging threats to
space systems posed by hostile states and nonstate actors are fundamentally different from
that experienced during the Cold War.
Vulnerabilities span the whole of the space
community, and these weaknesses have been
studied by adversaries to the U.S. and its
allies. These adversaries are now much more
diverse, sophisticated, and technologically
competent; they are equipped and able to
disrupt space activities. Defending space
assets demands new tools as deterring or
eliminating evolving threats will be difficult.
Securing the High Frontier of Space
U.S. law and policy place great emphasis on
diplomacy and international engagement; it is
a centuries-old practice that has secured
borders, enhanced commerce, and brokered
and resolved disputes. Assuming adversaries,
and friends, pay heed to customary and treatybased provisions of international law, the
global engagement pillar of space assurance
affords the space community a respectable
measure of confidence they can all have
assured access to space. Even so, given the
present minimal international law restrictions
on space activities, smart decision-making is
also vital to operate safely and securely. The
complete span of international legal, policy,
diplomacy, and engagement implications
should therefore be fully considered when
planning for and executing space assurance
activities. The U.S. has done this for decades;
it has applied significant experience and

March 2003; Major General William L. Shelton, commander,
14th Air Force, “Update on Space Operations,” Air Force
Association National Symposium on Space, Beverly Hills,
California, 17 November 2006; Warren Ferster and Colin
Clark, “NRO Confirms Chinese Laser Test Illuminated U.S.
Spacecraft,” Space News 2 October 2006; and Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s
Republic of China 2007, Annual Report to Congress
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2007).
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wisdom to prepare for and take care of threats
posed by ASAT and other systems for the
entirety of the Space Age.
What are the applicable foundations of
international law? First, treaties and other
bilateral agreements to which sovereign states
are signatories, and which govern issues of
interest; and second, multinational agreements
among sovereigns. International agreements
are governed, not by contract law, but by the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 12
Under the Vienna Convention, states can do
anything they want and agree to, unless what
is contemplated violates a peremptory norm
(i.e., a fundamental principle of international
law that is accepted by the international
community of states as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted). While the U.S. has
not ratified the Vienna Convention, it treats
the bulk of its rules as compelling under
customary international law, which is a third
foundation of international law. The fourth
foundation deals with general principles
common to mature legal systems. And the
fifth, deals with the subsidiary “municipal”
determinations of law (e.g., national decisions,
such as those rendered by the U.S. Supreme
Court). 13
International law is an integral part of the U.S.
legal system. Its founding fathers convened at
the
1787
Philadelphia
Constitutional
Convention to revise the unwieldy and
moribund Articles of Confederation; the
impetuses for their meeting were intractable
commercial, trade and defense issues, also
important in the international arena. The
framers knew international law existed, its
12

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May
1969.
13
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
defines its sources. See Nathaniel Burney, “International Law:
A brief primer for information purposes only,”
http://www.burneylawfirm.com/international_law_primer.htm
(accessed January 2010).

9

importance, and the document reflects this.
The Constitution, Article I § 8, Clause 10 sets
out in pertinent part: Congress has the power
“to define and punish offenses… against the
Law of Nations.” Treaties are concluded under
the authority of the Constitution, Article II §
2, Clause 2 , which declares the President
“shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make treaties,
provided that two-thirds of the Senators
present concur.” 14 Article VI, Clause 2
provides: “…all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the U.S. the
name of the U.S., shall be the supreme Law of
the Land.” 15 Generally, treaty terms take
precedence over conflicting U.S. statute
terms. 16
With relatively few treaty restrictions
governing activities in space for military or
other purposes, some might think the U.S. is
faced with a dilemma – should it only abide
by a permissive “letter of the law” standard or
the “spirit of the law”? If only the letter of the
law, what approach should it want to see
adopted by current or fledging space nations?
Actually, the choice is not between the letter
and spirit of the law; on the whole, the U.S.
abides by both standards. Decades of senior
policy-makers within the Executive and
Congressional branches of the U.S.
Government have recognized the importance
14

Under international law, the terms “treaty” and
“international agreement” are synonymous, although the
terms do have different meanings within the U.S. Department
of Defense (DOD). DOD Document 5530.3, International
Agreements, 11 June 1987, Enclosure 2, defines “international
agreement” more broadly, to include agreements between
lower levels of nations’ governments (e.g., the U.S.
Departments of Defense) that are under the umbrella of a
treaty, but have not themselves been ratified (“advice and
consent”) by the U.S. Senate.
15
Customary law is not part of the “supreme Law of the
Land” though some U.S. Supreme Court Justices are now
making some rather disconcerting noises about incorporating
portions of such law into the U.S. constitutional system.
16
The major exception to this is when Congress intends for a
later statute to override the conflicting treaty provision.
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of the domain; assessed risks associated with
not providing measured and calm global
leadership to preserve access to it; and made
decisions in accord with those assessments. 17
In turn, the U.S. encourages comparable
policy-making by other states of the global
community.
As it executes global engagement activities,
the U.S. has been and will be on the receiving
end of criticisms and exhortations that it does
not follow the spirit of the law when refusing
to accede to new agreements, standards, rules,
and practices affecting space activities. But
this refusal involves instruments whose terms
lack precision, are unverifiable, fail to
comprehensively address issues, or place the
U.S. and its allies’ defense and economic
security interests at risk. These critiques must
be expected in the rough and tumble of the
global stage, where each state jockeys for its
own national or regional advantage.
Treaties, conventions, and agreements already
in force regularize space activities despite
their minimalist nature. As such, they help
protect capabilities of systems that have been
or are about to be placed on orbit. Bilateral
and multilateral arms control treaties also
preserve some of the sanctuary aspects of
space by prohibiting “interference” with
“national technical means” (NTMs), which
can
include
missile
warning
and
reconnaissance satellites used to verify treaty
compliance. Confidence-building procedures
17

While diplomatic engagement has been helpful, there is an
element of risk in relying solely on it to assure access to space
capabilities. Enforcement mechanisms for violating treaties
and agreements relating to space are rather limited. There are
no specific enforcement mechanisms in place to address
violations of space related treaties, and this increases the risk
of depending on such documents and handshakes to protect or
assure access to space. Violations of treaties and other
agreements should nominally be responded to through
economic means and diplomatic consultation, and if
necessary, other sanctions, assuming a nation or some part of
the global community agree to them.

have been agreed to and these have improved
opportunities for transparency between
potential adversaries, perhaps improving
dialogue to prevent any dispute from
devolving or escalating into armed conflict or
to a nuclear catastrophe. Other treaties and
conventions, such as those involving the
International Telecommunications Union
(ITU) address vexing spectrum management
issues, which have profound impacts on
military, civil, and commercial space systems.
The ITU presently attempts to equitably
reconcile the explosion of information
technologies, exponential user growth and
needs, all within nature’s limited useable
bandwidth in the electromagnetic spectrum.
The Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies of 1967, or the Outer Space
Treaty (OST) as the treaty is informally
known, forms the basis for much of
international space law, including its
important legal principles and prohibitions.
Under the treaty, all nations share the global
space commons; notably, it is also an
important foundation of the entire U.S.
military, civil, and commercial space
programs. The treaty was consummated at a
time when U.S. policy-makers concluded
space offered unique benefits for the military
and political dimensions of the Cold War
national security strategy. They hoped to
fashion an agreement to preserve access to the
domain, and these motivations and the
document have endured and continue to serve
the U.S. and its allies’ national interests.
Assuming the mantel of the world’s leading
spacefaring nation, the U.S. helped lead the
way on discussions relating to the treaty’s
formation, crafting the treaty instruments, and
forging a global consensus to set a tone and
worldview that space activities should be
prosecuted for peace and the benefit of
mankind.
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As a signatory to the OST, the U.S. supports
freedom of access to space by all spacefaring
powers, agreeing to treaty language that
provides: “Outer space …shall be free for
exploration and use by all States without
discrimination of any kind…” 18 The treaty
also declares nations should have “freedom of
scientific investigation in outer space.”
Addressing topics that affect the potential for
space conflict, the OST provides that
international law applies. “…Article III [of the
OST] incorporates the application of
international law, and specifically the Charter
of the UN, in outer space, making it a vital
part of the corpus juris spatialis.” 19 This
incorporation of international law, not just the
UN Charter, is important and guiding.
Every major spacefaring nation is a signatory
to the OST. Rights and obligations of non18

See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty).
Article I – “The exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried
out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries,
irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
development, and shall be the province of all mankind. Outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be
free for exploration and use by all States without
discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in
accordance with international law, and there shall be free
access to all areas of celestial bodies. There shall be freedom
of scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and
encourage international co-operation in such investigation.”
Article III – “States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on
activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with
international law, including the Charter of the UN, in the
interest of maintaining international peace and security and
promoting international co-operation and understanding.”
Article IV – “States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to
place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction,
install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such
weapons in outer space in any other manner…”
19
P.J. Blount, “Limits on Space Weapons: Incorporating the
Law of War into the Corpus Juris Spatialis,” IAC-08-E8.3.5,
Presented to the International Institute of Space Law
Colloquium, International Astronautics Congress, Glasgow,
UK, October 2008.
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signatories can be found in international
customary law. Customary international law
“...consists of rules of law derived from the
consistent conduct of States acting out of the
belief that the law required them to act that
way.” 20 OST signatories
…the U.S. can look to both treaty
supports and customary law
sources, as customary
freedom of law may be applied
access to whether or not a state is
space by all a treaty party. The vast
spacefaring majority of the world,
powers… including the U.S.,
accepts in principle the
existence of customary
international law even though there are often
differing opinions as to what rules are
contained in it. Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
acknowledges the existence of customary
international law, and the ICJ rules are
incorporated into the UN Charter by Article
92, which sets out in pertinent part: “The
Court, whose function is to decide in
accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall
apply...international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law.” 21
Customary international law is something
done as a general practice – not because it is
expedient or convenient, but because it is
considered law, arising out of a sense of legal
requirement. According to Shabtai Rosenne,
there are three elements that must be satisfied
before one can conclude a rule is part of
customary international law. First, a rule can
be discerned by a widespread repetition by
states of similar international acts over time
(state practice); second, the acts by states
related to the rule must occur out of a sense of
20

Shabtai Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International
Law (Oceana Publications, July 1984), p. 55.
21
UN Charter, Article 92.
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legal obligation; and third, these acts must be
taken by a significant number of states and not
be rejected by a significant number of states.
A marker of customary international law is
consensus among states exhibited by
widespread conduct together with a
discernible sense of obligation. 22
Under customary international law, what is
done, written, or said can establish legal
precedent. But not always as such matters do
not usually undergo examination in a
courtroom setting. This
presents an opportunity Under
for mischief, even if customary
only in a diplomatic international
drama. This explains law, what is
why U.S. policy-makers
done, written,
feel compelled from
time-to-time to rein-in or said can
senior officers and establish
officials who speak out legal
on topics or matters precedent.
related
to
space
security, space conflict, or other important
issues before a decision has been made by the
entire U.S. national security policy
community.
Uncoordinated
speeches,
doctrine, concepts of operations, and other
instruments can have a corrosive effect on the
formation of space policy. They can,
unwittingly, establish policy and potentially
legal precedent in advance of a comprehensive
interagency consensus. While fundamental
principles of good faith and equity apply in
international law, no seemingly innocuous
comment goes unpunished. Actions and words
can have a legal, policy, and diplomatic effect
– even where no specific legal document or
other agreement memorializes them.

Three concepts apply to the formulation of
customary law – recognition, acquiescence,
and estoppel. According to Malcolm Shaw:
Recognition is a positive act by a
state accepting a particular situation,
and even though it may be implied
from all the relevant circumstances, it
is nevertheless an affirmation of the
existence of a specific factual state of
affairs even if that accepted situation
is inconsistent with the term in a
treaty. Acquiescence, on the other
hand, occurs in circumstances where
a protest is called for and does not
happen, or does not happen in time in
the circumstances. In other words, a
situation arises, which would seem to
require
a
response
denoting
disagreement, and since this does not
transpire, the state making no
objection is understood to have
accepted the new situation. The idea
of estoppel in general is that a party,
which has made or consented to a
particular statement upon which
another relies in subsequent activity
to its detriment or the other’s benefit,
cannot
thereupon
change
its
position. 23

Provocative or unintentional jamming or
dazzling incidents involving space systems
may require immediate response and even
protest, or a state may risk a determination in
customary law that it has acquiesced to the
events.
Estoppel involves a legal concept “whereby
states deemed to have consented to a state of
affairs cannot afterwards alter their
position.” 24 As an example, State Party A
states something to induce an expectation,
stating: “Party A will monitor the space
environment and warn all spacefaring nations
of potential space collision threats.” Though
23

22

Shabtai Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International
Law (Oceana Publications, July 1984).

Malcolm Nathan Shaw, International Law (Cambridge
University Press, 5th Edition, 2003), p. 437.
24
Ibid., p. 439.
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no specific agreement is made with Party A
for the provision of such services, State Party
B justifiably believes Party A’s statements
that Party A will employ its SSA capabilities
as stated. Party B refrains from securing such
tools, and relies on Party A in operating its
space systems. Assuming a Party B satellite is
damaged by a collision to which Party A had
the sufficient resources and specific
information to warn of the problem, then the
doctrine of estoppel could offer Party B some
possible legal or diplomatic recourse.
The classic example of actions having legal
effect or precedent in the space context is the
launch of the Sputnik satellite system over a
half-century ago. This launch established the
legal precedence and customary international
law for free passage of space systems and
over-flight rights while on-orbit. Some
suggest that President Dwight Eisenhower
directed a slowing of pending U.S. space
launch activities so the Soviets could
successfully launch first, allowing their
actions to establish customary over-flight
rights. According to Nancy Gallagher and
John D. Steinbruner:
A 1950 RAND report that has been
called “the birth certificate of
American space policy” underscored
the practical importance of legal
justification. The report emphasized
the “vital necessity” of improved
intelligence about the closed Soviet
Union, but cautioned that because the
existence of spy satellites could not
and should not be kept secret for
long, creating a favorable context in
which to use the new technology
would be just as important as
developing the capability itself. The
authors
recognized
that
reconnaissance satellites would pose
a dilemma for Soviet leaders, who
would see the loss of secrecy as a
major violation of sovereignty and a
quasi-permanent threat to security.
But U.S. satellites would be too high
to shoot down, at least initially, so

Soviet response options would be
limited to legal and diplomatic
protests, attacks on ground stations,
or total war. If the U.S. paid careful
attention
to
political
and
psychological issues associated with
space technology, the RAND report
argued, it could constrain the Soviet
counter
reaction,
strengthen
deterrence,
reduce
Politburo
resistance to international inspections
of atomic installations, and possibly
elicit a radical reorientation of Soviet
behavior along more cooperative
lines.
To establish a favorable political
context and set a precedent that could
be used to legitimize future
reconnaissance
satellites,
the
Eisenhower administration decided to
start by launching a scientific satellite
even though military alternatives
would have been ready sooner. The
launch
coincided
with
the
International Geophysical Year, and
the satellite, launched using a
modified research rocket, was placed
in an orbit that would not traverse the
Soviet Union. The U.S. decision to
wait until it could launch a scientific
satellite allowed the USSR to create a
public sensation by being the first
country to launch a man-made
satellite, but one of Eisenhower’s
military advisors remarked that the
Soviets “had done us a good turn,
unintentionally, in establishing the
concept of freedom of international
space.” That judgment reflected an
appreciation that space could not be
physically controlled by military
force in the manner that territory on
Earth or the airspace over it is
controlled.
Some accommodation in space for
mutual benefit would be necessary
even in the context of global
confrontation. Khrushchev appeared
to have recognized this logic, as well.
After the Soviets shot down an
American U-2 reconnaissance plane
in May 1960, Charles de Gaulle
asked about cameras in the Sputnik
orbiting over France, and Khrushchev
said that he objected to airplane
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overflights,
not
surveillance. 25

satellite-based

The Eisenhower Administration’s objective to
obtain universal acceptance of the concept of
satellite free passage and overflight rights was
more fully achieved years later when these
customary law principles were included in the
OST. In the meantime, statements of such
principles were presented and discussed
within various global community and UN
forums, and can be found in a number of
disparate documents including the 1958
National Aeronautics and Space Act, and UN
General Assembly resolutions.
Free passage and overflight rights continue to
be matters that warrant interest. This is an
important issue as air space is subject to
sovereignty rules; in contrast, signatories to
the OST make no such claims on outer space.
If violated, this may justify self-defense or
reprisal responses by objecting states,
especially with regard to spacecraft and
related equipment transiting what would
traditionally be considered air space during
spacelift or de-orbit mission phases. Current
international community treaty and customary
law treatments of free passage and overflight
rights have been pushed to the limits by the
rogue North Korea bogeyman. North Korea
arguably exploits the rules to facilitate and
prosecute provocative ballistic missile
25

Nancy Gallagher and John D. Steinbruner, Reconsidering
the Rules for Space Security, American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, Reconsidering the Rules of Space Project,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2008, pp. 7-8. The adviser was
Donald Quarles, Eisenhower’s assistant secretary of defense
for research and development. See A. J. Goodpaster,
“Memorandum of Conference with the President,” 8 October
1957, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. Also, see
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (Doubleday, 1965), p.
556; and George B. Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White
House (Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 334. “In other
settings, the Soviets did not initially distinguish between
satellite and aerial overflights and denounced both as an
illegal infringement on national sovereignty.” See Gerald
Steinberg, Satellite Reconnaissance: The Role of Informal
Bargaining (Praeger, 1983), pp. 26–29.

development activities. It has launched longrange ballistic missiles over the Japanese
Islands, but claims its launches are part of
developing a new satellite system. The North
Korean April 2009 launch has contributed to
the controversy.
North Korea claims that the mission
was a peaceful attempt to launch a
communications satellite into orbit,
but the image suggests otherwise,
according to Geoffrey Forden, a
physicist and arms-control analyst at
the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. Forden triangulated the
trajectory of the rocket using the
contrail in the image, the position of
the satellite taking the picture, and
North Korea’s declared ’splashdown
zones’ for the first and second stages.
Based on his analysis, the TD-2’s
[Taepodong 2] course appears to be
too shallow to be a space launch. To
reach orbit, Forden says, the rocket
should have been travelling almost
vertically in an attempt to gain
altitude early on in its flight. Instead,
it appears to be pitching horizontally,
sacrificing height for distance in a
trajectory that would allow it to sling
a warhead as far as possible. Such a
trajectory could be consistent with
that of an intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM). 26

Presenting a threat to peace, the North Korean
ballistic missile and nuclear proliferation
activities have been deemed violations of UN
Security Council Resolution 1718, which
demands the country not conduct new nuclear
tests nor launch a ballistic missile. 27
Nevertheless, North Korea, who only recently
acceded to the OST on 3 May 2009, insists its
April 2009 rocket launch is part of an effort to
26

Geoff Brumfiel, “Analysts spar over launch image”,
Naturenews 8 April 2009.
27
Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, “Satellite spots activity at North
Korean missile site, officials say,” Res Communis 29 March
2009, http://rescommunis.wordpress.com (accessed March
2009).
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put a satellite in orbit; it argues this activity
falls under the treaty’s allowances that outer
space “shall be free for exploration and use by
all states without discrimination of any
kind.” 28 The argument has gained traction in
parts of the global community. China has
refused to condemn the launches asserting
North Korea has the right to peaceful use of
space. 29 Even Japan agrees North Korea has a
right to a space program, “but only after it
denuclearized and no longer posed a threat.” 30
“The Korean communist regime has been
careful to follow the spirit of the treaty,
keeping the world appraised of its plans,
unlike its unannounced missile launches in
1998 and 2006.” 31 In asserting its rights to
launch a satellite, North Korea notified the
International Civil Aviation Organization and
International Maritime Organization that it
intended to launch an “experimental
communication satellite.” 32 It also made a
notification of the launch in accord with the
Registration Convention. 33 Despite these
efforts, and underscoring the potential for an
underlying deception, North Korea did not

28

Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, “North Korea launch a test for
international law”, Res Communis 2 April 2009,
http://rescommunis.wordpress.com (accessed April 2009).
29
“China says North Korea has right to peaceful use of
space,” The China Post 8 April 2009.
30
“Japan Says North Korea Space Program OK after
Denuclearization,”
Space
War
7
April
2009,
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Japan_Says_NKorea_Spac
e_Program_OK_After_Denuclearisation_999.html (accessed
April 2009).
31
Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, “North Korea launch a test for
international law” Res Communis 2 April 2009,
http://rescommunis.wordpress.com (accessed April 2009).
32
Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, “North Koreans have notified
several UN agencies that they plan on launching”, Res
Communis
12
March
2009,
http://rescommunis.
wordpress.com, quoting, Robert Wood, U.S. Department of
State, Daily Press Briefing – March 12 (accessed March
2009).
33
Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, “North Korea Accedes to
Registration Convention”, Res Communis 11 March 2009,
http://rescommunis.wordpress.com (accessed March 2009).
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follow all necessary international procedures
for launching a satellite:
The Radio Regulations of the
International
Telecommunication
Union (ITU), to which North Korea
also belongs, stipulates that the
launch of a communications satellite
needs to be announced in advance.
The regulations also require member
states to give prior notice of a
satellite’s operating frequency, its
orbital location and other information
to the ITU two to seven years before
a satellite goes into use. However,
North Korea did not give such prior
notice to the ITU, the sources said. 34

The North Koreans protest that they are only
engaged in peaceful space activities. Yet they
make bellicose threats of dire consequences
for any one attempting to interfere with them
or other state activities. These mixed signals
complicate planning for potential missile
defense intercepts of these launched systems,
since the U.S., its allies, and most nations
subscribe to the free passage rules for space.
The U.S. does not want to be seen as denying
that right even if the complaining nation is
involved in a ruse.
Beside the North Korean launches, other
proposals related to free passage remain in
controversy, and could also be sources of
conflict involving space systems. For
example, some argue for a new legal
definition for the demarcation between a
country’s air space (Earth’s atmosphere) and
outer space. The U.S. does not officially
accept a specific “boundary;” instead, it
employs a functional approach to assert spacerelated free passage and transit rights.
Unfortunately, if boundaries for the definition
of space are strictly defined sometime in the
34
Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, “North Korea ‘ignored satellite
procedures’”,
Res
Communis
8
April
2009,
http://rescommunis.wordpress.com,
citing
The
Daily
Yomiyuri (accessed April 2009).
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future by action of treaty or through
customary international law development, this
could dangerously affect necessary spacerelated rights. The development of customary
law on the subject of free passage and transit
rights has been described by Isabella
Diederiks-Verschoor:
Some seem to accept silent
acquiescence as sufficient ground for
the existence of a rule of custom,
others feel that explicit recognition is
an essential requirement… Clearly,
the crux of the matter centers around
the element of ‘recognition’ as
evidence of acceptance of a specific
practice, and the form such
recognition can take.
…Van Bogaert considers it an
essential necessity that states show
‘by diplomatic intercourse’ that they
recognize a certain norm as legally
binding. Custom inevitably implies a
certain period of time, but Van
Bogaert feels that there is no need for
a practice to be long-lasting, provided
recognition is properly signaled. He
also notes that it might be logical to
consider approval by the UN General
Assembly as an expression of such
recognition.
As regard to the time factor, Judge
Lachs of the International Court of
Justice agrees that that a short period
of time is not in itself a bar to the
formation of a new rule of customary
law. He suggests that a kind of ‘right
of innocent passage’ has evolved on
the basis of reciprocity, pointing out
that on a number of occasions states
engaged in space activities, which did
not inform other states of their plans
to launch space objects or ask
permission to pass through the
airspace of other states, did not meet
objections from the states concerned,
nor did those states reserve for
themselves the right to object to such
flights.
The debate on this matter has
hitherto remained entirely academic:
both the USA and the former USSR,
responsible as they are for most space
object launchings, have always been

careful to carry them out from their
own territories, and no protests have
ever been recorded in respect of any
launchings, wherever they took place.
However, as Wassenbergh observes,
‘There is not a right of instant
customary international law that
space objects can “freely” transit
through foreign airspace. The fact
that in practice so far no objections
have been raised against foreign
space objects transiting a State’s
airspace is no reason to refer to a
customary right of transit, as too few
States are considered to be confronted
with such transit (and none have
been), and no opinion juris with
respect to such practice has been
pronounced as yet.
Even if a right of transit for space
objects through the airspace of
foreign countries is universally
agreed upon it will always have to be
subject to guarantees of safety and
security.
All this leads you to conclude that
customary law is already playing a
significant role in space law, and that
states have evidently found it
necessary, if not expedient, to abide
by its rules. 35

Some proponents argue space should be
defined as beginning at 100 kilometers (km)
above sea level. This is known as the Kármán
Line, calculated by and named for Theodore
von Kármán. This demarcation has been
accepted by the Fédération Aéronautique
Internationale (FAI). 36 However, if adopted by
action of treaty or customary law, returns of
U.S. and allied spacecraft could be threatened.
The threat would not be limited to just purely
military systems, as civil and commercial
systems would be put at risk. The Soviet
35

See Isabella Henrietta Philepina Diederiks-Verschoor, An
Introduction to Space Law (Kluwer Law International, 1999),
pp. 11-12.
36
See “The 100 km Boundary for Astronautics,” Fédération
Aéronautique Internationale Press Release, 24 June 2004,
http://www.fai.org/press_releases/2004/documents/1204_100
km_astronautics.doc (accessed June 2009).
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Union reserved the right to shoot or bring
down aircraft in its airspace, and did so with
alarming and tragic deadly effect for Korean
Air Lines 007 during the early 1980s, and with
other highly publicized commercial aircraft
incidents. Given the risks, the U.S. and its
allies might be forced to employ deterrence
strategies and/or prepare for conflict if a state
wanting adoption of the Kármán Line also
threatens spacecraft that cross below it above
their territory. Given these complications, the
U.S. has not agreed to the definition.
Another important legal concept, the
peremptory norm (also called jus cogens,
Latin for “compelling law”), affects state and
non-state actor obligations with regard to
space conflict. The concept is related to, but
differs, from customary law. The peremptory
norm is a principle of law from which no
violation is permitted, even by treaty. “Unlike
ordinary customary law that has traditionally
required consent and allows the alteration of
its obligations between states through treaties,
peremptory norms cannot be violated by any
state.” 37 Under the Vienna Convention, any
treaty that conflicts with a peremptory norm is
void. 38 New peremptory norms can develop
under the Convention, 39 but the document
does not itself specify any specific norms or
how they are developed or created.
Peremptory norms have not been fully
itemized, but they include injunctions against
waging aggressive war, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, maritime piracy,
genocide, apartheid, slavery, and torture.
37

U.S. Legal Definitions, “Peremptory Law & Legal
Definition,”
http://definitions.uslegal.com/p/peremptory
(accessed January 2010).
38
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 53.
39
“Emergence of a new peremptory norm of general
international law (jus cogens): If a new peremptory norm of
general international law emerges, any existing treaty which
is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.”
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 64.
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These norms have arisen out of case law and
changing political policy-making attitudes,
and can be found where there is a clear
international disapproval of specific practices
or acts.
There is some disagreement over how
peremptory norms should be acknowledged
and put into force. The relatively new concept
conflicts with the traditional consensual nature
of treaty and customary international law that
ensures state sovereignty. According to Rafael
Nieto-Navia, there are three pre-requisites
(some a bit tautological in nature) for a norm
to be “elevated” to the status of a norm of jus
cogens. 40 First, the peremptory norm must be
a norm of general international law. General
international law is international law binding
on most, if not all, states; however, not all
facets of general international law have the
character of jus cogens. The rules do not exist
“to satisfy the need of the individual states,
but the higher interest of the whole
international community…” 41 This need can
be seen in rules created to achieve
humanitarian purposes.
Second, the norm must be “accepted and
recognized by the international community of
States as a whole.” 42 Accepting and
recognizing a norm within the international
community can be either express or implied.
Ascertaining the minimum breadth necessary
for acceptance is subject to debate; the
international community tries to avoid
situations whereby one or a few rogue states
can effectively negate any decision to
designate a norm as peremptory. Thus, a norm
can be considered as jus cogens if it is
accepted and recognized by the international
40

Rafael Nieto-Navia, “International Peremptory Norms (Jus
Cogens) and International Humanitarian Law,” 2003,
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/WritingColombiaEng.pdf,
(accessed June 2009), p. 10.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
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community of States as a whole; consent of all
states is not required (similar in the way in
which principles of general customary
international law are formed). In this way,
norms of jus cogens can be drawn from the
traditional sources of international law –
treaties, international custom, and the like. 43
It is a well-accepted principle that treaties do
not bind non-parties without their consent.
Nieto-Navia contends that exceptions to this
principle are those conventions or treaties
whose objects and purposes render them more
important. Ultimately,
if provisions of treaties Without
or conventions satisfy question,
the more important international
criteria to be recognized law
as jus cogens, states not
party to them will also undergoes
be bound by their continuous
provisions. Of course, a change and
large
portion
of is constantly
international
law evolving.
remains customary in
nature and treaties often only codify the
existing customary law rules, and do not
establish peremptory norms. 44
As a third prerequisite, the norm must be one
from which no derogation is permitted. It can
be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law of the same
character. This “is in fact the main identifying
feature and “essence” of a norm of jus
cogens.” 45
Nieto-Navia suggests it is possible to classify
norms that are not subject to derogation by
treaties or otherwise. These are: norms that
have a fundamental bearing on the behavior of
the international community of states as a
43

Ibid., pp. 10-11.
Ibid., p. 11.
45
Ibid., p. 12.

whole and from which no derogation is
permitted at all; norms which are necessary
for the stability of the international juridical
order; norms having humanitarian objects and
purposes including certain principles of
human rights and international humanitarian
law; norms of general interest to the
international community as a whole or to
international public order; and norms, which
are binding on all new states even without
their consent as being established rules of the
international community. 46
Without question, international law undergoes
continuous change and is constantly evolving.
This means new norms of jus cogens should at
least in theory continue to develop with
respect to the law of space systems, their
operations, and space warfare. Examples of
acts being contrary to the norms of jus cogens
would appear to include interfering with some
important space systems, especially those
presenting NTM, missile warning, emergency
communications, and even PNT capabilities.
Space-borne NTMs serve an important role:
assuring adversaries that they have complied
with arms control treaty terms; providing
transparency, enhancing confidence in actions
of others, and diffusing tensions; and helping
stem the potential of a nuclear holocaust,
which would produce a catastrophe whose
damaging effects would be global in nature.
Reserving access to such NTM systems by
antagonists would therefore appear to be a
peremptory norm; hence, this would proscribe
any attacks on such systems to destroy,
disable, or otherwise interfere with them.
Proscribing such attacks would satisfy the
higher needs and general interest of the whole
international community.
Interestingly, the term “National Technical
Means” (NTMs) was not specifically defined

44
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and detailed in the original Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty, nor in subsequent arms
control treaties. Some argue this could lead to
a finding that if satellite systems were not
specified and described fully in the treaty they
should somehow not warrant the treaty’s
protection. 47 While not specific, the “NTM”
term references the variety of land, air, sea,
and space technologies and systems that can
be used to monitor and verify treaty
compliance. If the treaty’s language could be
interpreted to disallow classifying of any
system as an NTM, even a space system, then
the provision barring interference would
appear to have no meaning or effect. Nothing
in the record supports such a result as the
intent of the signatories. The Vienna
Convention holds that treaties are to be
interpreted “in good faith” 48 and “ordinary
meaning given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.” 49 Consent may be implied if the
other parties fail to explicitly disavow an
initial unilateral interpretation, particularly if
that state has acted upon its view of the treaty
without complaint. For the purposes of this
discussion, satellite systems can be employed
to monitor treaty compliance and thus can be
classified as NTMs.

47
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Indeed, this point was raised in a formerly
classified document, where the late Secretary
of Defense Melvin R. Laird argued the U.S.
should acknowledge:
…the fact that national technical
means of verification for the U.S. and
the USSR include satellite based
reconnaissance. We should further
state that all our legitimate national
technical means, including satellite
based reconnaissance, taken together,
give us confidence that we can verify
compliance with the provisions of
these agreements within satisfactory
limits… the fact of U.S. satellite
reconnaissance is widely known. I
believe that acknowledging this fact
in connection with the strategic arms
limitation agreements has the
important advantage of muting
possible adverse reaction… 50

The Russian and the U.S. positions on limiting
interference with NTMs have been set out in
treaty and agreement. China, Canada, the
United Kingdom, France, and other significant
spacefaring
powers
have
made
pronouncements condemning interference
with such systems, and supporting the
transparency efforts. A norm that favors
protection of spaceborne NTMs should be
supported at least by global spacefaring
nations, if not the international community of
states as a whole; no overarching alternate
norm, stripping these protections, has been
proposed.
Similar arguments can be made with regard to
spaceborne missile warning and emergency
communication capabilities that these should
not be attacked or interfered with. These
systems would help adversaries to understand,
50

See Melvin R. Laird, “Memorandum for Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, Subject: Revelation of
the Fact of Satellite Reconnaissance in Connection with the
Submission of Arms Limitation Agreements to Congress,” 8
June
1972,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB231/doc02.pdf (accessed January 2010).
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manage, and limit the extent of damage
associated with exchanges of weapons of mass
destruction, all to the benefit of the global
community. Arguments that peremptory
norms proscribe attacks on space-based PNT
capabilities could also be made. Proponents
for this position would be bolstered by
demonstrating the dimensions of the effects
and global chaos that could occur in the
commercial and civil communities as a result
of the destruction of these capabilities. While
these arguments are less compelling from ones
tied to preventing conflict with weapons of
mass destruction, they could be made just the
same and, perhaps, accepted.
No matter their importance, it would seem
NTMs and/or other systems would warrant
less protection if their mission payloads
become blended with other more active, nonprotected
warfighting
functions
(e.g.,
supporting integrated fire control and targeting
functions for missile defense, or deploying
spacecraft platforms or collocating command
and control stations that involve a myriad of
payloads, not just protected missions and
payloads, but other militarily important
payloads). If a peremptory norm applies, this
could complicate national security space
system acquisition and operational strategies,
limiting how systems could be configured, in
order to preserve any jus cogens protection
rights. Since NTMs and other systems are
usually employed to support a wide variety of
warfighting missions, this reality could
swallow whole the concept of a peremptory
norm protecting them, unless their mission
attributes and operations are carefully
restricted. Protections for such blended
systems would need to be found elsewhere in
treaty or customary law.
Peter Hays spotted this problem when he
posed the following questions and suggested
the ABM Treaty might not provide protected
status to some spy satellite activities:

How are the parties to judge whether
space-based NTM are engaged in
legitimate
treaty
compliance
verification or in general espionage
and how much noninterference
should they be given in either case?
An ASAT attack on space-based
NTM attempting to verify compliance
with the treaty would surely
constitute “interference,” but how
about lesser levels of nondestructive
interference such as laser “dazzling?”
What about interference that takes
place in portions of the orbit that do
not pass over the territory of the
treaty signatories? Based on these
questions and despite the NTM
protection these provisions were often
alleged to provide in the heyday of
détente, the provisions in the ABMT
[ABM Treaty] should not be seen as
constituting an ASAT prohibition or
as granting a strong and specific level
of legal protection for NTM at all
times. Even more importantly, the
amount of “protection” this language
provides for all other civil,
commercial, and military space
systems – including commercial
remote sensing systems that might or
might not be performing NTM
missions – would seem to be even
more tenuous. 51

Treaties and Customary Law
Article III of the OST declares that states
parties must conduct their space activities “in
the interest of maintaining international peace
and security.” The treaty’s preamble also
recognizes “the common interest of all
mankind in the progress of exploration and
use of outer space for peaceful purposes.” 52
51
Peter L. Hays, “U.S. Military Space: Into the Twenty-First
Century,” INSS Occasional Paper 42 (U.S. Air Force Institute
for National Security Studies (INSS) Air University Press,
2002), pp. 58-59.
52
Article IV places the “peaceful purposes” restriction on the
Moon and other bodies; it suggests that States may engage in
non-peaceful activity in space as long as it does not occur on a
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Though crafted before the space era, a careful
reading of the UN Charter shows its terms are
fully consistent with and encourage peaceful
space activities. The first purpose of the UN is
to “maintain international peace and security,
and to that end: to take effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace, and for the suppression of
acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means,
and in conformity with the principles of
justice and international law, adjustment or
settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace.” 53
The UN and its 1945 Charter arose out of the
ashes of the League of Nations and failures of
the international community that led to World
War II. Despite its inadequacies, the League
helped establish the groundbreaking KelloggBriand Pact of 1928, also known as the Pact
of Paris – this treaty is continues in force
today. In Kellogg-Briand, the signatories
condemned recourse to war as a solution to
international controversies, and renounced it
as an instrument of national policy in their
relations among each other. It proscribed the
threat and use of force in contravention of
international law, and territorial acquisitions
resulting from such actions. 54
The UN Charter’s language expands on the
terms set out in Kellogg-Briand Pact. Article
2(3) provides: “All members shall settle their
international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and

celestial body. Indeed, some argue this is how the U.S.
officially interprets this article.
53
UN Charter, Article 1(1).
54
The Pact was concluded outside the League of Nations and
remains a binding treaty. Importantly, the Kellogg-Briand
Pact was used as a foundation for the post World War II
prosecutions at Nuremburg.
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security, and justice, are not endangered.” 55
Article 2(4) of the Charter presents another
significant rule: “States shall refrain from the
threat of or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any
state. 56 The phrase “international peace and
security” contained in Article 2(3) is echoed in
the later agreed-to OST. The repetition of the
words “international peace and security” in
the OST links “peaceful purposes” back to
norms of “peaceful means” enunciated in the
UN Charter. 57
Some believe that under the UN Charter, war
was outlawed. 58 While not entirely correct, the
Charter firmly establishes the general
principle that armed conflict is neither proper
nor inevitable, irrespective of the political
purposes or merits. This new view replaced
the ancient Augustinian “just war”
formulation. 59 Still, despite its imperative for
preserving international peace and security,
the Charter does not ban all use of force. The
document outlaws the aggressive use of force,
and the aggressive use of force has become an
international crime. 60
“Acts of aggression” are not defined within
the Charter. Indeed, the definition for “act of
aggression” has been debated over the
decades. Some argue the term was left
undefined on purpose, that if a list of acts
were specifically set out as “aggression.” then
anything not making the list might not count;
55

UN Charter, Article 2(3).
UN Charter, Article 2(4).
57
J.P. Blount, “Limits on Space Weapons: Incorporating the
Law of War into the Corpus Juris Spatialis,” IAC-08-E8.3.5,
Presented to the International Institute of Space Law
Colloquium, International Astronautics Congress, Glasgow,
UK, October 2008, p.3.
58
Oscar Schachter, “The Right of States to Use Armed
Force,” Michigan Law Review 1620 (1984).
59
Saint Augustine believes that a war was just when it was
waged in order to redress a wrong or unjust enrichment.
60
See UN Charter 1(1), and, generally, Antonio Cassesse,
International Criminal Law (2003), pp. 110-125.
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the signatories did not want to leave an
opening for unseemly argument by
aggressors. 61 Even so, insight into the term’s
meaning can be found in UN General
Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974). 62 “This
resolution defines aggression as ‘the use of
force by a State against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence
of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the UN.’
Since one of the UN Charter’s purposes is to
maintain international peace and security,
States may not use force in a way that disturbs
international peace and security.” 63
Given the over-half century of rule-making
and statecraft just discussed, P.J. Blount
argues the OST’s principles of peaceful
purposes for outer space can now be found in
international customary law. According to
Blount:
The principle of the peaceful uses of
outer space can be found throughout
the literature on space law; however,
the Outer Space Treaty only uses the
term “peaceful purposes” to refer to
outer space in the preamble of the
treaty. It is used in the body of the
treaty to refer to the Moon and other
celestial bodies, but not to outer space
in general. There is, however, strong
support for the term applying to outer
space via customary international law
from the term’s use in the preambles
to both the Declaration of Legal
Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space and in the Outer Space
Treaty to its use in laws, policies, and
61

“Indirect aggression,” however, has not found favor as an
“act of aggression.”
62
See Definition of Aggression, UN General Assembly
Resolution 3314, UN GAOR, 29th Session, Supplement No.
31, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974).
63
P.J. Blount, “Limits on Space Weapons: Incorporating the
Law of War into the Corpus Juris Spatialis,” IAC-08-E8.3.5,
Presented to the International Institute of Space Law
Colloquium, International Astronautics Congress, Glasgow,
UK, October 2008.

official statements of numerous States
dealing with their respective space
programs. 64

While the principle of “peaceful purposes” has
most likely entered customary international
law and now applies to space activities, the
meaning of that term is even now a bit
uncertain – uncertain in part because the
phrase is undefined and because nations apply
it in different ways. 65 Some argue the phrase
means any military use of space violates the
treaty. 66 This is a decided minority view.
Though there are limits, the alternate U.S.
view is military space activities are presumed
to be allowed unless specifically prohibited by
law. Naturally, the permissive U.S. position
generates consternation within peace elements
of the international community, who argue the
U.S. seeks to preserve its hegemony in and
dominance of the space domain. Nevertheless,
the U.S. view is compelling, convincing, and
clarifying – longstanding customary practice
and law permits military use of space. As
noted by Adam Frey:
Military use of space in support of
operations – such as communications,
intelligence gathering, and precision
targeting – is commonly considered
peaceful if it does not violate other
international law. In other words,
space operations are considered
peaceful, provided they are not
“aggressive.” Space may still be used
as a medium of warfare: the treaty
does not prohibit anti-satellite
(ASAT) weapons or even nuclear
weapons that merely transit space.
Other weapons may be deployed in
64

Ibid., p. 2.
Ibid., p. 2.
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Adam E. Frey, “Defense of U.S. Space Assets: A Legal
Perspective,” Air & Space Power Journal (Winter 2008),
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicales/apj/apj08/
win08/frey.html (accessed June 2009). Also, see Joan
Johnson-Freese, “The Viability of U.S. Anti-Satellite (ASAT)
Policy: Moving Toward Space Control,” INSS Occasional
Paper 30 (U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security
Studies (INSS), January 2000), p. 10.
65
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space so long as they are neither
nuclear weapons nor weapons of
mass destruction. Furthermore, selfdefensive acts in space are also
permissible, provided they do not
violate other treaty restrictions. 67

As touched on above, the “U.S. employs a
permissive interpretation of the OST and the
other rules regulating military activities in
space.” 68 The traditional U.S. interpretation,
shared by most other spacefaring countries, is
“nonaggressive” military support activities are
not inconsistent with the peaceful-use
principle. 69 But what are “aggressive acts” in
space? How should they be defined? Should
such acts be defined and limited to effects
produced on just spacecraft, or should effects
to the entirety of space systems be considered
(e.g., spacecraft, their constellations, links,
footprints for sensor and communications
activity, ground control stations, or even
sustainment and acquisition activities)? Some
suggest the definition of “aggressive acts”
should encompass actions, such as the use of
force from space or in space when not
consistent with exceptions found within the
UN Charter. Others argue the “peaceful
purposes” clause should be interpreted to
mean states cannot use outer space for fullscale warfare, particularly nuclear war. 70
Those who continue to argue any military use
of space violates peaceful use principles
ignore
reality
of
the
long-standing

67

Ibid.
Nancy Gallagher and John D. Steinbruner, Reconsidering
the Rules for Space Security, American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, Reconsidering the Rules of Space Project,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2008, p. 42.
69
Ivan Vlasic, “The Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Nonpeaceful Uses of Outer Space,” in Peaceful and Non-peaceful
Uses of Space, Bhupendra Jasani, ed., (Taylor and Francis,
1991), pp. 37–55.
70
Christopher M. Petras, “Space Force Alpha: Military Use of
the International Space Station and the Concept of ‘Peaceful
Purposes,’” Air Force Law Review 53 (2002): 157-61.
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militarization of space by the global powers. 71
The intent of the OST’s framers and an
interpretation of its terms allowing military
activities in space can readily be ascertained
by looking to the practices of major
spacefaring powers. They continue to use
space for military purposes following
endorsement of the OST.
When U.S defense officials’ writings mention
the OST, they typically insist U.S. policy and
military uses of space not explicitly prohibited
in Article IV (i.e., no weapons of mass
destruction in orbit and military activities on
celestial bodies) are permitted. 72 Some suggest
this posture ignores Article III’s declaration
that space activities must be performed in
accord with international law, including the
UN Charter’s rules about the threat or use of
force. 73 Nonetheless, and consistent with its
views, the U.S. has steadily expanded the
scope of its “peaceful” non-aggressive
71

According to Thomas C. Wingfield, “Legal Aspects of
Offensive Information Operations in Space,” 23 March 2000,
p. 6, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod-io-legal/
wingfield.doc (accessed January 2010): “Nowhere in the
Outer Space Treaty is the term [“Peaceful purposes”] defined,
and two opposing views have developed. The majority
opinion, certainly among spacefaring nations, is that
“peaceful” means “nonaggressive,” a relatively high standard
allowing for considerable military operations in space. The
minority view, more common among the less advanced, nonspacefaring nations, is that “peaceful” means “nonmilitary,”
setting such a low threshold that even routine, peacetime
military business, such as communications and weather
observation, would be prohibited.”
72
Interestingly, during hearings on the ratification of the Outer
Space Treaty, it was noted that “Secretary of State Dean Rusk
asserted that while the U.S. was confident in its ability to
adequately verify the OST prohibition on nuclear weapons
and weapons of mass destruction, that ‘the treaty does not
inhibit, of course, the development of an anti-satellite
capability in the event that should become necessary.” See
Peter L. Hays, “U.S. Military Space: Into the Twenty-First
Century,” INSS Occasional Paper 42 (U.S. Air Force Institute
for National Security Studies (INSS), Air University Press,
2002), p. 70.
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Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2008.
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military space activities, often for the
betterment of the global community and
benefiting potential adversaries. GPS (Global
Positioning System) PNT, SSA, missile
warning, and communication services
operated by U.S. military systems have been
used and exploited by global military, civil,
and commercial communities.
A tacit acceptance of the U.S. behavior has
emerged; indeed, all of the major spacefaring
nations have expanded their military activities
in space. Also, performing military activities
in space may have inherently humane ends,
even in support of destructive or deadly
military operations. Elizabeth Waldrop
correctly notes LOAC principles of
discrimination and proportionality are
enhanced by the use of space assets “to
successfully carry out near-surgical strike with
minimum civilian casualties.” 74 In the end,
however, the “various unopposed military
uses of space may as a practical matter enlarge
the unofficial definition of ‘peaceful purposes’
to the point that specific arms control
agreements may be the only effective
limitation on development and deployment of
various weapons in space.” 75
Space Warfare
Despite the histrionics of the peace and
disarmament community, the conduct of
military space activities is an accepted
practice and consistent with the OST and other
agreements. Plainly, the OST, conventions,
and international agreements do not foreclose
space warfare or preparation for such conflict.
There are caveats to this point, however. The
OST expressly limits placement of nuclear
weapons and weapons of mass destruction on
74

Elizabeth Waldrop, “Weaponization of Outer Space: U.S.
National Policy,” High Frontier (Winter 2005): 40–41.
75
Ibid., 36–37.

orbit, and restricts such weapons and military
bases on celestial objects. In parallel, the
Limited Test Ban Treaty restricts nuclear
explosions in space. 76 Even so, the UN
Charter and OST do “not prohibit States from
placing weapons of a defensive nature in
space (unless some further meaning can be
attributed to the term peaceful purposes) or
from placing weapons required by order of the
UN Security Council in order to maintain
international peace and security. Probably the
difference between an aggressive weapon and
a defensive weapon can almost always be
found in its use.” 77 Or, the difference can be
found in the politics or diplomacy of its use.
What is a “space weapon?” The devil is in the
details, especially given the variety of ways
we discussed above in which space systems
can be attacked and degraded. Should the
definition of space weapon include systems or
combat operations that attack terrestrial
components of space systems, or jam or
interfere with system command and control?
Should it encompass seemingly innocuous
civil satellites or microsatellites that can be
vectored to kinetically engage adversary
systems; or systems left dead in orbits,
without executing end-of-life super-sync or
other operations to reduce chances of
collisions with other satellites. Perhaps, the
definition of “space weapon” should be broad:
an instrument or instrumentality of attack or
defense used to fight space systems or from
the space domain.
76
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty restricts military
activity and prohibits placing “nuclear weapons or any other
kinds of weapons of mass destruction” into orbit or
permanently affixing them to a celestial body. Also, the Moon
and other celestial bodies may be used only for “peaceful
purposes,” and they cannot be used for military bases or
weapons testing.
77
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Presented to the International Institute of Space Law
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built with destructive intent to be
used in a terrestrial-to-space, spaceto-space,
or
space-to-terrestrial
capacity”
…I
recognize
that
alternatives exist, usually depending
on which side of the debate the
definer sits. Contention focuses on
whether
ground-based
weapons
should
be
included…
Some
definitions include as a space weapon
a defensive interceptor such as
THAAD or Aegis SM-3 when the
planned interception is OUTSIDE the
atmosphere, but exclude the use of
Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD when the
planned interception is WITHIN the
atmosphere. This is a particular issue
for THAAD which has both an exoand an endo-atmospheric capability.
There is no consensus [on the
definition]. 79

U.S. Congressman Terry Everett argues:
Some believe a space weapon is
purely a weapons system based in
space that collides with another space
object or intercepts a missile traveling
through space. However, I would
argue, the damage caused by a
ground-based high energy laser is just
as severe for a target satellite as the
damage caused by a physical on-orbit
collision. The key difference is the
latter may create unacceptable debris
field, posing further risks to satellites.
It is the ambiguity in definition
that makes arms-control measures,
which ban space weapons difficult to
implement and nearly impossible to
enforce. This is compounded by the
fact that satellites have tremendous
dual-use value, making it very
difficult to distinguish a non-weapon
space system from a weapon space
system. Any satellite could be
maneuvered in such a way as to
collide with a target satellite. Any
ballistic missile, with sufficient
orbital ephemeris data and software
changes, could be used to target a
satellite. 78

Michael Krepon and Michael Katz-Hyman
believe their definition:
…respects the distinction between
capability and actuality. It excludes
residual or latent space warfare
capabilities, such as ballistic missiles.
Also excluded in this working
definition are satellites that provide
essential military functions, but do
not serve as weapon platforms. In
other words, the definition used here
clarifies the essential distinction
between the current military uses of
space and the flight-testing and
deployment of space weapons that
some wish to pursue in the future.
This
definition
also excludes
activities that are specifically
designed to interfere with the uplinks
or downlinks of satellites. Jamming is
treated separately from direct,
physical attacks against satellites
because jamming has long been
considered a part of warfare, whereas
direct attacks in or from space would

Dr. Michael Rance, a United Kingdom missile
defense and space policy expert and leader
proffers:
There is no formal definition of
“weaponization of space” or “space
weapons,” but some have tried.
Michael Krepon and Michael KatzHyman propose this (citation
omitted): “terrestrially based devices
specifically designed and flight-tested
to physically attack, impair, or
destroy objects in space, or spacebased devices designed and flighttested to attack, impair, or destroy
objects in space or on Earth.” Bruce
DeBlois suggests something similar:
“A space weapon is that which is
78
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be consequential firsts in the history
of warfare. 80

The challenge of identifying space weapons in
terms of just exactly where and under what
conditions they exist is highly complex.
Robert A. Ramey opines:
(The) basic term space weapon lacks
definition in international law. As a
result, the concept it represents,
which broadly speaking includes any
implements of warfare in space, is
difficult to isolate. Without this
foundational definition, one cannot
define phrases on which it might rely.
The difficulty comes into particular
focus by observing that any
comprehensive definition of space
weapons will include space systems
equally used for nonmilitary,
nondestructive, and nonaggressive
purposes. Though space weapons
may seem to include only a discrete
class of armaments with easily
definable characteristics, a closer
examination “reveals a less obvious
and more inclusive set of systems.” 81

Despite the challenges in the definition, no
treaty bans conventional space weapon
systems, so it can be concluded that
“nonnuclear ASAT weaponry is… legal.” 82
Yet a conclusion that ASAT weapons are legal
does not give state parties license or authority
to use or station conventional weapons in
outer space (on orbit or otherwise); such
activities must be conducted within the
framework offered under treaties and
customary international law, which encourage
the non-aggressive “peaceful use” of space. In
the end, these activities and interests must be
balanced against the other.
80
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Independent Working Group on Missile Defense, the Space
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(Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 28 August 2006), p. 73.
82
See Bruce A. Hurwitz, The Legality of Space Militarization
(North-Holland, 1986), p. 127.
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Bruce Hurwitz argues in The Legality of Space
Militarization, “Considering the spirit of the
law, the conclusion appears to be that antisatellite weapons are legal, de lege late, but
should be illegal, de lege ferenda.” 83 The
principle of non-aggression places an
affirmative duty on States not to station
weapons of an aggressive nature in outer
space; examples of such provocative
aggressive acts could be the deployment of a
co-orbital mine in the vicinity of a
competitor’s military space asset, performing
“intercepts,” or creating conditions for or
causing conjunctions between satellites and
objects on orbit.
Despite the steady expansion in military use of
space by global space powers, considerable
mutual restraint has been exercised with
respect to deployment of space-based
weapons. No space-based weapon, that is, an
instrument or instrumentality of attack or
defense used to fight space systems or from
the space domain, is deployed on-orbit today.
This reality has occurred because global
policy-makers have come to appreciate the
terrifying practical consequences of space
weaponization and resulting conflict: the
debilitating problems and physics of resulting
space debris if the weapon systems are used;
the indiscriminate nature and consequences of
employing nuclear weapons in space as borne
out by the Starfish Prime experiment
conducted by the U.S. in the early 1960s; the
stakes space-dependent nations risk if they
plan for such conflict; and the loss of stability
in the space domain, which is increasingly
globalized in an interdependent world.
Keeping in line with this thinking, proscribing
interference
with
NTM
monitoring
capabilities was a rather pragmatic choice to
enable the super powers to advance nuclear
weapons reductions over the past four
decades.
83

Ibid., p. 128.
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Some states protest the continuing expansion
of some U.S. military space activities, believe
more should be done to limit them, and have
pushed for adoption of proposed treaties, such
as the Treaty on the Prevention of the
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the
Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space
Objects (PPWT), presented as part of the UN
Conference
on
Disarmament’s
(CD)
discussion on the Prevention of an Arms Race
in Outer Space (PAROS). The proponents
suggest the progress of science and
technology make it necessary to strengthen
international principles relating to reducing
potential threats. The Chinese argued that a
peaceful and tranquil outer space free from
weaponization and arms race serves the
common interests of all countries, and the
Russians argued that the security of outer
space is facing serious challenges.” 84 The
PPWT seeks to ban two interrelated conducts:
the placement of weapons in outer space; and
the threat or use of force against outer space
objects.
The proposed PPWT treaty defines “weapon
in outer space” as:
Any device placed in outer space,
based on any physical principle,
which has been specifically produced
or converted to destroy, damage, or
disrupt the normal functioning of
objects in outer space, on the Earth or
in the Earth’s atmosphere, or to
eliminate a population or components
of the biosphere, which are important
to human existence or to inflict
damage on them. 85
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February 2002, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/
jkxw/t408634.htm (accessed January 2010).
85
Proposed Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of
Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against
Outer Space Objects, Article 1C.

27

The “threat of the use of force” is defined as:
Any hostile actions against outer
space objects including, inter alia,
actions aimed at destroying them,
damaging them, temporarily or
permanently disrupting their normal
functioning or deliberately changing
their orbit parameters or the threat of
such actions. 86

However, as conceded by Russians and
Chinese, verification of such a PPWT treaty
would be extremely difficult. Also, the PPWT
does not ban development and testing of
Earth-based ASATs. Even disarmament
groups, like Project Ploughshares, concede the
“the PPWT lacks precision, has potential
loopholes, or is subject to interpretation.” 87
This is a sad state of affairs for a major arms
control proposal. Given these defects, the
Russians and others suggest agreements on
Transparency and Confidence Building
Measures could be implemented to
compensate for them and move the process
along.
For its part, the U.S. has pushed back, first
abstaining, then voting “no” to reject the
PAROS proposals. Under the George W. Bush
administration, it argued the existing
multilateral arms control agreement regime is
“sufficient,” there is no present “problem in
outer space for arms control to solve, and the
proposed treaty does adequately dispose of
threats posed by ground based systems.” 88
Despite its own issues associated with
complying
with
space-related
treaty
obligations, especially with its 2007 ASAT
86
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See Government space arms control proposals, Secure
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index.php?id=151&page=Governmental_Proposals (accessed
June 2009).
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test, China’s representatives disingenuously
charge recent U.S. space activities “run
counter to the fundamental principle of
peaceful use of outer space” and contend the
U.S. goal in outer space is to “defy the
obligations of international legal instruments
and seek unilateral and absolute military and
strategic superiority.” 89 These specious claims
do not reflect the
totality and reality …”peaceful
of
U.S.
space purposes” in
efforts, which span space should
a spectrum of civil, be construed to
commercial,
and
mean “nonmilitary activities
and missions. No aggressive;”…
doubt the Chinese
actions and attendant diplomatic overtures are
part of a strategic messaging campaign to
champion the internal, regional, and global
interests of its government. Some could
characterize the Chinese actions as a form of
“lawfare.” “The term lawfare describes the
growing use of international law claims,
usually factually or legally meritless, as a tool
of war. The goal is to gain a moral advantage
over your enemy in the court of world
opinion, and potentially a legal advantage in
national and international tribunals.” 90

89

Nancy Gallagher and John D. Steinbruner, Reconsidering
the Rules for Space Security, American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, Reconsidering the Rules of Space Project,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2008, p. 42, citing the “Statement
by H.E. [His Excellency] Mr. Li Changhe – Chinese
Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, Head of the Chinese
Delegation for the Conference on Disarmament – at the
Plenary Meeting of the CD,” 12 March 1998,
www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/ lich0398.htm (accessed June
2009); Fu Zhigang, “A Chinese View of Star Wars,” The
Spokesman 72 (2000): 17–18; and “Statement by Ambassador
Hu Xiaodi for Disarmament Affairs of China at the Plenary of
the Conference on Disarmament,” 7 June 2001,
http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/cd060701.htm (accessed
June 2009).
90
David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey, “Lawfare,” Wall
Street
Journal
23
February
2007,
A11,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117220137149816987.html
(accessed December 2009).

For years, the U.S. has acknowledged the
diplomatic posturing relating to space
weaponization, summarizing only the points
made, but not conceding them. Furthermore,
though it has tinkered with the technologies
and possibilities from time-to-time, the U.S.
has yet to deploy any space-based weapon
system. The Obama Administration and its
domestic allies propose to negotiate a ban on
space weapons, however defined, and even
though there is uncertainty about exactly what
would be considered acceptable or workable.
Interestingly, but not lost on the arms control
and space policy community, while references
to negotiating such a ban were first posted in
January 2009 on the White House website,
they were removed only a few months later. 91
This more than likely transpired due to the
realities of interagency process, which require
measured and thoughtful policy making. Still,
the Obama Administration has now endorsed
the PAROS-based discussions within the UN
CD.
Despite the difficulties, the U.S. should strive
to sort through the intractable issues presented
by space weapons and weaponization and help
establish normative space community
behaviors relating to them. It has assumed
similar leadership roles for the entirety of the
Space Age, serving as a rule-setter and guide
to achieve best space practices. It has
leveraged its position as the preeminent space
91

After Obama was sworn into office, the official White
House Web site was updated with a set of policy guidelines
including one on restoring U.S. leadership in space. Under the
heading “Ensure Freedom of Space,” the statement said the
White House would seek a ban on weapons that “interfere
with military and commercial satellites.” See Turner Brinton,
“Obama’s Proposed Space Weapon Ban Draws Mixed
Response,”
Space.com,
4
February
2009,
http://www.space.com/news/090204-obama-space-weaponsresponse.html (accessed January 2010). According to John
Logsdon, former director of the George Washington
University Space Policy Institute, the text originated from an
Obama campaign white paper that was transferred verbatim to
the White House website without input from any of the
government bodies that manage national policy..
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power and used its bully pulpit to influence
the global space-airing community. The U.S.
assumed such a leadership role on space
debris and end-of-life operations back in the
1980s when analysis showed an alarming
expansion in space debris arising from space
operations. 92

responsibility to determine the existence of
any “threat to the peace” or acts of aggression.
The Council can then recommend and lead an
appropriate response; however, because
Security Council actions are subject to
international political negotiation, any
response would not likely be quick or a
significant deterrent to an aggressor. 94

Self-Defense and International
Peace and Security

In Nicaragua v. U.S. (1986), the ICJ offered
insight into the meaning of the Article 51 right
of self defense against armed attack. 95 In that
case, the Soviet Union and Cuba were accused
of assisting the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, who
were alleged to have committed acts of
destruction and atrocities against Honduras
and Costa Rica. On the other side, the
Nicaraguan Contras were fighting the
Sandinistas, and the U.S. was assisting in their
counter-revolution against the Sovietsponsored Marxist regime. The U.S. was
accused by the Sandinistas of unauthorized
overflights, mining a harbor, and training
rebels at an alleged CIA training camp.

As noted above, “peaceful purposes” in space
should be construed to mean “nonaggressive;”
hence, any use of a weapon in space or any
attack on a space system would have to
conform to the exceptions to the ban on the
use of force found in the UN Charter. 93 The
first exception applies if the use of force is
authorized by the Security Council in order to
maintain international peace and security. As a
second exception, Article 51 reaffirms that
nothing in the Charter should be construed to
impair the inherent right of self defense
against armed attack. This right of selfdefense has always been recognized, whether
in municipal or international law, and existed
well before the advent of the UN Charter.
Thus, under Article 51, if a state is subject to
an armed attack, it may use force to repel the
attackers and stop the attack. Alternatively, if
it is unclear whether an action constitutes such
an attack, Chapter VII of the UN Charter gives
the UN Security Council the authority and

In its ruling, the ICJ held it is no longer
acceptable to settle disputes with force, what
had been customary law for millenniums.
Importantly, the court held the use of force
could now only be justified in one of three
ways: (1) self-defense activities recognized as
rights under Article 51 of the UN Charter; (2)
enforcement actions under Chapter 7 of the
UN Charter; and (3) possibly through
application of pre-UN anticipatory defense
rules of necessity and proportionality. 96 The
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See Fact Sheet on Presidential Directive on National Space
Policy, 11 February 1988, which provides in pertinent part:
“The directive further states that all space sectors will seek to
minimize the creation of space debris. Design and operations
of space tests, experiments and systems will strive to
minimize or reduce accumulation of space debris consistent
with mission requirements and cost effectiveness.”
93
P.J. Blount, “Limits on Space Weapons: Incorporating the
Law of War into the Corpus Juris Spatialis,” IAC-08-E8.3.5,
Presented to the International Institute of Space Law
Colloquium, International Astronautics Congress, Glasgow,
UK, October 2008, p.3.
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Jia Huang, “New Challenges to the Traditional Principles of
the Law of War Presented by Information Operations in Outer
Space,” Journal of Politics and Law 2: 1 (2009): 40.
95
As was its right, the U.S. did not agree to subject itself to
jurisdiction by the ICJ, which then proceeded and based its
finding of fact based on the presentations made by the
Sandinistas. The U.S. still disputes facts in the case, as well as
the actual outcome, but it does endorse substantial portions of
the ruling and cites it in other cases.
96
The U.S. and a few other countries assert this third principle
of anticipatory defense from time to time; they are the rules
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court held states have a right of collective selfdefense only if they are under armed attack.
Finally, in making an armed response in selfdefense under Article 51, a state must also
immediately report the fact of the armed
attack to the UN Security Council, and the
state must also promptly report its own actions
in response.
According to the ICJ, the sole justification for
U.S. actions in Nicaragua v. U.S. was
collective self-defense under Article 51.
However, the court found none of the states
involved the purported collective self-defense
reported to the UN that they were subject to
armed attacks. In addition, nobody reportedly
asked the U.S. to help, nor did the U.S. report
an attack to the UN. Hence, the ICJ
concluded, the right of collective self-defense
could not be invoked.
The ICJ ruled self-defense rights could not be
invoked if the threshold of actual armed attack
was not reached. 97 The UN’ definition of
aggression provided the court a foundation to
establish the threshold for an armed attack.
According to the Court, an “armed attack” is
not the same as an act of aggression. A mere
threat of force is not an armed attack, nor
would all acts of aggression count. Hence, an
opposing state may engage in an illegal use of
force, yet that may not constitute an armed
attack allowing for the use of force in self-

defense. According to the ICJ, even though
Nicaragua may have been guilty of odious
violations of international law, absent an
armed attack there was no right of collective
self-defense that could be invoked by U.S. or
its allies and friends. According to the court,
the words “an armed attack occurs” speak of
the actual commencement of physical violence
by armed forces. As we will see, the ICJ
ruling on this point is somewhat unrealistic if
applied to attacks on space systems.
Use of Force and Self-Defense
Must space systems be subject to some sort of
physical violence before a response, armed or
otherwise, can be initiated? Should nonkinetic types of attacks against space systems
qualify as armed attacks? In short, the answers
are “No” and “Yes,” respectively.
Threats are no longer presented just in the
terrestrial ground, sea, and air environment, or
just with classically recognized kinetic
weapons. They are now manifested in space,
through new and exotic electromagnetic
means or information operations. Since the
venues and mechanisms for attack are
evolving, so too must the vague definition of
“armed attack” at least with respect to space
systems.
According to Jia Hueng:

from The Caroline Affair discussed later. In Nicaragua v.
U.S., the ICJ held that the UN Charter did not supersede
custom, but exists alongside it. The U.S. position is that
anticipatory self-defense is inherent in the right of selfdefense. The ICJ, however, expressly held that it did not
address the legality of anticipatory self-defense because the
issue had not been raised. See Joshua E. Kastenberg, “The
Use of Conventional International Law in Combating
Terrorism: A Maginot Line for Modern Civilization
Employing the Principles of Anticipatory Self-Defense and
Preemption,” Air Force Law Review 55 (Spring 2004): 114.
97
The ICJ also held there is no such thing as a right of
“collective” armed response to acts, which do not constitute
an “armed attack.”

…the current international laws have
not given any definite definition of
the term “use of force” and the
information operations in outer space
have brand-new features, which are
apparently different from those of
traditional
armed
conflicts
characterized by the mass of troops
and armaments and the invasion of
territory. So, we have to consider
what actions by or against objects in
space will be considered to be uses of
force. The international community
would probably not hesitate to regard
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as a use of force the destruction of a
satellite by a missile or a laser. It
would probably react similarly if it
could be proven that one nation took
over control of another nation’s
satellite by electronic means and
caused it to fire its retro rockets and
fall out of orbit. In such a case, the
consequences will probably matter
more than the mechanism used. The
reaction
of
the
international
community to lesser kinds of
interference is hard to predict. For
example, if one nation were able by
electronic means to suspend the
operations of another nation’s
satellite for a brief period, after which
it returned to service undamaged, it is
likely
that
the
international
community would consider such an
action as a breach of the launching
nation’s sovereign rights, but not as a
use of armed force. 98

To hold intentional dazzling, electromagnetic,
or information operation activities that target,
seek to damage, and actually disable, destroy,
degrade, or interfere with space systems as not
“armed attacks” would render the word
“attack” meaningless. International law must
preserve peace and security and, by extension,
protect space systems from a wide variety of
threats and in venues not contemplated within
the UN when it was founded in 1945. In our
modern world, a state secures and defends its
territory, political independence, and elements
of national power (diplomatic, information,
military, and economic) with space and spaceenabled information systems. They provide
the state a myriad of essential services –
communications,
warning,
intelligence,
weather, PNT, and missile and space defense.
A state must assure itself of the right to
exercise jurisdiction and control over these
98

Jia Huang, “New Challenges to the Traditional Principles of
the Law of War Presented by Information Operations in Outer
Space,” Journal of Politics and Law 2: 1 (2009): 40, citing
DOD General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal
Issues in Information Operations (May 1999), p. 27.
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systems free from interference; to do so a state
must have the right to defend them against
attack. Limiting the right of self-defense in
response to attacks on these capabilities would
be illogical, especially since they can be
essential to the survival of a state. Such a
holding – that there is no such right – would
mean the rights of free passage of space
systems codified in the OST and found
elsewhere within customary law and treaty
would be just empty words and mean little.
“The maintenance of the right of self-defense
is critical for protection of the space network,
but recent attempts by international bodies to
limit this right signal an apparent trend toward
the devolution of the inherent right of selfdefense.” 99
Defining intentional and also damaging
electromagnetic and information operations as
armed attacks are consistent with a necessary
expansive reading of Article 51’s right of selfdefense. Two divergent views have developed
concerning Article 51’s right of self-defense.
The expansive view maintains the word
“inherent” in Article 51’s right of self-defense
provides the customary international law
rights of self-defense remained intact and
Article 51 simply confirmed the right of selfdefense in the particular situation of an armed
attack, but did not deny it in others. This is the
U.S. view – states retain their rights under
international law, especially self-defense
principles of necessity and proportionality,
except those specifically surrendered under
the UN Charter.
The 2006 U.S. National Space Policy is in
accord with the expansive interpretation. It
frames the primary objective of the Policy as
preserving a relative national U.S. advantage,
99

See Gregory E. Maggs, “The Campaign to Restrict the
Right to Respond to Terrorist Attacks in Self-Defense Under
Article 51 of the UN Charter and What the U.S. Can Do
About It,” Regent Journal of International Law 4:149 (2006):
155-167.
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rather than establishing a mutual benefit, by
declaring that freedom of action in space is as
important to the U.S. as air power and sea
power. The 2006 National Space Policy
asserts a broad array of U.S. rights and vital
interests in space. It rejects any limitations on
the fundamental right of the U.S. to operate in
and acquire data from space. The policy also
emphasizes that the U.S. is prepared to take
unilateral action to dissuade, deter, defeat,
and, if necessary, deny space-related activities
hostile to its interests.
The alternate restrictive view asserts that the
UN Charter allows only for a narrow right of
self-defense – a right to respond only in the
specific situation of a prior armed attack.
[The
restrictive]
view
has
considerable support and is consistent
with a number of resolutions passed
by the Security Council. Proponents
of this view see Article 51 as a
partner to Article 2(3), which requires
peaceful settlement of disputes, and
Article 2(4), which outlaws the use of
force. They consider “the permission
in Article 51 [to be] exceptional in
the context of the UN Charter and
exclusive of any customary right of
self-defense.”
This
restrictive
approach addresses the fear that
expansive interpretations of Article
51 create a loophole through various
countries could rationalize military
adventurism. 100

Aggression not formally amounting to “armed
attack” can also be just as threatening to the
sovereignty and the existence of a state as full
military hostilities. Spacefaring states defend
their political independence within the
confines of the UN Charter. They exercise
jurisdiction and control over their space
systems, and by preventing and defeating
100

Norman Menachem Feder, “Reading the UN Charter
Connotatively: Toward a New Definition of Armed Attack,”
NYU Journal of International Law & Policy 395 (1987): 404.

attacks on those activities. The jurisdiction
and control element is quasi-territorial
according to Bin Cheng, and this provides
accord for a state asserting rights of self
defense for space systems as a defense of
national sovereignty, territorial integrity, or
political independence. 101
Those that argue for narrow, and limiting
interpretation, only provoke resort to self-help
by states outside the bounds of the Charter. “A
legal system which merely prohibits the use of
force and does not make adequate provision
for the peaceful settlement of disputes invites
failure.” 102 Though a bit counter-intuitive, the
use of force in self-defense, in turn, enables
attainment of the overarching objectives of
international peace and security.
Some suggest the restrictive view of selfdefense is more analytically sound and widely
accepted than the other view. They argue an
expansive reading of Article 51 conflicts with
the letter and spirit of the UN Charter.
Scholars arguing for a restrictive interpretation
fail to adequately address the practicalities of
modern warfare; a narrow interpretation and
definition of attacks and permissible selfdefense is simply unworkable as there does
not appear to be a happy medium, which
actually preserves and protects the spacefaring
rights of nations. The covert nature of modern
forms of diplomatic, information, military,
and economic conflict and the potential for
crippling destruction and damage continues to
evolve with a potential for catastrophic
101

“…since territorial sovereignty has been banned from outer
space and, with it, territorial jurisdiction, the overriding
jurisdiction in outer space is quasi-territorial jurisdiction. Bin
Cheng, “The Commercial Development of Space: The Need
for New Treaties,” Journal of Space Law 19: 1 (1997).
102
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Connotatively: Toward a New Definition of Armed Attack,”
NYU Journal of International Law & Policy 395 (1987),
citing Waldcock, “The Regulation of the Use of Force by
Individual States in International Law,” Recueil Des Cours 81
(1952): 455-456.
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characterized as an “armed attack,”
then a conventional response may not
be warranted. A conventional
response, in this case, may in fact be
considered the “armed attack” under
Article 51. A response alike would
not constitute an “armed attack,” but
there are still at least three obstacles
for the retaliation side as follows.
Firstly, it is difficult to identify the
attacker. Information attack in outer
space has the characteristics of longrange and anonymity and the attacker
can conduct information attack
against space assets in or through
foreign countries. Information can
flow across international borders
while a nation’s military, judicial, and
security agencies cannot carry out
investigations in a foreign country at
will and this kind of investigation
may be considered as spy so it cannot
gain cooperation from related
countries. Secondly, it is difficult to
produce evidence. Space assets are in
an
abominable
environment
characterized by intensive radiation,
extreme temperature, and microgravity. Occasionally, they may be
stricken by small meteors or space
debris, which runs at high speed. So
they may be damaged by the natural
cause. A space asset usually consists
of many complex systems and there
are frequent malfunctions and
program errors. Because of these
factors, the offended state cannot
produce sufficient evidence that it has
suffered from intentional attack.
Finally, even though the attacker can
be identified and proven to be
supported by a foreign government,
this foreign country may lack the
space information infrastructure that
would make it vulnerable to a
response alike. 104

consequences. 103 Kinetic, electromagnetic, and
cyber
attacks
intentionally
targeting,
damaging, and interfering with satellites and
their supporting terrestrial systems would
appear logically and realistically to satisfy
conceptions of armed attack that would
warrant and allow a proportionate response (as
provided in the LOAC, described in more
detail below) in accord with the UN Charter
and customary law of self-defense exceptions.
Such attacks should therefore trigger a right of
self-defense.
Concluding there is a right of self-defense for
attacks on space systems requires an analysis
to assess whether an actual attack has taken
place. As will be discussed later in this paper’s
discussion of the ICJ Case Concerning Oil
Platforms, there are considerable challenges to
U.S. abilities to identify, classify, characterize,
and attribute space threats and events. Within
the hostile physical environment, varied
energetic and kinetic events affecting space
systems occur on a recurring basis; moreover,
satellite electronic, sensor, or other glitches
could exhibit attributes of an attack until
analysis has resolved the issue. Ultimately,
even if one concludes there has been an attack,
attributing the source of the event to a
particular state or non-state actor could prove
to be extremely difficult.
The challenge to resolving information attacks
would be similar. According to Jia Huang:
…if an aggressor uses information
techniques to conduct the operation
and inflicts little or no physical
destruction, whether this kind of
attack can be regarded as “armed
attack” is disputable. If an
information
attack
cannot
be
103

The increasingly covert nature of modern form of
aggression and their greater potential for devastation have
made both scholars and states dissatisfied with the limited
legal availability of the justification of self-defense. Ibid., p.
418.
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Anticipatory Self-defense
for Space Systems

shortfalls exacerbate the time lag and analysis
challenges.

Some states maintain that within the right of
self-defense is a right to prevent an armed
attack from occurring by using anticipatory
self-defense. 105 The U.S. is one such state. The
Caroline Affair dispute with the United
Kingdom in 1837 gave rise to a formal
interpretation in international law setting out
the elements of lawful anticipatory selfdefense. The case stands for the proposition
that the use of force in anticipatory defense
may be justified and employed only in matters
in which the “necessity of that self-defense is
instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice
of means, and no moment for deliberation.”
The use of such force must also be
proportional. The criterion of immediacy and
necessity must be based upon the very fact
that there is no other course available to
prevent the threatened attack from being
executed. By nature, this excludes execution
of pre-planned attacks.

Assuming they have been identified as a
lawful target, terrestrial components of space
and ASAT systems can be struck within days,
hours, or minutes depending upon the
proximity of military forces to the target. The
U.S. Strategic Command and Air Force Space
Command have toyed with the idea of a
conventional strike missile from time to time,
though that system is subject to a number of
limitations, and developing workable rules of
engagement for its employment should prove
difficult. As to potential space-based targets,
systems could be deployed to engage such
targets, but the delay could be hours, days,
weeks, months, or even more; the timing for
strikes with kinetic or particle beams, or other
systems would be dependent on the
prospective target’s orbit, intercept physics,
and readiness of the sensor, shooter, and
command and control systems employed.

Can an anticipatory defense be presented in
response to an imminent threat to U.S. space
systems? Physics and engineering realities
make the immediacy criterion rather difficult
to achieve. There will always be time lag and
latency associated with detecting and
analyzing an event, ascertaining the source
and potential for damage, determining that a
party intended to cause the damage, and then
mobilizing weapons in response to perform
space
or
terrestrial-based
combat.
Complicating these problems, U.S. SSA assets
are underfunded and overtaxed though they
have been described repeatedly by U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Air
Force space officials as a top priority; the

The case for using force for anticipatory
defense of space systems can be compared to
performing anticipatory defense in the event
of a potential nuclear strike. The signs of
preparedness for employing nuclear weapons
would have to be so overwhelming that only a
definite intention to use them would logically
explain the actions being undertaken. Since
the risks of inaction could be catastrophic,
they would demand immediate action.
However, Louis-Philippe Rouillard suggests
the fueling of one missile or even of a region’s
missiles might not be enough to justify an
attack based on anticipatory self-defense,
since some might think no country would use
a limited amount of nuclear weapons on a first
strike as this would leave it open to utter
destruction upon a retaliatory strike. 106 Would
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Some argue the drafters of the UN Charter intended to
restrict the right of self-defense under the Charter and
customary international law and state practice involving
anticipatory defense measures was not accepted.
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See Louis-Philippe Rouillard, “The Caroline Case:
Anticipatory Self-Defense in Contemporary International
Law,” Miskolc Journal of International Law 1: 2 (2004): 117.
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an analogous circumstance apply to a potential
attack on a space system? Probably not. The
loss or potential loss of a single satellite or
redundant ground node of a space system
should not present a serious enough threat that
a state should not first attempt to resolve the
developing dispute through diplomatic,
economic, or global engagement means. Law
on the use of force only “allows States to
respond with force when a peaceful settlement
of the dispute cannot be negotiated.” 107
Law of Armed Conflict
“States may use force to defend themselves or
to defend others, however, there are accepted
limitations to this exception.” 108 Before using
force, one must evaluate not only space law,
but also assess use of force and LOAC
humanitarian law considerations. The LOAC
is a body of international law that sets
boundaries on the use of force during armed
conflicts through application of fundamental
principles or rules. 109 LOAC principles and
rules combine elements of treaty and
customary international and municipal law.
The LOAC sets limits on when and to what
degree force may be used, targeting, and
treatment of noncombatants, civilians, and
107

P.J. Blount, “Limits on Space Weapons: Incorporating the
Law of War into the Corpus Juris Spatialis,” IAC-08-E8.3.5,
Presented to the International Institute of Space Law
Colloquium, International Astronautics Congress, Glasgow,
UK, October 2008, p. 4.
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DOD policy is to comply with the Law of War “in the
conduct of military operations and related activities in armed
conflict, however such conflicts are characterized.” See DOD
Law of War Program, DOD Directive 5100.77, 9 December
1998. Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)
provides that the U.S. “will apply law of war principles during
all operations that are categorized as Military Operations
Other Than War.” See Implementation of the DOD Law of
War Program, CJCSI 5810.01, 27 August 1999. Under the
U.S. military’s Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE), “U.S.
forces will comply with the Law of War during military
operations involving armed conflict, no matter how the
conflict may be characterized under international law.”
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prisoners of war. Its fundamental targeting
rules are very relevant to concepts of space
warfare.
The
overarching
LOAC
considerations are: necessity, distinction or
discrimination, proportionality, humanity, and
chivalry.
Space warfare possibilities present policy and
law challenges, but rules for them can be
derived and applied through analogy from
terrestrial venues. As one might expect, the
traditions, principles, and rules that might
apply in space arenas were initially developed
to apply in traditional terrestrial venues – land,
sea, and air. Important components of space
systems are terrestrially based; LOAC
targeting considerations for targeting and also
defending terrestrial components are better
understood and established. Even so, not all
rules are directly translatable to the space
environment. Some even believe LOAC
principles are inapplicable to unmanned
space-based components of satellite systems,
but that is, however, a rather limited
viewpoint. In the end, each LOAC
considerations must be considered before
prosecuting military conflict in space or
against terrestrially-based space system
support, command and control, and user
components.
The first LOAC principle to consider,
“military necessity,” provides “a person or
object should not be targeted unless doing so
gives an attacker some real advantage.” 110
Military necessity requires combat forces
engage in only those acts necessary to
110

Adam E. Frey, “Defense of U.S. Space Assets: A Legal
Perspective,” Air & Space Power Journal (Winter 2008),
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicales/apj/apj08/
win08/frey.html (accessed June 2009). According to Frey,
“The principle has four elements: the user of force must be
capable of regulating it; force must be necessary to achieve,
as quickly as possible, the enemy’s partial or complete
submission; it must be no greater in effect on the enemy’s
personnel or property than needed to achieve victor; and it
must not otherwise be illegal.”
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accomplish a legitimate military objective.
“The U.S. formally acknowledged this
principle when it signed the 1907 Hague
Convention, which prohibits any action to
destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless
such destruction or seizure is imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war. The
Nuremberg trials also explained that
destruction as an end-in-itself is a violation of
international law. There must be some
reasonable connection between the destruction
of property and the overcoming of the enemy
forces.” 111
Military necessity only allows that degree of
force required to defeat an enemy. In addition,
attacks must be limited to military objectives
whose “nature, purpose, or use makes an
effective contribution to military action and
whose total or partial destruction, capture, or
neutralization at the time offers a definite
military advantage.” 112 In applying military
necessity to targeting, the rule generally
allows targeting those facilities, equipment,
and forces which, if destroyed, would lead as
quickly as possible to the enemy’s partial or
complete submission.
Applying the rule of necessity in engaging
space systems, warfighters must take into
account the nexus between the adversaries’
war effort and the space system. Importantly,
targeting on-orbit spaceborne assets may be
unnecessary if the same military necessary
result can be obtained by targeting
terrestrially-based components, or jamming up
and down links.
111

See “Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, the Hague, 18 October
1907,” Article 23(g), International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) International Humanitarian Law Database,
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e
636d/1d1726425f6955aec125641e0038bfd6 (accessed June
2009).
112
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 12
October 1949, Articles 51-54.

Related to necessity, the central idea of
distinction is one may only engage valid
military targets. Military objectives must be
separated and distinguished from protected
civilian objects to the maximum extent
possible. An indiscriminate attack is one that
strikes military objectives and civilians or
civilian objects without an attempt to
distinguish between military and nonmilitary
targets. Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva
Conventions limits targets “strictly to …those
objects which by their nature, location,
purpose, or use make an effective contribution
to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage.” 113 Civilians and
civilian property are prohibited targets. 114
Distinction also requires defenders to separate
military objects from civilian objects to the
maximum extent feasible. 115 If system is to be
civilian in nature, it needs to be separated
from military systems. This is difficult and
complex to achieve with some spaceborne
systems – communications, PNT, weather, or
classically constituted imagery systems have
dual civilian and military applications. For
example, the global PNT resource, GPS, is
operated by the U.S. Air Force, and it
produces vital effects for the civil and
commercial communities. Important weather
satellites relied on by the U.S. military and its
allies, but also global civil and commercial
communities, are operated by the U.S.
Department of Commerce; the U.S. Air Force
provides a back-up command and control
center for the Defense Meteorological Satellite
Program (DMSP). The U.S. obtains large
portions of its satellite communications
113

See Ibid., Article 52(2).
See Ibid., Articles 51-54.
115
In a space context, it would be inappropriate to locate a
civil space habitat for spacecraft personnel next to an
adjoining space weapon or military system.
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capability by leasing international commercial
transponders, as do other militaries, civil, and
commercial users. Similarly, significant
portions of remote sensing and supporting
launch capabilities are produced by
commercial providers, consistent with U.S.
remote sensing and commercial space launch
policies that encourage such relationships.
Attacking such objects may hinder an enemy,
but civilians would suffer tremendously as an
outgrowth of this mixed civil and military use
of space systems.
Under Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva
Conventions, limits are imposed on attacks on
civilian objects 116 and attacks that cause
“widespread, long-term, and severe damage”
to the environment. 117 Consequently, a
weapon must be targeted with discrimination.
What then should be done to address the
tricky issue of space debris? The creation of
space debris must be expected and considered
if kinetic or otherwise destructive weapons are
about to be employed. Substantial debris fields
should be reasonably foreseen to cause
damage to other civilian space assets. Since
kinetic or otherwise destructive engagements
could break the threshold of “widespread,
long-term, and severe damage” to the
environment, the focus should be on assessing
the number and size of pieces of expected
space debris, their orbits, the length of time on
orbit, the ability to track the debris, and
potential damage. The 2007 Chinese ASAT
left thousands of pieces of space debris on
orbit, at altitudes where they will remain on
orbit for hundreds to thousands of years,
presenting long-term threats to imagery,
environmental, and communication systems.
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See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions,
Article 52.
117
See Ibid., Article 55. Protocol Additional restrictions’
apply to land, sea, and air combat and these limitations are
echoed elsewhere in other treaties and in customary
international law.
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Given the prevalent global understanding of
the problems of space debris and their physics,
a spacefaring state cannot reasonably contend
it could not foresee the damage that would
occur as a consequence of initiating a kinetic
or other destructive ASAT event. If so
employed, it could be reasonable to conclude
the attacking state executed an indiscriminate
attack, one where the means of attack
“employs a method or means of combat the
effects of which cannot be limited as
required.” 118 For this reason, employing
ASAT weapons would appear to be unlawful
if they create space debris that damages
civilian space systems, regardless of whether
or not the damage occurs during or after the
time of conflict.
Would deploying or exploding space mines be
lawful? Probably not, but this assumes the
mine is designed to explode, fragment, and
riddle space with debris. 119 What if the mine is
kept on orbit for an extended period? In such
event, P.J. Blount opines we should look by
analogy to the restrictions placed on
unsecured naval mines: 120
According to the Hague Convention
VIII, these mines must be disabled
within an hour of release due to the
way in which they might move and
destroy nonmilitary objectives. While
the ban is not directly translatable to
space due to physics, the principle
behind this ban is. So placing a
weapon in space that engages targets
at random would also be unlawful.
The principle could be extended by
an analogy to torpedoes, which must
be disabled if they miss their targets.
118

Ibid. and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), 8 June 1977,
Article 51(4).
119
It might be possible to develop and field space mines
designed to minimize space debris or other long-term
problems.
120
“These would be contact mines that are not secured by a
mooring or anchor and have the ability to be swept away in a
current.”
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A weapon in space that misses its
target and continues to poses a threat
due to its capabilities might also be
illegal (e.g., a warhead being used as
an ASAT that misses its mark). 121

Another distinction relates to a potential for
causing damage or injury to humans in space.
Civilians may not be made the object of a
direct attack; however, the LOAC recognizes
a military target need not be spared because its
destruction may cause collateral damage that
results in unintended death or injury to
civilians or damage to their property.
Commanders and their planners must take into
consideration the extent of unintended indirect
civilian collateral destruction and probable
casualties that will result from a direct attack
on a military objective and, to an extent
consistent with military necessity, seek to
avoid or minimize civilian casualties and
destruction. Anticipated civilian losses must
be proportionate to the military advantages
sought. In the end, it could be difficult to
justify some losses without compelling
“survival of the State” rationales. It would
appear to be illegal to conduct activities that
might cause damage to the International Space
Station, or other manned civil space systems,
or injury to their space personnel, whether on
orbit, or during lift and return operations.
Proportionality prohibits the use of any kind
or degree of force exceeding that needed to
accomplish a military objective. An attacker
must therefore balance the expected damage
against the military advantage to be gained. 122
121

P.J. Blount, “Limits on Space Weapons: Incorporating the
Law of War into the Corpus Juris Spatialis,” IAC-08-E8.3.5,
Presented to the International Institute of Space Law
Colloquium, International Astronautics Congress, Glasgow,
UK, October 2008. Kinetic ASATs are typically launched on
sub-orbital trajectories so if they miss they come right back
down, like an ICBM warhead. Co-orbital ASATs generally
require larger boosters to achieve their mission objectives.
122
Robert A. Ramey, “Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier:
The Law of War in Space,” Air Force Law Review 48 (2000):
79-82. “The proportionality test is the U.S.’ preferred method

This requires a balancing test between the
substantial, actual, and direct military
advantage anticipated by attacking a
legitimate military target and the expected
incidental and unfortunate civilian injury or
damage. Under this test, excessive incidental
losses are prohibited. This principle
encourages combat forces to minimize
collateral damage – the incidental, unintended
destruction that occurs as a result of a lawful
attack against a legitimate military target, and
leverages the rules relating to necessity and
discrimination. This principle is also reflected
in Additional Protocol 1, which prohibits “an
attack, which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.” 123
An action causing excessive or catastrophic
damage to civilians or property should be
illegal. Since Additional Protocol 1’s test is
subjective, commanders could reasonably
disagree on whether attacking these objects
truly “offers a definite military advantage.” 124
The principle of proportionality offers some
guidance with regard to using force against
space systems: since collateral damage to
civilians is considered a natural consequence
of combat, the proportionality test should be
applied to determine if an attack on a dual-use
object warrants the consequences to the

of determining whether a target is a permissible one. The U.S.
has declined to sign certain treaties, or portions thereof, that
prohibit certain targets without any balancing test.”
123
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol 1), Article 51(5)(b), ICRC International
Humanitarian Law Database, http://www.icrc.org/ih1.nsf/
FULL/470 (accessed June 2009).
124
J. Ricou Heaton, “Civilians at War: Reexamining the
Status of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces,” Air
Force Law Review 57 (2005): 182-183.
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innocent. 125 Hence, attacking and destroying
vital PNT systems, such as GPS, may be held
illegal since global society at large relies upon
the use of these systems. 126 The same
conclusion may apply to attacks on
environmental monitoring systems, especially
if used to protect civilians from weather,
natural disaster or other environmental threats.
If necessary to engage these systems, then it
may be more acceptable, and lawful, if the
damaging effects are reversible or temporary
during specific periods of military activity.
What of nuclear weapons? The OST bans the
stationing of nuclear weapons and weapons of
mass destruction in space. Also, “the Nuclear
Test Ban treaty prohibits states from causing
nuclear explosions in outer space.” 127 Such
weapons
present
significant
distinction/discrimination challenges. As
noted, the space and defense communities
learned of these issues during the 1960s
Starfish Prime and other upper atmospheric
nuclear weapons experiments. So the use of
nuclear weapons in space, aside from transit
of a nuclear warhead that most concede can be
legally executed in certain conflicts, should,
125

The expression “definite military advantage” is derived
from the Hague Rules of Air Warfare. The idea conveyed is
that of “a concrete and perceptible military advantage rather
than a hypothetical and speculative one. The advantage must
be military and not purely political, and involve an evaluation
of the long-term military benefits of any action contemplated.
See Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the
Law of International Armed Conflict (Cambridge University
Press, 2004), pp. 83-86.
126
The U.S. GPS system is a free global utility, but until
recently the U.S. reserved the right to control and degrade its
signal. Current U.S. policy is to distribute the system’s PNT
signal without any control or degradation. In September 2007,
the U.S. announced its decision to procure the future
generation of GPS satellites, GPS III, without the selective
availability (signal degradation) technical feature. “DOD
Permanently Discontinues Procurement of Global Positioning
System Selective Availability,” DOD News Release 1126-07,
18 September 2007. Russia, China, Europe, Japan, and India
have deployed, or plan to deploy, their own spaceborne PNT
systems.
127
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere,
in Outer Space and Under Water, 10 October 1963, Article 1.
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on first blush, be completely foreclosed.
However, according to Blount:
…the International Court of Justice’s
(ICJ) Advisory Opinion on Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons might have created an
exception to this rule. The ICJ ruled
that in general the use of nuclear
weapons would be “contrary to the
rules of international law applicable
in armed conflict, and in particular
the principles and rules of
humanitarian law.” However, the
court states that a State may use a
nuclear weapon when the “very
survival of a State would be at stake.”
Since the court treats this as a
moment of necessity in which both
customary and treaty law can be
suspended, it is feasible that the Outer
Space Treaty and the Limited Test
Ban Treaty could also be suspended
and that a State may, during “an
extreme circumstance of selfdefense” use a nuclear weapon in
space. 128

Under what circumstances employment of a
nuclear weapon in space could be legally
envisioned? Perhaps to defeat on-orbit
weapons of mass destruction or nuclear
weapon system posing a serious violation of
the Outer Space and Limited Test Ban treaties
or an otherwise serious provocation. Such use
would require balancing the risks to the space
environment and other space systems, and
considering peace and security options
associated with failure against possibilities of
defeating the threat. Could using the same
argument allow use of nuclear weapons
against pure space assets presenting
communications, PNT, warning and other
capabilities that enable 21st Century militaries
operations by adversaries? Probably not, but
128

P.J. Blount, “Limits on Space Weapons: Incorporating the
Law of War into the Corpus Juris Spatialis,” IAC-08-E8.3.5,
Presented to the International Institute of Space Law
Colloquium, International Astronautics Congress, Glasgow,
UK, October 2008, p. 8.
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approving that argument would create an
exception that would negate arms-control and
peacekeeping aspects and limitations imposed
by the Outer Space and Limited Test Ban
treaties, the UN Charter, and other bilateral
agreements.
A state must do “everything feasible to verify
that the objectives to be attacked are military
objectives.” 129 However, operations in this
context, requires use of the panoply of space
capabilities – satellite imagery, satellite PNT
systems, satellite communication systems, and
even meteorological data. Denying an
adversary access to space systems may relieve
him of some portion of this important
obligation to mitigate civilian casualties by
employing
such
techniques
and
technologies. 130 Furthermore, a weapon that
could be used in a nondiscriminatory manner
or in such a way it would cause unnecessary
suffering is only banned if it can also be used
in a discriminatory manner and cause limited
suffering. “In such a case it is the illicit use of
the weapon that is outlawed and not the
weapon itself.” 131

communications systems, even in selfdefense. Articles 8 and 9 of the Hague
Convention V, which was concluded in 1907,
decades before satellite communications
systems were even envisioned, provide a
neutral state is not required to restrict a
belligerent’s use of “telegraph or telephone
cables or of wireless telegraph apparatus
belonging to it or to companies or private
individuals” as long as these facilities are
provided impartially to both belligerents. It
appears these Articles would apply to modern
day satellite communications, though some
think this remains an open question.
Another issue that must be addressed is how
to treat neutrality rights in time of conflict.
Since space law accords states the
responsibility over their private entities
involved in space operations, an argument can
be made to hold a neutral state responsible for
the actions of its private entities. According to
Elizabeth Waldrop:
…when a State issues a license
authorizing a private entity to provide
certain services, there can be little
argument that the State should be
held responsible for subsequent
conduct of the private entity.
Accordingly, if a neutral State
permits its space systems to be used
by a belligerent military, the opposing
belligerent would have the right to
demand that the neutral State stop
doing so. If the neutral State is
unwilling or unable to prevent such
use by one belligerent, it would seem
reasonable to authorize the other
belligerent to prevent the offending
use. In the context of space systems
used in time of conflict, before
resorting to force a belligerent could
(or should) demand a neutral nation
not to provide satellite imagery,
navigation services, or weather
information to its adversary. 132

War must be waged in accordance with widely
accepted formalities, and avoid unlawful
treachery. These principles impose an
obligation to reduce noncombatant civilian
casualties and damage, but this can be difficult
to achieve as military and civilian space
systems become more and more intertwined.
The concept of “neutrality” may also limit
military space conflict activities. Belligerents
should have no right to attack neutral satellite
129

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, Article
57(2)(a)(i).
130
Of course, denying an adversary access to space assets
might save lives if the adversary is using them to target
innocent civilians.
131
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Presented to the International Institute of Space Law
Colloquium, International Astronautics Congress, Glasgow,
UK, October 2008, p. 6.
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Law on the Use of Force
Given the realities of operating in space, its
global nature, and the fact threats are
manifested nearly always outside the territory
of a state, self-defense measures invariably
require military activities conducted outside
the confines of that state. Some suggest the
ICJ objected to such extra-territorial selfdefense measures in its 6 November 2003
ruling in the Case Concerning Oil Platforms
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of
America), a dispute involved issues arising out
of the Tanker War of 1984-1988 and
analogous to space conflict.
The term Tanker War was first
applied to a series of naval battles and
incidents in the Persian Gulf from
1984-1988 that was part of the larger
Iran-Iraq War that spanned most of
the decade. For two years, the U.S.
was involved in the Tanker War to
counter the hostile actions of military
and paramilitary forces of the Islamic
Republic of Iran. These forces
engaged in a broad pattern of lowlevel, yet unlawful, uses of force,
targeting not only U.S. forces, but
also U.S.-owned and flagged
commercial
shipping,
foreign
commercial activities, and the
strategically important Persian Gulf
waterway itself in the form of minelaying in international waters. 133

In arriving at its ruling, the ICJ addressed
issues associated with the “inherent right of
self-defense.” It held the facts presented with
regard to missile attacks on U.S.-flagged
tankers and mining incidents and attacks on
U.S. warships in the Gulf were not sufficient
to support an invocation of an inherent right to

Force Law Review, Spring 2004, 157-231, citing DOD
General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal Issues
in Information Operations (May 1999).
133
Darren Huskisson, “Protecting the Space Network and the
Future of Self-Defense,” Astropolitics 5 (2007): 123-143.
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exercise self-defense under international law.
In disposing of the U.S. position, the Court
expressed interest and concern with where the
vessels were attacked, especially since they
were not located in U.S. territorial waters. The
ICJ concluded the U.S. could not assert a right
of self-defense in defense of third parties
unless those parties requested “collective self
defense,” and mere ownership of a vessel was
not sufficient to assert the right. The ICJ
placed the burden on the U.S. to show the
attacks on its vessels were of such a nature as
to be qualified as armed attacks within the
meaning of that expression in Article 51 of the
UN Charter, and as understood in customary
law on the use of force. 134 The ICJ concluded
the right of self-defense can be asserted only if
it can detect, and attribute, and conclusively
prove, an attack by the hostile actor.135
Confirming the applicability of the
international law criteria of necessity and
proportionality in relation to the use of force
in self-defense, the ICJ ruled it was not
satisfied the U.S. attacks were necessary to
respond to the shipping incidents in the Gulf
and constituted a proportionate use of force in
self-defense. Some suggest this formulation
could have strict and adverse implications for
future claims of a right of anticipatory or preemptive self-defense insofar as it holds that an
armed attack is a prerequisite to the right of
self-defense under Article 51 of the UN
Charter and under customary international
law. 136 Darren Huskisson has written a critique
of the ICJ Oil Platforms decision and its
potential importance. 137 The case presents
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v. United States of America).
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Ibid.
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The Court was not faced with an issue of anticipatory or
pre-emptive self-defense since the alleged attacks against U.S.
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137
See Darren Huskisson, “Protecting the Space Network and
the Future of Self-Defense,” Astropolitics 5 (2007): 123-143.
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substantial implications for space conflict
issues:
A Space War would have factual
similarities to the 1987-1988 phase of
the Tanker War. One could envision a
regional conflict, even one in which
the U.S. is not directly involved, that
would have spill-over effects on the
U.S. space networks as the
belligerents attempted to deny the
other the use of space services, just as
Iran and Iraq tried to deny each other
the commercial use of the Persian
Gulf during the Tanker War. The
U.S. would likely use force in
response to any severe instances of
harmful interference, such as attacks
against U.S.-owned and registered
space
systems
and
foreign
commercial systems and even
potentially in response to the
emplacement of space mines. Due to
limited space situational awareness
(SSA), the U.S. could expect a space
adversary to conduct its operations
under an even stealthier cloak of
deniability than existed in the Tanker
War.
The specter of a Space War raises
many questions… May the U.S.
defend portions of the space network
located outside the U.S. territory?
Would it be permissible to use force
to defend non-U.S. territory? Would
it be permissible to use force to
defend non-U.S. registered space
assets? What is the standard of proof
for establishing an “armed attack” on
the space network, thus triggering the
right of self-defense? Must the U.S.
ascertain the intent of the attacker
before initiating an armed response?
Is the gravity of the attack on the
space network relevant to the
triggering of the right of selfdefense? 138

No doubt, the ICJ was unwilling at any level
to conclude the myriad of actions taken by the
Iranians arose to any level constituting an
138

Ibid.

“armed attack.” At best, the ICJ ruling can be
viewed as a political verdict,139 perhaps
mischaracterizing the evidence on a shooting
war that took place nearly two decades earlier
during the Reagan Administration, then
shaping its decision to telegraph displeasure
with the George W. Bush Administration’s
campaign to develop and employ a coalition to
remove the murderous Sadaam Hussein
regime from power in Iraq, and battle Al
Qaeda proxies in Afghanistan and globally.
Despite these faults, the Court’s reasoning
cannot be dismissed as wholly in error. Yet
careful analysis shows the ruling does not
impose new or unreasonable burdens on those,
such as the U.S. and its allies, who seek to
defend their space systems.
The Court was clearly troubled the U.S. had
reflagged U.S. and non-U.S. owned vessels
and inserted itself into the controversy and
shooting war between Iran and Iraq and
between other states in the region of the
Persian Gulf/Gulf of Arabia. The ICJ looked
for and apparently required a stronger nexus
and compelling interest for self-defense
between the Tankers being attacked and their
relationship with the U.S. The ICJ was
looking to see if sovereigns having significant
local territorial interests in protecting the
tankers invoked collective self-defense
obligations with the U.S. That had not
happened, nor was there any general
invocation by the parties of the right of
collective defense.
Given the foundational defects in the Oil
Platforms ruling, Huskisson’s analogy
between the tankers and space systems being
attacked is incomplete. Contrary to the
situation involving tankers in Oil Platforms,
139

The Court found no evidence of intent by Iran to
specifically target U.S. ships with either a missile strike or
mining operations, even if they were fired; thus the court
concluded no “armed attack” occurred which could give rise
to self-defense measures.
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U.S. space systems present clear and
compelling capabilities vital to insuring the
extensive and instant U.S. global diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic
interests. This is in accord with the OST,
which provides spacefaring powers retain
jurisdiction and control over their space
objects and operations even if no signatory
shall assert rights of sovereignty to portions of
outer space. A state must be able to defend
such jurisdiction and control rights.
By his complaint, Huskisson presents the very
solution necessary to perfect the right of selfdefense for a U.S. owned space asset, or
defending a foreign registered system. U.S.owned space systems need only be registered
by the U.S. If the U.S. proposes to invoke selfdefense rights for a foreign registered space
system that must involve and be performed in
accord with an invocation of collective
defense rights by the registering State.
Although the current version of the
Registration Convention does not direct reregistration of space objects launched into
space upon transfers of ownership, control,
and operation (this is a subject for a future
modification of the Convention or a treaty
affecting the use of force and LOAC). 140
Pending such changes, perfecting self-defense
rights for transferred systems could be
achieved by invocating the rights with an
Article 51 submission to the UN Security
Council.
Huskisson worries the Court’s opinion
establishes a burdensome requirement to
identify the hostile actor attacking a U.S.
space system. He rightly concedes an
important point of international law relating to
the use of force that a nation asserting a right
of self-defense must attribute an attack to a
140

Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into
Outer Space, 15 September 1979, also known as the
Registration Convention, at Article II.
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specified hostile actor. With regard to LOAC
issues, a military action must be necessary and
distinguish
between
combatants
and
noncombatants. Huskisson dismisses these
evidentiary requirements of ascertaining the
hostile actor as unreasonably difficult to
achieve given the current state of SSA
capabilities; he correctly spots SSA challenges
as its capabilities are best equipped to provide
a forensic understanding of recent events
rather than real-time feedback on on-going
events. Huskisson wrongly infers the
evidentiary requirement should be partly
ignored or accommodated because it could be
overly difficult to satisfy.
Current SSA tools and overall capabilities
need to be improved given the ICJ’s opinion
in the Oil Platforms. This is a correct result,
and encourages appropriate planning and
resource development. It would be far more
destabilizing to encourage commanders or
national leaders to authorize or engage in
military actions based on “hunches” that an
attack has or is about to happen, and
“hunches” as to who made the attack.
Huskisson also complains about the Court’s
requirement that a state ascertain the intent of
the attacker before initiating an armed
response. Again, Huskisson misses the Court’s
important point. Not all events causing
damage to space systems are the result of an
attack. To find otherwise would ignore a half
century of space physics, engineering, and
operational experiences. This would risk
peace and security over accidents or other
non-hostile events. Space systems are
continually battered with a variety of
environmental events – space debris, electrical
charging, cosmic rays and energetic particles,
and others. Assuming an event can be traced
to some state or actor, a strong factual
determination must nonetheless be made as to
whether the interference or damage occurred
inappropriately or by accident. For example,
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jamming incidents affecting space systems
occur in many venues, most inadvertent, some
not. An assessment and inquiries must be
made to determine the true context of the
event to satisfy LOAC requirements of
necessity, distinction, and proportionality.
Finally, Huskisson complains about whether
the gravity of an attack on a space system is
relevant to the triggering of the right of selfdefense. Huskisson again missed the ICJ’s
point. The ICJ ruling encourages application
of classic necessity and proportionality rules
when executing purported self-defense
actions. Peace and security interests can best
be achieved and preserved if necessary and
proportionate responses are presented in
response to armed attacks.
Attacks on Space Systems
Conflict in outer space or affecting the domain
is also limited by a myriad of space
governance, environmental, disarmament, and
arms control agreements. There are
boundaries on these limits. For example,
under the Vienna Convention during time of
conflict, treaty terms inconsistent with a state
of armed conflict may not apply between
belligerents, unless the terms of the treaty
itself are specifically intended to apply during
conflict.
The Liability Convention 141 expands on a
topic noted in the Outer Space Treaty that
“launching states” are liable to other states for
damage caused by space objects, including
debris. States are liable only for direct damage
caused by a space object (i.e., loss of life,
personal injury or other impairment of health,
or loss of or damage to property). If damage is
141

See Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, September 1972, known as the
Liability Convention.

caused to another space object in outer space,
liability is based on fault. On the other hand, if
damage is caused by a space object on earth or
to an aircraft in flight, liability is absolute.
Notably, there can be more than one launching
State – a launching state is any state that
launches an object, procures the launch of an
object, or from whose territory or facility an
object is launched. If there is more than one
launching State, joint and several liability
rules would apply. States may make
indemnification agreements and apportion
liability among themselves. Since allied
nations supporting space conflict activities
could be construed as launching states,
liability issues and allocation of liability issues
should be resolved before engaging in such
activities.
Does the Liability Convention offer an
exclusive remedy for rights of a state in event
of an attack on its space systems? No – the
Liability Convention does not exclude or limit
the right of self-defense affirmed in Article 51
and such a reading cannot be found in its
negotiation or record of the U.S. Senate
ratification. The Liability Convention presents
other challenges, however, and does not offer
a satisfactory disposition to attacks. According
to Adam Frey:
Although it clarifies some of the
Outer Space Treaty’s ambiguity, the
Liability Convention still faces
criticism. First, its definition of an
“object” as including “component
parts” does not specify whether this
includes debris, so some suggest a
launching state might not be liable for
debris-based
damage.
Second,
although the convention imposes a
“fault” standard for damages, it does
not define how much care should be
exercised during a launch. In other
words, if two space objects collide,
one state could argue that it took all
reasonable precautions, while the
injured state could argue that it did
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not. Third, fault may be difficult to
prove since specific pieces of debris
can be difficult to identify and track,
and the cause of a collision can prove
equally elusive… the mere fact of a
collision does not automatically put
the state that created the debris at
fault. Finally, there is no established
system for processing claims or for
interpreting
or
enforcing
the
convention’s terms. The convention’s
litigation mechanisms have never
been used, so their effectiveness
remains unknown. 142

harm, it must undertake “appropriate
international consultations” before
proceeding. Conversely, if a state
believes it could be harmed by
another’s actions, it “may request
consultation concerning the activity
or experiment.” Article [X] further
allows states to request observation of
each other’s launches, and Article
[XII] requires any space facilities and
equipment to be open for observation.
However, the treaty provides no right
of appeal if two states cannot resolve
these issues themselves. 143

Similar to the Liability Convention, the OST
does not set out substantive remedies for a
state that has had its space assets attacked by
another state or non-state party. Nonetheless,
some, including Frey, suggest the OST may
provide “an appropriate response” if a state
interferes with another’s space activities. It is
based on consultation:

In the end, the Liability Convention’s real
limitations on space conflict activities arise
out of its provision for liability associated with
causing damage to third-parties. These
liability issues must be evaluated, addressed,
and/or mitigated by law-abiding states before
performing self-defense military activities that
could cause damage to third-party space
systems. Planners must account for payment
of damages or plan to limit such problems.

Articles [VI] and [VII] hold states
liable for damage caused by their
space activities and launches, whether
such activity is conducted “by
governmental agencies or by nongovernmental entities” within the
state. Further, Article [IX] requires
states to avoid the “harmful
contamination” of outer space and
celestial bodies. If a state believes
that its activities could cause such
142

Adam E. Frey, “Defense of U.S. Space Assets: A Legal
Perspective,” Air & Space Power Journal (Winter 2008),
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicales/apj/apj08/
win08/frey.html (accessed June 2009). The statement by Frey
that “fault may be difficult to prove since specific pieces of
debris can be difficult to identify and track, and the cause of a
collision can prove equally elusive… the mere fact of a
collision does not automatically put the state that created the
debris at fault” has been forced to the forefront by the 10
February 2009 collision between the Iridium 33 and Cosmos
2251 communications satellites. The impact between the
Iridium Satellite LLC-owned satellite and the 16-year-old
defunct Russian military satellite occurred at 780 kilometers,
a low Earth orbit (LEO) altitude used by satellites that
monitor weather and carry telephone communications. It is
considered the most crowded area of space. See “When
Satellites Collide: Iridium 33 Strikes Defunct Russian Sat in
Unprecedented Accident,” GPS World, 12 February 2009.

The 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon
Test in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and
Under Water, also known as the Partial (or
Limited) Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), prohibited
“any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any
143
Adam E. Frey, “Defense of U.S. Space Assets: A Legal
Perspective,” Air & Space Power Journal (Winter 2008),
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicales/apj/apj08/
win08/frey.html (accessed June 2009). On the matter of
consultation, while it appears the Chinese did not offer to
engage in such discussions, it appears from news reports of
the incident the U.S. knew the ASAT test was pending. “The
events show that the [U.S.] Administration felt constrained in
its dealings with China because of its view that it had little
leverage to stop an important Chinese military program, and
because it did not want to let Beijing know how much the
U.S. knew about its space launching activities.” Further, the
U.S. did not request consultation even though the Outer Space
Treaty states this was its right. Had the U.S. been willing to
discuss the military use of space with the Chinese that might
have been enough to dissuade them from going through with
it. See Michael R. Gordon and David S. Cloud, “U.S. Knew
of China’s Missile Test, but Kept Silent,” The New York
Times 23 April 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/23/
washington/23satellite.html?_r=2&hp=&pagewanted=print&
oref=slogin (accessed June 2009).
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other nuclear explosion” in the atmosphere,
underwater, or in outer space. 144 PTBT is
superseded by the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CBTB) that bans all nuclear testing in
all mediums, though the CTBT has not as of
yet entered in force. 145 The OST does not
specifically prohibit testing weapons in outer
space itself, as opposed to on celestial bodies,
instead it proscribes the stationing of nuclear
weapons on orbit. With PTBT and CBTB,
testing and subsequent use of nuclear weapons
in response to attacks on space systems appear
to be banned, unless employed in a possible
narrow exception that allows such devices to
be employed to preserve the “survival of a
State.” Employing nuclear weapon systems
against conventional space systems probably
could not be shown to support such a survival
objective.
A series of bilateral agreements between the
U.S. and the former Soviet Union, now held to
be binding on Russia by protocol, prohibit
interference with early warning systems and
NTMs. As noted earlier, NTMs include a
variety of technologies and systems. The
definition should include space (e.g., photoreconnaissance satellites) and terrestrial assets
(e.g., land-based radars, seismographs, radar
and intelligence systems on ships and aircraft,
etc.) that can verify arms control treaty
144

Nuclear powers France and China did not sign or ratify the
PTBT. Also, the PTBT did not ban underground nuclear
testing.
145
Nuclear powers China, Israel, and the U.S. signed, but have
not ratified the CTBT. As of October 2009, 151 States have
ratified the CTBT. Thus, one could argue that the norms of
the Treaty to ban all nuclear testing in all mediums is
emerging as a universal norm binding upon states that have
not ratified the Treaty. Entry into force of the CTBT is an
achievable goal. The CTBT is entering “the most defining
period of its existence,” as there has been a “paradigm shift”
in support for the Treaty since U.S. President Obama set out
the U.S. agenda for non-proliferation and arms control in
April 2009 followed by his agreement with Russian President
Medvedev in London in 2009 to seek entry into force of
CTBT, http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2009/
after-ten-year-hiatus-entry-into-forceof-comprehensive-testban-treaty-an-achievable-goal (accessed January 2010).

compliance. Since they provide transparency,
NTM systems are thought to help reduce the
risk of nuclear war. The earliest of these
provisions was contained in the 1972 ABM
Treaty between the Soviet Union and the
U.S. 146
While the U.S. has withdrawn from the ABM
Treaty, other treaties in force today contain
this same prohibition, including the 1987
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
(INF), 1992 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START I), and 1990 Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Recognition
of the important role played by NTMs has
been made evident. Given the importance of
spaceborne NTMs role in stemming the
potential of a nuclear holocaust, noninterference rules that preserve and allow
adversary access to their systems would
appear to be taking on the trappings of a
peremptory norm that nations may want
treaties to perfect.
The Environmental Modification Convention
of 1978 147 prohibits all military or hostile
environmental modification techniques that
might cause long-lasting, severe, or
widespread environmental changes in Earth’s
atmosphere or outer space. “Each State Party
to this Convention undertakes not to engage in
military or any other hostile use of
environmental modification techniques having
widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects as
the means of destruction, damage, or injury to
any other State Party.” 148 “Widespread” is
defined as “encompassing an area on the scale
of several hundred square kilometers;” “long146

See Treaty between the U.S. of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems, 3 October 1972, but no longer in effect as of
13 June 2002 due to U.S. withdrawal.
147
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, 5
October 1978, known as the Environmental Modification
Convention.
148
Ibid., Article I(1).
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lasting” is defined as “lasting for a period of
months, or approximately a season;” and
“severe” is defined as “involving serious or
significant disruption or harm to human life,
natural and economic resources, or other
assets.” 149 The Environmental Modification
Convention focuses on proscribing military
weapons, tactics, and techniques that
deliberately change natural processes. 150
Would the use of nuclear weapons in space
violate the Environmental Modification
Convention? Perhaps, yes, but only if used
with hostile intent, to deliberately manipulate
space
environmental
processes,
with
widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects,
causing damage or destruction to space-based
systems, and directed against another party to
the treaty.
Would employing systems attacks that create
widespread, long-lasting, or severe spacebased debris fields, be unlawful? Again, yes,
if the essential elements of the Convention are
violated. A state that creates debris
intentionally in order to ruin the environment
for use by its adversary would violate the
Convention.
149

Ibid.
The U.S. Delegation Statement provides: “The
Environmental Modification Convention is not an
Environmental Protection Treaty; it is not a treaty to prohibit
damage to the environment resulting from armed conflict.
Rather, the Environmental Modification Convention fills a
special, but important niche reflecting the international
community's consensus that the environment itself should not
be used as an instrument of war.” The U.S. position on
“criteria that have been established for determining what
constitutes a prohibited action under the convention: first, the
convention specifies military or any other hostile use. The
U.S. understanding is that hostile intent is a precondition for a
violation; second, it must meet the definition of an
environmental modification technique, that is the deliberate
manipulation of a natural process; third, effects must be
widespread, long-lasting or severe as defined in Article II and
related understandings; fourth, these effects must be the
means of destruction, damage or injury; and fifth, it must be
directed against another state party. Only if all of these
criteria are met is an action prohibited by the convention.”
150
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What should be concluded if a party protests
the effects and damage were unintended?
Some suggest a state that creates orbital debris
while targeting specific adversary targets
would not violate the Convention, but that act
would instead only constitute a violation of
the Geneva Additional Protocol 1. However,
as to the space environment, the science and
danger of orbital debris is now very much
acknowledged, notwithstanding denials and
protests of any potential offending state.
Perhaps the requisite hostile intent and
deliberate manipulation elements could be
deduced from the willful and wanton
disregard for the damage that occurs and the
recklessness of the act. This same reasoning
could also be made to prohibit the use of
nuclear weapons in defense of space systems.
Agreements, such as the 1971 Accidental
Measures Agreement (updated in 2004), the
1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification
Agreement, and the 1990 Dangerous Military
Activities Agreement address dangerous laser
use and dangerous interference with nuclear
weapons command and control systems, and
so potentially limit possible space warfare
activities. 151 They are intended to prevent
outbreak
of
nuclear
war
due
to
misunderstanding, accidental launch, or
misinterpretation of unidentified objects
detected by early warning systems, and are
primarily focused on the topic of
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
These agreements basically seek to prevent
miscalculation by requiring parties to provide
notice whenever there is an accidental launch
of a ballistic missile in the direction of the
151

See Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of
Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the U.S. of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics, 30 September 1971;
Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement, 31 May
1988; and Agreement between the Government of the U.S. of
American and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities,
12 June 1989.
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other party, or when a party’s early warning
system detects an unidentified object.
These agreements affect the prosecution of
self-defense in response to attacks on space
systems. For example, the Accidentals
Measures Agreement with Russia requires the
parties to take measures to guard against an
accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear
weapons. It requires a party to notify the other
immediately if an accidental or unauthorized
incident occurs, if an early warning system
detects an unidentified object, or if there is
any other unexplained event involving
possible detonation of nuclear weapons.
Importantly, the Accidental Measures
Agreement requires a party to provide
advance notice of any planned missile
launches beyond the territory of the launching
party and in the direction of the other party.
The Launch Notification Agreement requires a
party to provide at least 24-hour advance
notice of the date, launch location, and
estimated impact area for any ballistic missile
launch. These notification requirements could
require potentially disruptive or compromising
information exchanges with Russia before
prosecuting
military
space
activities,
especially if space launches are required. Such
exchanges could limit the ability of the U.S. to
prosecute space-related military/conflictrelated activities.
Although not traditional space “arms control”
agreements, the U.S. is party to numerous
bilateral or multilateral agreements that may
restrict and limit “space activities” from being
performed in or from the territory of another
state party. For example, in the U.S. pursuit of
a global ballistic missile defense system, it is
entirely foreseeable that states where key
components are located could impose
restrictions on U.S. space or other activities in
exchange for the U.S. right to base ground- or
link- segments in that state. In the recent past,

several long-standing allies limited their
cooperation with the U.S. on missile defense
related activities, not wishing to participate,
support, or cause a potential violation of the
ABM Treaty, even though they were not
signatories to that agreement. These positions
have evolved as perceptions of threats to
national interests changed and the U.S
withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002. The
existence of such agreements and potential
limitations on space activities should not be
ignored in a discussion of the law relating to
space conflict activities.
Citing a changed global environment, the U.S.
withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002.
Assuming a new ABM Treaty is negotiated on
the same or similar terms, where would such a
treaty leave ASATs from a legal perspective?
There is, not surprisingly, more than one
answer. Some analysts suggest that it may be
impossible to distinguish between ABM
directed-energy space vehicles and those
deployed exclusively for anti-satellite
purposes. 152
Hurwitz argues that “all extraterrestrial
autonomous weapons are illegal. However,
non-nuclear weapons, which are not
autonomous, may be stationed and, in
accordance with generally accepted principles
of international law, used in Earth orbit.” 153 In
short, while the ABM Treaty appears to
prohibit the use of directed-energy weapons in
an ABM mode, “the same technology when
used in the development/testing/deployment
of ASATs is not prohibited.
Given the overlap of technologies, careful
consideration must be given to whether
152

Joan Johnson-Freese, “The Viability of U.S. Anti-Satellite
(ASAT) Policy: Moving Toward Space Control, INSS
Occasional Paper 30, U.S. Air Force Institute for National
Security Studies (INSS), January 2000, p. 16.
153
Bruce A. Hurwitz, The Legality of Space Militarization
(North-Holland, 1986), p. 135.
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systems might be favored in one case as an
ABM system, but not as an ASAT, or vice
versa. This issue generated considerable
political debates in the 1980s, when debates
involving the SDI were also fought over
ASAT technologies, options, opportunities,
and related programs. 154 U.S. ASAT
technology
development
efforts
have
continued on and off for decades. Peace and
disarmament advocates now attack U.S.
missile defense systems as fledgling ASAT
systems, a topic brought to the forefront by the
2008 interception of the disabled USA 193
intelligence satellite by a modified Aegis
cruiser and missile defense missile over the
Pacific.
Conclusions
“Arming the heavens” might seem a most
tempting option to respond to threats to U.S.
space
systems.
Regardless of the “Arming the
wisdom of such heavens” might
action, the facts
remain that the U.S. seem a most
is dependent on use tempting option
of space systems for to respond to
military operations threats to U.S.
and security; that space systems.
these systems are
vulnerable to disruption, attack, and even
destruction; and that at stake are the
154

Once the Strategic Defense Initiative was politicized during
the 1980s, debates ran the gamut of the defense and policy
communities. Opponents posed objections, most technical, to
missile defense claiming – the Soviet ABM radars complexes
were not violations of the ABM treaty; propulsion, sensor,
and targeting systems could not be miniaturized for a kinetic
kill vehicle; kinetic kill technologies could not be integrated
on the battlefield; command and control systems could not be
developed to engage ballistic missiles; software programs
needed to manage an effective ABM system requires too
many lines of code; lasers cannot engage and defeat missile
targets; withdrawal from the ABM treaty would lead the U.S.
straight into World War III; and the like. Each of the technical
objections has been defeated by “smart” technical programs.
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asymmetric advantages space capabilities
provide the U.S. and its allies. Adversaries can
easily see the tremendous leverage they can
obtain by disrupting space systems. Given
these pressures, space presents a feasible arena
for conflict activities.
Policy, law, and resulting strategy formulation
for defense of space systems requires more
sophistication. Provocateurs advocating and
planning for unconstrained space warfare have
been marginalized over the decades as
seasoned and knowledgeable leaders in the
executive
and
military
departments,
congressional delegations, and international
community approach such options with
extreme caution. If performing self-defense
activities, lawful options must be considered
and selected by a state in event an adversary
or entity threatens or attacks its space
systems? Employing space systems in accord
with international law is vital to ensure
continued access to space capabilities and that
the space domain remains a peaceful
environment as envisioned by the OST
Regime. By doing this, the U.S. will maintain
not only an ultimate strategic high ground, but
also a moral one.
We know that under treaty and customary law,
the U.S., as well as member states of the UN
and states that have ratified OST, must use
space for peaceful purposes, refrain from
using space aggressively, take care to preserve
the space environment, and be prepared to
indemnify if it damages another nonbelligerent
state’s
assets.
Applicable
international treaties, conventions, customary
law, and LOAC principles do not specifically
describe what the U.S. should or can do in
preparation for or in response to an attack on
space systems. Rather, as some contend, they
highlight what cannot be done.
The right to respond to attacks against space
systems is limited. Relevant treaties,
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customary law, the LOAC, and other legal
principles substantially restrict space warfare
options and the potential for such conflict
among law-abiding nations. The use of force
is allowed only in self-defense or in accord
with authorization of
the UN to maintain The right to
international
peace
respond to
and security. Kinetic,
electromagnetic
or attacks
information operation against space
attacks against space systems is
systems are each an limited.
“armed attack” to
which the use of force is permitted in accord
with the self-defense exception. The right to
conduct conflict and space warfare activities
involving space systems is constrained by the
LOAC, and the right of anticipatory selfdefense may lawfully be employed in defense
of space systems only in limited
circumstances.
If engaged in space-based warfare, a state
must comply with the legal obligations set out
in the OST, Registration Convention, Liability
Convention,
PTBT/CTBT,
Environment
Modification Convention, and other treaties.
Certain satellite systems and their supporting
ground-based, and command and control
systems should not be attacked; this could
include spaceborne components of NTMs,
especially if they are necessary and important
to reduce chances of a full-fledge nuclear
conflagration, or resolution of such a conflict.
Even if lawful means and methods are
employed and targets engaged, physical,
technical, environmental, and political
realities, and their risks and benefits, still limit
options to defend and fight space systems;
specifically, they limit the when, where, and
how adversary space systems can, or should
not, be engaged.
The U.S. can lawfully take a passive approach
to defend its space systems, allowing it to treat

some attacks and threats as a mere distraction.
Satellite vulnerabilities can be reduced by
using anti-jamming measures; hardening to
protect against electromagnetic pulses,
radiation,
or
explosions;
improving
maneuverability to actively avoid attacks. Yet
as we have seen with developments in North
Korea, developing states and terrorist groups
can gain access to space system and propose
to engage in serious mischief. Attacks could
range the span of space systems – terrestrial,
link, and on-orbit assets. There is no assurance
a self-restraint option will protect orbital
assets.
If deterrence fails, a lawful self-defense
“punishment strategy” can be employed.
Absolute flexibility should be maintained by
the U.S. and its allies in the way they wield
such deterrence, if they choose to wield it at
all. The lawful range of diplomatic,
information,
military,
and
economic
instruments of national power should be
considered and employed. These instruments
are not limited to just offensive or defensive
counterspace or space control activities,
though preparing for destructive space-based
combat activities must be carefully considered
and generally deferred given the risks such
conflict presents to the very space
environment the U.S. wishes to protect.
Nevertheless, preparing to employ a complete
suite of these instruments “would signal to any
adversary considering U.S. space systems as a
legitimate target that the U.S. has the means
and resolve to respond if it so chooses.” 155
Preparing for the lawful use of U.S. and allied
retaliatory measures can encourage or, if
necessary, compel offender reconsideration of
its course of action and compliance to
international morays or legal obligations if
engagement cannot succeed.
155

See John B. Sheldon, “Space Power and Deterrence: Are
We Serious,” Marshall Institute Policy Outlook (November
2008): 3-4.
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Important, but lost on many who seek to
contest the space domain, a retaliatory
deterrence strategy for the U.S. has little
credibility if directed at adversary space assets
since the U.S. “…is the most space-reliant
country today. Threatening to attack adversary
satellites in response to attacks on U.S.
systems may prove fruitless if the adversary in
question does not leverage significant
military, diplomatic, and economic power
through such systems…” 156 Presently, the U.S.
is the only globally space-enabled power, so
adversary spaceborne components probably
should not be engaged tit-for-tat. 157 Such
would only be a pyrrhic act. This may change
as other nations gain the wherewithal,
experience, and access to space capabilities
and fully exploit them for military purposes.
Non-aggressive weaponization of space is
legal as is the use of force in self-defense
against space systems components whether in
space or the terrestrial environment. Treaty
and U.S. policy allows developing and
deploying systems designed to protect
satellites, or defeat ASAT and strategic threats
(e.g., ICBMs). Employing a weapon system in
self-defense to engage targets, whether
ground, air, or space-based, if accomplished in
such a way the combat event does not create
space debris, and is targeted in accord with
LOAC principles, appear to be lawful under
current treaty and customary law. Jamming
technologies can be employed to deny
adversary access to space and protect
spacecraft, and their effects may be reversible
156

Ibid.
Joint Publication 3-14, 6 January 2009, p. II-5. Negation
includes “Active and offensive measures to deceive, disrupt,
deny, degrade, or destroy an adversary’s space capabilities.
Negation includes actions against ground, data link, user,
and/or space segment(s) of an adversary’s space systems and
services, or any other space system or service used by an
adversary that is hostile to U.S. national interests.” Also, see
the 2006 U.S. National Space Policy which states: “…the
U.S. will …deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space
capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.”
157

51

and not contaminate the environment. SSA
and other sensor systems, command and
control, and shooter capabilities may not be
powerful and nuanced enough over the nearterm to achieve all the results needed and
desired. That may change as space control
technologies evolve.
In the event of war, the U.S. and its allies may
defend components of their space systems that
are subject to jamming and cyber attack since
such attacks can be considered armed attacks
in a modern context. In doing so, they must
accurately determine the source of the attack
and confirm adversary state or non-state actors
intended to target the system at issue and
cause destructive effects. The U.S. should be
able to treat certain adversary satellites and
supporting systems as legitimate targets only
after ensuring that satellite’s loss would not
excessively harm civilians or the space
environment, or violate other peremptory
norms. The U.S. response must be necessary
and proportional; not more than that amount
necessary to accomplish military objectives to
defeat adversary forces and to achieve the
enemy’s partial or complete submission.
Attacks against adversary NTMs capabilities
should be avoided as attacking them could
violate peremptory norms to take all actions
necessary to prevent nuclear war, ensure
compliance with nuclear weapons arms
control agreements, and prevent attacks by
weapons of mass destruction. On the other
hand, the U.S may lawfully respond to attacks
against its own national NTMs and nuclear
command and control capabilities under rules
relating to self-defense and, if necessary,
reprisal. 158
158

Reprisals are acts taken in response to LOAC violations.
Such an act of reprisal would be otherwise forbidden if it was
not for the prior unlawful act of the enemy. A lawful act of
reprisal cannot be the basis for a counter-reprisal. To be
lawful, a reprisal must: timely respond to grave and
manifestly (clearly) unlawful acts; be for the purpose of
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Conflict involving space systems need not be
space-based. In defending its systems, the
U.S. could lawfully use existing terrestriallybased military systems to defeat and/or
prevent adversary weapons from entering
space, or from being successfully operated
there. Adversary ground control stations could
be engaged and command and control
linkages interrupted, reduced, or destroyed.
If facts establishing conditions of immediacy
and necessity to U.S and allied systems are
satisfied, anticipatory self-defense actions
could be undertaken. The goal of such
anticipatory self-defense actions could involve
targeting the enemy’s systems before and
during launch. Jammers could also be located,
degraded, and destroyed; e.g., GPS jammers
were engaged and destroyed during Operation
Iraqi Freedom by GPS-aided Joint Direct
Attack Munitions described as precision
guided munitions or “smart bombs.” Spacelift
facilities could also be engaged to disable
adversary launch capabilities.
The U.S. is obligated to protect the space
environment. Obligations imposed by the
Outer Space and Environment Modification
treaties, Liability Convention, and other
agreements, and physical reality, make it
politically wise, and immensely practical to
keep space safe and usable. As the nation that
exploits space capabilities to their maximum
extent, the U.S. has the most to lose if the
domain is compromised and lost to unwise
operations or conflict. Self-defense acts that
seek to or actually damage the space

compelling the adversary to observe the LOAC and not for
revenge, spite, or punishment; give reasonable notice that
reprisals will be taken; have had other reasonable means
attempted to secure compliance; be directed against the
personnel or property of an adversary; be proportional to the
original violation; be publicized; be authorized by national
authorities at the highest political level. Only the President of
the U.S., as Commander-in-Chief, may authorize U.S. forces
to take such actions.

environment for extended periods may be
impermissible; hence, the U.S. must observe
the obligation to avoid and minimize the
creation of debris when operating defensive
space weapons. “Soft-kill weapons that
disable are clearly acceptable and favored if
weapons need to be employed against space
based components. Explosive weapons, such
as space mines surrounding satellites, are not,
especially since they can create significant
space debris.” 159 Given the potential for
resulting debris, taking action to destroy or
damage adversary space systems “may violate
the duty to avoid the harmful contamination of
space” except in the most pressing
circumstance. 160
The U.S. is the global leader in space and has
filled this role for half a century. Its systems
work and have been revolutionary in
presenting new capabilities in the civil,
commercial, and military arenas. As it has
done for decades, the U.S. enjoys a unique
position to shape the direction of global space
activities for this new century. With this
position comes great responsibility – to forge
behaviors to mitigate space debris, prevent
armed conflict, and enhance the peace,
security, and prosperity of spacefaring nations
and the rest of the world. Space capabilities
are at risk to a myriad of threats, but continued
efforts to improve space governance by
international treaties, customary law, best
practices, policy, strategy, and overarching
global behaviors will secure the high frontier.
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The New Space Order: Why Space Power Matters for Europe
Nicolas Peter
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More than fifty years since the dawn of the
Space Age and twenty years since the end of
the Cold War, space affairs and politics
remain interlinked. Space activities are
increasingly tied to national power for major
world powers, and political objectives are still
the driving force for most space activities. Yet
in an ever more globalized and competitive
multipolar world, status and power that arise
from the employment and access to the most
advanced technologies are now widely
perceived as key to the powers and standings
of states. The importance of space activities is
increasing, transitioning in terms of perception
by today’s world leaders from a “nice to have”
to a “need to have” status. A sound
understanding of the nature and exploitation
of space power is critical for Europe as it
provides tangible and intangible benefits back
on Earth that allow Europe to maintain its
position in the global “space hierarchy” in the
21st Century.
The world, since the end of the Cold War, is
increasingly interlinked and interdependent at
many levels. At the same time, the balance of
powers across the world is changing and
shifting with emerging world powers rising,
particularly in Asia. This is complicated by
the fact that there exists a renewed emphasis
and importance accorded by states on spheres
of influence based on geography or on topical
issues. In particular, a greater importance is
placed on a country’s ability to innovate as a
source of competitive advantage. The world is
becoming at the same time both “flat” and
“spiky.” 1 Science and Technology (S&T)
1

A “flat” world implies that the world is more globalized and
interconnected. See Thomas Friedman, The World Is Flat: A

prowess is one of the key elements of this
emerging flat/spiky system of competitive
multipolarity. Governments are fully engaged
in improving their national economies and
overall competitiveness, but also because they
realize that it represents for them a means,
among others, for achieving national
objectives, including foreign policy motives,
especially in the domain of “S&T politics,”
such as nuclear energy, but also in the area of
space affairs.
In the early years of the Space Age, the
performances of the United States (U.S) and
Soviet Union in space activities came to be
interpreted as a
The world is measure of their
becoming at relative military,
economic,
and
the same time scientific strength
both “flat” and on the world
“spiky.” stage. During the
Cold War, human
and robotic space accomplishments became on
the geopolitical level an element of a
country’s power and influence. Space, since
the 1950s, is a key attribute of a state’s power.
However, since the 1990s, the space context is
dramatically evolving. Similar to the process
of internationalization of innovation, space
activities are expanding beyond the traditional

Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2005). A “spiky” world suggests that by almost any
measure the international landscape is not at all flat. On the
contrary, the world is spiky with concentrated centers of
power, influence, economic horsepower and cutting-edge
innovation. See Richard Florida, “The World is Spiky,” The
Atlantic Monthly, October 2005.
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spacefaring countries 2 to new global players,
such as China and India, as well as other
emerging countries, with changing patterns of
international space relations leading to a new
space order.
In this evolving geopolitical context, the
importance of space power is increasing as
space remains a proxy demonstrating power
and because more actors are using space.
Although there is a great deal of rhetoric about
the impact of S&T on international affairs,
there is relatively little analytical work on the
link between space and national power, as
well as between space power and international
affairs. This paper aims to provide a
preliminary overview of a complex and wideranging subject that brings together the
important issue of space power and European
influence in international relations.

elements of the Cold War rivalry between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union, principally as a
substitute for armed conflict. 5 During this
phase, space activities were limited to a small
number of other countries, primarily in Europe
and Asia, but with
…the more
limited
importance of capabilities than the
space power is two superpowers.
increasing as Indeed, the technical
and
space remains difficulties
financial
burdens
a proxy
associated with the
demonstrating full range of space
power... activities remained
prohibitive for most
countries; only a limited number of countries
were able to benefit from the use of space
technologies and activities due to the inherent
technical complexity, high costs associated
with space activities, and the necessity for a
high-skilled workforce.

Towards a New Space Order
Since the pioneering of space activities, the
geopolitical context of space affairs changed
dramatically. 3 The history of space activities
can be structured into three phases, each
having distinct features and characteristics: (1)
“proto-space age” (pre-World War II); (2)
“Space 1.0” (Cold War); and (3) “Space 2.0”
(post-Cold War). 4
Space 1.0 took place from the late 1950s to
the late 1980s. For more than three decades,
space was viewed as one of the emblematic
2

The term spacefaring country defines a country capable of
developing, launching, and operating satellites in space
autonomously. This implies the state possesses a fairly robust
launch infrastructure and indigenous capabilities to
manufacture and operate space systems.
3
Nicolas Peter, “The Changing Geopolitics of Space
Activities,” Space Policy 22 (2006): 100-109.
4
Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe in the Need for a
Conceptual Framework,” paper presented at the 59th
International Astronautical Congress, Glasgow, Scotland, 29
September - 3 October 2008.

The current space phase, Space 2.0, which
started at the beginning of the 1990s as a
result of the changing geopolitical context
linked to the end of the Cold War, is
characterized by a multipolar world and the
rise of many new actors with increasing
technical
capabilities,
advancing
an
6
internationalization of space. In particular, a
technological revolution linked to the
development of small satellite technology, the
increasing reliability and accessibility of
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology,
and the multiplication of commercial services
leading to a reduction of the price of access to
space facilitate the involvement of nontraditional actors in the space arena. 7
Countries previously unable to pursue space
activities now have a greater opportunity to
5

Nicolas Peter, “The Changing Geopolitics of Space
Activities,” Space Policy 22 (2006): 100-109.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
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enter the space arena; the space environment
is no longer the exclusive province of a
handful number of countries as it was during
the Cold War.
Spacefaring powers are joined by other
countries that have some degree of space
involvement. An increasing number of
countries have acquired over the years space
capabilities for national reasons (e.g., support
national
economy
and
overall
competitiveness, public services, and ensure
national security), as well as international
reasons (e.g., regional influence and prestige).
They recognize the advantages of space
activities from the tangible aspects of
positioning-navigation-timing (PNT), remote
sensing, and telecommunications to the more
abstract aspects of political influence and
prestige. There are tangible benefits that result
from investing in space, such as job creation;
stimulation of national interest in Science,
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics
(STEM); and spin-off technologies resulting
from research and development (R&D). There
are intangible benefits as well – a successful
space program brings heightened global
prestige and increased domestic credibility
and prowess.
While few countries have independent launch
capability (nine total), and even less have
human spaceflight capabilities (three total),
the number of players controlling their own
communications systems have doubled since
the end of the 1980s. 8 There are, as of
December 2009, 27 countries with satellitebased Earth observation resources compared
with three in 1980, not to mention the
numerous countries that have their own image
receiving stations for remote sensing systems. 9
8

Bertrand de Montluc, “The New International Political and
Strategic Context for Space Policies,” Space Policy 25
(2009): 20-28.
9
Ibid.
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The multiplication of actors in the post Cold
War context is accompanied by an emerging
globalization of space activities with actors
now scattered all over the world and no longer
limited to the “North.” 10 The multipolar space
environment and the resulting new space order
is characterized by the rapid integration of
China and India as new space powers, and the
entry of countries
…a successful particularly from the
space program “South,”
like
brings Malaysia, Thailand,
Indonesia. 11
heightened and
global prestige New ambitions to
dedicated
and increased create
space agencies are
domestic surfacing on all
credibility and continents and more
prowess. countries
are
formulating
space
policy to guide their domestic and
international space activities with the principal
aim being to improve their capabilities and
competitiveness. 12
10

It is important to note that national organization of space
activities and the weight of national budgets differ greatly
among countries around the world. Not all countries involved
in space activities do posses a national space agency, and the
national authorities responsible for space matters vary widely.
A first category is composed of countries with their own
agencies devoted more or less exclusively to space. In a
second category, space affairs are directly handled by a
ministry (education, research and technology, industry or
trade, defense, etc.) or by an inter-ministerial entity. See
Nicolas Peter, “The Changing Geopolitics of Space
Activities,” Space Policy 22 (2006): 100-109.
11
The use of the term “South” refers to all developing
countries, as well as all Least Developed Countries (LDCs). It
rests on the fact that the entire world’s industrially developed
countries (with the exception of Australia and New Zealand)
lie to the North of developing countries. However, the
diversity of countries in the South must be kept in mind.
Some countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, China, India,
Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea have enviable records
of technical and scientific achievements compared to others in
the South and even the North.
12
Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe in the 21st
Century,” European Space Policy Institute Perspectives 21,
May 2009, http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/
Perspectives/espi%20perspectives%2021%20.pdf (accessed
January 2010).
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As a reflection of the international system, the
current space environment is characterized by
a growing number of countries with varying
ranges of space capabilities (e.g., technical
and scientific). This, in turn, is leading to
more options for international cooperation in
the second space
phase as there is a There is a
growing
pool
of mushrooming
potential partners to of bilateral and
take part in space multilateral
States cooperation….
activities. 13
around the world are
now looking to a variety of partners as they
plan their future endeavors since partnerships
are helpful to transfer technologies and
explicit and tacit knowledge. Those
partnerships are driven by scientific and
technical motives, often with “high politics”
as objectives. There is a mushrooming of
bilateral and multilateral cooperation,
including regional cooperation, and there is
the development of a complex and
multidimensional web of relations in the space
arena. 14
A bipolar space world has been replaced by a
pluralistic space context marked by a plethora
of complex relationships. The early years of
international
space
cooperation
were
characterized by power asymmetries in the
two superpower’s favor vis-à-vis their partners
as illustrated with U.S.-European space
relations. However, the traditional asymmetry
in space activities, while still existing in term
of resources, tends to disappear in regard to
capabilities with the emergence of spacefaring
countries with similar capabilities to the
historical two space powers, the U.S. and
13

International cooperation in space can be defined as any
sharing of knowledge or technology between two, or more,
states within the context of mutually acceptable conventions
for the exchange of that knowledge or technology. It can take
many forms, but in general both parties can derive benefits.
14
Nicolas Peter, “The Changing Geopolitics of Space
Activities,” Space Policy 22 (2006): 100-109.

Soviet Union/Russia. Roles and relationships
in space are being redefined in the new space
order. The U.S. and Russia are no longer the
only players that can lead cooperative
projects. There are now numerous actors with
varying degrees of capabilities allowing them
to lead cooperative ventures as well.
The patterns of relations in space are
fundamentally changing. There is now a
variety of cooperation possibilities leading to
new relations evolving beyond the traditional
“North-North” cooperation and the unilateral
“North-South” axes of cooperation of the first
space phase. The new axes of “South-South”
cooperation has been growing in recent years
in many fields, such as in energy, and space is
no exception as they are now more countries
from the South with mature technical
capabilities that are using space to reach out to
new partners. This leads to the development of
new networks of cooperation as there are
cooperation possibilities with new hubs and
centers of gravity
…being involved appearing in Asia
in space affairs is and centered on
increasingly being China and India.
seen… as a New axes of
necessary cooperation are
arising; some are
element to being, deepening, while
at a minimum, a others
are
regional or weakening. 15 The
continental power. multiplication of
space actors and
the new relations among institutional entities
are leading to the emergence of a new space
order that was unforeseeable twenty years ago.
In the current phase of space activities, there is
also a growing diversity in the types of actors
involved in space affairs that influences the
overall space context. The involvement of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
15

Ibid.
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other non-state actors, like private enterprises,
are leading to a multiplicity of actors and
stakeholders in the space environment.
Dozens of companies offer services in open
global markets and states can now meet much
of their need for space benefits in the market
place due to the wide array of
communications, navigation, reconnaissance,
weather satellite, and launch services
commercially
available.
Commercial
technology and know-how transfers have
made possible the global distribution of space
technologies. The declining price, widening
availability of satellite construction, and space
launch capabilities allow an ever growing
number of states to establish a presence in
space. While to date only a few states have
mastered the full range of space capabilities,
the proliferation of space products and
services are allowing states, and non-state
actors, to benefit from the advantages
provided by space activities without
developing,
launching,
and
operating
indigenous space systems. Private companies
of traditional space powers are the main
drivers in this process. Also, new and
emerging actors, as they climb the global
“space hierarchy,” are providing new sources
of technologies and fostering the proliferation
of space technologies worldwide.
While the internationalization of space is not
entirely new, it is now taking place at a much
faster pace. The space system is now more
open and dynamic than during the Cold War.
Space is spreading more widely, including to
developing countries, and involves more than
simply purchasing technologies. This trend is
likely to progress even more rapidly over the
coming years. This means that a country does
not have to be a technologically advanced
country to acquire space capabilities and this
makes all countries potential space players.
The asymmetric advantage the superpowers
once enjoyed because of their space prowess
is eroding because many countries can now,
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by partnering with other states or commercial
entities, receive certain kinds of space support.
The space context is evolving towards a new
space order where space activities are
becoming more widespread. However, space
activities are prioritized differently depending
on the country, and consequently the
objectives of space programs differ
accordingly. A growing number of states are
using space programs for political and
symbolic objectives, such as demonstrating
and increasing national pride and to achieve
national independence, regional influence, and
technological maturity. 16 In the current space
phase, being involved in space affairs is
increasingly being seen, even by newcomers
to the space arena, as a necessary element to
being, at a minimum, a regional or continental
power. For world powers, space is
increasingly perceived as an indispensable
element of national power. The importance of
being involved in space affairs is growing in
the unfolding new space order, and no country
can now be regarded as a world power, or
remain one, unless it possess cutting-edge and
diversified space capabilities.
The Growing Importance
of Space Power
In recent years, with the aforementioned
evolution of the geopolitical context,
traditional bases of national power have been
fundamentally transformed. Military and
economic metrics are no longer the sole
indicators of national power. 17 Other variables
are increasingly important, such as S&T
prowess, and in the 21st Century the overall
political, economic, and technological
16

Bertrand de Montluc, “The New International Political and
Strategic Context for Space Policies,” Space Policy 25
(2009): 20-28
17
Herein, national power is defined as the capacity of a
country to pursue strategic goals through purposeful action.
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leadership of a country must be shown in
many areas, space being one of them.
Having now passed its 50th anniversary, the
Space Age has attained a great degree of
maturity. 18 Space activities are indispensable
tools for modern society that have proliferated
globally. When a state seeks to garner more
power, it is increasingly being involved in
space affairs as this is a symbol of technology
progress. The range and pervasiveness of
activities in space resulted in these activities
becoming tied, over the years, to national
power. Space activities represent a definitive
measuring device for the relative status of
countries and an indicator of a state’s weight
and influence on the global scene.
Concomitantly, the proliferation of space
capabilities in recent years has not elevated
every country into the spacefaring category.
Only a certain number of attributes confer this
status: access to space and the ability to
pursue activities autonomously. Nonetheless,
a sound understanding of the nature and
exploitation of space power is necessary
because it has consequences and profound
implications,
both
domestically
and
internationally, and gives additional overall
national power to a state as space provides for
soft power projection. 19
The body of space power literature lacks a
single comprehensive theory that thoughtfully
defines, explains, and predicts the nature,
significance, and functioning of space

power. 20 According to Colin Gray, “space
power suffers from an unusual malady: an
acute shortage of space-focused strategic
theory and the lack of
Space power a binding organizing
to
aid
is not simply concept
understanding
of
what
satellites and
it is all about.” 21
access to Nevertheless, there is
space; it is no void of space
anything and power theory. There
numerous
everything a are
country can proposed space power
achieve theories, but none has
achieved consensus in
through the space community;
space. more
than
five
decades since the first
steps into space, there is no definitive work on
space theory comparable to the writings of
Clausewitz, Mahan, and Mitchell among
others in their respective fields. 22 Space power
still lacks a holistic approach and its elements
remain disjointed and embryonic in
comparison to other domains of land, sea, and
air.
One of the most pervasive elements
confronting the space community is the lack
of common vocabulary. The need for a solid
definitional construct is of pivotal importance
to develop a better understanding of the
practice of space power, including its potential
and its implications. While different
definitions emphasize different aspects, no
definition covers all aspects of the actors,
capabilities, functions, and purposes of space
20

18

Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe, in the Need for a
Conceptual Framework,” paper presented at the 59th
International Astronautical Congress, Glasgow, Scotland, 29
September - 3 October 2008.
19
Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe in the 21st
Century,” European Space Policy Institute Perspectives 21,
May 2009, http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/
Perspectives/espi%20perspectives%2021%20.pdf (accessed
January 2010).

Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe, in the Need for a
Conceptual Framework,” paper presented at the 59th
International Astronautical Congress, Glasgow, Scotland, 29
September - 3 October 2008.
21
Colin Gray, “The Influence of Space Power Upon History,”
Comparative Strategy 15 (1996): 293-308.
22
Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe, in the Need for a
Conceptual Framework,” paper presented at the 59th
International Astronautical Congress, Glasgow, Scotland, 29
September - 3 October 2008.
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power. The most common definition is one
from the work of Lupton. He defines space
power as the “the ability of a nation to exploit
the space environment in pursuit of national
goals and purposes, and includes the entire
astronautical capabilities of the nation.” 23
Yet this definition does not capture some
important realities of the emerging space
order. Space power can be defined herein as
the “total strength and
ability of a state to …as long as
conduct and influence there is not
activities
to,
in, major conflict,
through, and from the most
space to achieve its important form
goals and objectives
of space
(security, economic,
and political) to affect power is nondesired outcomes in military.
the presence of other
actors on the world stage, and if necessary, to
change the behavior of others by exploiting
space systems and associated ground
infrastructure as well as political leverage it
has garnered.” 24
This definition is inclusive of the essential
elements for any definition of space power. It
focuses on states as the main space actors, on
national objectives, the use of space as a
medium distinct from other media, and the use
of capabilities that are required by the space
medium. Space power is about the
exploitation of the space environment, and the
purpose of that exploitation is to achieve some
national objectives or purposes. It is the ability
to use space to get desired outcomes by
influencing the environment and the behavior
23

David Lupton, On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine
(Air University Press, 1988).
24
Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe in the 21st
Century,” European Space Policy Institute Perspectives 21,
May 2009, http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/
Perspectives/espi%20perspectives%2021%20.pdf (accessed
January 2010).
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of others. In other words, space power is the
pursuit of national objectives through the use
of space affairs. 25
Space power has the potential to provide
significant contributions to the political and
strategic objectives of governments that
undertake space activities. It can, for instance,
support a country’s overall national power and
international standing. Space power alone,
however, cannot ensure the attainment of
terrestrial political objectives; it must be
combined with other power elements.
Nonetheless, space power is a major element
of national power, and it is becoming a
strategic concern for many countries. Space
power is not simply satellites and access to
space; it is anything and everything a country
can achieve through space. 26
The foundations of space power range from
obvious hardware elements (e.g., launch sites;
launch vehicles, telemetry, tracking, and
communications sites; on-orbit satellites; and
other spacecraft), to socioeconomic elements
(e.g., human capital), and to political and
regulatory elements (e.g., number of seats in
international organizations and other relevant
bodies). 27 Spacefaring countries possess
inherent attributes of space power. Any state’s
approach to space power depends on its
perception of the strategic environment and its
position relative to other space actors, and the
inherent value of space power depends on
what it allows you to do. Moreover, a
spacefaring country can be a major actor in
domains linked with space activities (e.g.,
25

Ibid.
Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe, in the Need for a
Conceptual Framework,” paper presented at the 59th
International Astronautical Congress, Glasgow, Scotland, 29
September - 3 October 2008.
27
Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe in the 21st
Century,” European Space Policy Institute Perspectives 21,
May 2009, http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/
Perspectives/espi%20perspectives%2021%20.pdf (accessed
January 2010).
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technical and scientific activities), but this
does not necessarily imply that this actor
possesses the complete spectrum of space
activities or that this actor can exercise space
power to its maximum. 28
Not all states have developed similar space
capabilities (space is also spiky) and there
exist gradations of advantage. It is necessary
that a country fully demonstrate “political
will” and develop the attendant national policy
and strategy to exploit the elements of space
power. Space policies and programs when
well conceived, linked, and executed provide
tangible and intangible space power benefits.
There are different elements in the space
power continuum with a complex interaction
between civilian, economic, and military
programs and assets, as well as soft,
economic, and hard powers. 29 Space power is
multidimensional
and
demarcated
by
scientific, political, economic, and geopolitical
dimensions. Exercising space power conveys
a variety of benefits to space actors, such as
national and international prestige, military
advantage, economic competitiveness, and
scientific and technical prowess. It also
demonstrates the willingness of a state to
increase its standing in the global “space
hierarchy.”
Using the traditional four effects of national
power, the impacts of space power can be
categorized as: (1) diplomatic; (2) economic;
(3) military; and (4) cultural.30

global position that allows influence in the
international context.
2. Space power allows for the development
of a highly skilled technological workforce
and a dynamic industrial base that are both
critical for a country’s economic
competitiveness.
3. Space power can be used as a pressure
point to support political decisions since it
can be an element to dissuade targeted
players of hostile actions and can also be
used to apply force.
4. Space power can help to promote
awareness of a common identity among
citizens and demonstrate increased
confidence in future capabilities.
There is no general hierarchy of these
attributes since they do not exist in isolation
from one another and various traits are tied
together. 31 Space power leverages different
elements and is a foundation for a state’s total
power capability and, by its very nature,
enables the exercise of influence over a broad
spectrum of areas. The relative value of space
power depends on how much an actor uses
them and for what. Space power can be
applied in different ways. It can provide direct
benefits to the owner of space assets, but it
can also be used to encourage and reward
others, dissuade targeted players, and
ultimately, it can be used to apply force. All of
these demonstrate the flexibility and
versatility of space power. 32

1. Space power is a means of impressing the
world through the possession of elaborate
space capabilities illustrating an assertive

While the arguments over possible theories of
space power continue, space power is being
exercised by all spacefaring countries,
purposefully or not. Today, space power is
inseparable from all other forms of power due

28

31
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International Astronautical Congress, Glasgow, Scotland, 29
September - 3 October 2008.
30
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to the ubiquitous and pervasive nature of
space activities. There are, however, only a
few historical examples of the utilization of
space power to date. This short history of
space exploitation limits the evidentiary base
from which cogent conclusions can be drawn.
For example, only since the first U.S.-led Gulf
War are there examples of the utilization of
space power to support hard power (e.g., crisis
in Yugoslavia, and the current conflicts in Iraq
and Afghanistan). Despite this limited set of
historical evidence, space power is an
important reality. Also, as long as there is not
major conflict, the most important form of
space power is non-military. For space power,
soft power and economic power are just as
important as hard power. Space power has
profound implications both domestically and
around the world in terms of the credibility of
a country’s capabilities, and it provides both
symbolic and political advantages that are
beyond quantifiable material benefits.
Space Power
and International Relations
The competition for status and global
influence in many different domains remains a
key feature of today’s multipolar and
heterogeneous international scene. With the
recognition in recent decades of the increasing
role played by S&T for innovation and
economic development, more dedicated
policies are implemented throughout the world
to reinforce, protect, and enhance national
technological capabilities. Governments from
all over the world recognize the importance of
S&T as a critical element contributing towards
the development and implementation of strong
economic, political, national, security, and
social future of any country. They also
recognize that S&T can provide external
advantages at the international level as S&T
prowess contributes to diplomatic leadership,
creates respect in the international community,
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and raises the attractiveness of a country for
partnerships.
Governments initiate or participate in
international S&T cooperative ventures for a
number of scientific or technological reasons
that have been well documented. International
S&T agreements are also used by policymakers to serve foreign policy purposes; the
signing of an international S&T agreement
between governments or international
organizations can indicate a willingness to
improve relations among countries, leading to
broader cooperation. S&T activities are often
used to establish a network of international
partnerships to attract other countries in
someone’s sphere of influence or reinforce
existing relations as there are diplomatic gains
to be made through partnerships. Many
countries are using S&T as a political tool to
reach non-traditional partners to build trusting
relationships across political borders as
international cooperation in S&T allows
countries to engage in a public diplomacy of
deeds/actions and not just words.
S&T diplomacy – defined here as scientific
and
technological
cooperation
and
engagement with the explicit intent of
building positive relationships with foreign
governments – has played an important, often
underappreciated, role in the foreign policy of
world powers over the past fifty years.
International cooperation in S&T has been
growing steadily since World War II and can
now be considered the biggest contemporary
axis of civilian governmental cooperation. 33
Eugene Skolnikoff notes that these two
systems, foreign policy and S&T, operate in
an international environment that is
increasingly overlapping and this aspect of the
relationship continues to converge in recent

33

Nicolas Peter, “Towards the Emergence of EU Space
Diplomacy,” Space Policy 23 (2007): 97-107.
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years. 34 Increasingly, foreign policy contains
issues with a scientific component and science
grows more international in space. 35 Largescale space projects are emblematic domains
in which S&T is mobilized to serve foreign
policy.
While S&T cooperation developed, until
recently, largely independently of formal
foreign policy objectives, for space this is a
different. Space activities, since the beginning
of the Space Age, are a tool for foreign policy
used to directly
achieve diplomatic Space assets
objectives and to are not only the
gather information eyes & ears of
on
geopolitical governments…
events of concern
they also allow
(e.g., monitoring a
crisis). There is also governments to
an element of soft influence
power to reach out outcomes.
to partners and to
impress others. 36 With the exception of
scientific research or technology development
missions, activities in space are no longer an
end in-and-of-themselves, but a means for
accomplishing other national objectives. 37
The role of “space in foreign policy” and of
“foreign policy in space” is intricate. Space
assets are not only the eyes and ears of
governments and allow monitoring events
around the world, but they also allow
34

Eugene Skolnikoff, The Elusive Transformation: Science,
Technology and the Evolution of International Politics
(Princeton University Press, 1994).
35
Caroline Wagner, “The Elusive Partnership: Science and
Foreign Policy,” Science and Public Policy 29 (2002): 409417.
36
Space assets have the potential to affect the behavior of an
international actor by prestige projection, technology
partnerships, access to space services, industry services,
information exchange, and legal development among other
factors.
37
While space agencies are not responsible for making foreign
policy, they play an important role in foreign policy’s
execution through international engagement.

governments to influence outcomes. Space
activities enable states to wield other
instruments of national power with greater
precision, timeliness, and effectiveness. Space
activities blur the lines between domestic and
international affairs due to their very
international nature and due to the fact that
domestic policies impact the global scene.
Space affairs are an extension of the terrestrial
political environment.
From a political point of view, space is rich
with complex political and strategic
relationships. Space affairs are an instrument
of superpower status since the launch of
Sputnik in 1957, and space power during the
Cold War was a key aspect of the international
system where countries jockeyed for position
and global influence. Space power enhanced,
for example, the Soviet Union’s prestige by
being first to launch an artificial satellite or
the prestige of the United States by being the
first to land humans on the Moon. Those
achievements suggested that success in space
were the luxuries of an advanced state – the
product of the intellectual, engineering, and
manufacturing elite of the country – and they
became landmarks in the Cold War race for
prestige and power demonstration.
Space put forward a new criterion to
determine the global hierarchy along with
nuclear power status. Space affairs, from the
dawn of the Space Age, represent a measure
of national prestige and are an indicator of a
county’s influence on the global scene. The
spread of space capabilities and the rise of
new spacefaring countries are now factors
woven into existing patterns of international
affairs. Geography is one of the bedrocks of
international politics, like the board of a chess
game. Space is bringing a novel redistribution
of power, which reduces the importance of
proximity and endows non-state actors with
high levels of power. It is hard to imagine a
strategic actor performing well in the 21st
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Century without being engaged in space and
understanding and taking into account space
power. At the same time, the utilization of the
space
environment
presents
new
vulnerabilities, as well as the opportunities
discussed herein, for actors on the
international scene.
Given the growing diversity and heterogeneity
of the international system, one of the
currencies of international relations is
legitimacy in the eyes of both governments
and citizens across the world. In this context,
emblematic and ambitious space activities are
an indispensable tool as it projects a high level
of S&T capabilities and prowess used to
demonstrate national power at home and
abroad. With the on-going internationalization
and globalization of space affairs, no country
will be regarded as a world power, or remain a
world power, unless it possesses cutting-edge
and diversified space capabilities.
Space affairs are a currency to judge the
standing of a state vis-à-vis neighbors and
peers, and this is expected to remain so for the
foreseeable future. Consequently, the ability to
exercise space power will grow in importance.
Space power alone cannot, however, ensure
the attainment of political objectives. In
conjunction with other forms of conventional
power, space power can be of strategic value
and benefit. Space power is a significant
dimension of power
in
international Space is
relations and it is an bringing a
important
reality. novel
Exercising
space
redistribution
power
on
the
international scene of power...
gives the ability to
build international consensus by bringing
recognition, by primacy and authority, on the
part of other members of the international
space community.
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Europe in the Unfolding
New Space Order
There is a wide range of reasons why
governments engage in space activities. The
basic justifications are different among
countries at different times. For instance, the
“space race” between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union was mainly driven by the willingness to
demonstrate technological capability for
national security reasons and to promote
national prestige. In contrast to the two
superpowers’ space activities, European space
activities were initially driven by scientific
common endeavors and motives.
In Europe, space was originally dealt with by
individual countries. But as early as 1959, the
results of Europe’s nuclear research facility
(The European Organization for Nuclear
Research, know as CERN) introduced a new
model for space activities in Europe. 38
Subsequent discussions among European
stakeholders led to the creation of the
European
Launcher
Development
Organization (ELDO) in 1964, the European
Space Research Organization (ESRO) in
1964, and the European Space Agency (ESA)
in 1975 by combining the two aforementioned
organizations. Since then, ESA is the
intergovernmental agency responsible for
coordinating the collective, multinational
European space program. 39
ESA’s contribution to the development of a
collective European space capability is
fundamental. The European space sector is
now entering a new institutional evolution
with the emergence of the European Union
38
Kazuto Suzuki, Policy Logics and Institutions of European
Space Collaboration (Ashgate Publishing, 2003).
39
There are several other organizations with limited
responsibilities for specific collective activity, including, for
example, the European Organization for the Exploitation of
Meteorological Satellites (Eumetsat) for operational
meteorology.
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(EU) as a space actor. 40 The EU realized in the
1990s that space can provide support for a
host of its activities, and that space activities
serve policy objectives and deliver substantial
strategic, social, economic, and commercial
benefits to the EU, its member states, and its
citizens. 41 European space activities are
mainly conducted within a framework of
collaborative space endeavors, as well as in
the context of national space programs serving
particular political, economic, and security
purposes.
There is a complex intertwining of national
interests
together
with
a
growing
consciousness of the need for greater
cooperation at a continental level. The
European space landscape is split into three
distinct levels: (1) the overall European level
with the EU; (2) intergovernmental
organizations, like ESA and the European
Organization for the Exploitation of
Meteorological Satellites (Eumetsat); and (3)
national space agencies. The recent entry
(December 2009)
into force of the The rise of
Treaty on the new space
Functioning of the
actors is
European Union
(TFEU), known as reshaping the
the Lisbon Treaty, space
enshrines
space landscape.
policy as an EU
“shared policy.” It gives a clear mandate to the
European Commission to exercise its right of
reinforcing the momentum of the European
Space Policy embodied in Space Council

40

Nicolas Peter, “Towards the Emergence of EU Space
Diplomacy,” Space Policy 23 (2007): 97-107.
41
In the late 1990s, the EU started its first two major space
programs: the global navigation satellite system, Galileo, and
the Earth observation system for Global Monitoring for
Environment and Security (GMES). These two flagship
programs are the cornerstones of the current EU space
activities.

resolutions and endorsed by the European
Parliament.
For Europe as a whole, independent access to
space, space applications for the benefit of
citizens and governments, and space science
are the traditional reasons for engaging in
space activities. But as the EU has become
aware of the importance of space activities for
achieving a wide range of policy objectives,
and as the international political significance
of space has grown, space is now taking a
high profile in the Union’s dialogues with
major partners. 42 The international dimension
of civilian space activities is increasingly
becoming a major element of the EU’s
relations with third parties both to reinforce
existing relations and to establish new
partnerships through its programs that include:
Galileo and Global Monitoring for
Environment and Security (GMES); the
Framework Program (FP); and space
dialogues with the United States and Russia
and other international fora (e.g., International
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities).
The space context in which Europe will
continue to operate is likely to evolve because
of the emergence of new space actors being
both users and sources of space technology.
This does not necessarily posit a threat to
Europe, but it needs to be reckoned with for
the specific purpose of managing change in a
balanced and effective way.
Since the end of the Cold War, under the
influence of the overall process of
globalization, sources and distributions of
power are being transformed in a profound
way, and multipolarity is expected to grow in
the future making the space context even more
heterogeneous. Consequently, the relative
power of various emerging space actors will
grow as these actors influence other countries.
42

Nicolas Peter, “Towards the Emergence of EU Space
Diplomacy,” Space Policy 23 (2007): 97-107.
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This evolution will not radically alter the
space context as did China and India recently.
Emerging space actors will, however, have
higher degrees of freedom to shape their space
ties, rather than working only with the current
spacefaring countries. New networks will
form among states to pursue convergent goals
and interests, and in some cases the nucleus
will not be the traditional space powers.
Emerging space powers will also seek greater
leeway and autonomy to exert regional
influence. Space has always included both
competition and cooperation among states.
This will not change and certain areas will not
remain conducive to international cooperation.
But an increasingly multipolar space order
suggests a greater number of actors with
whom Europe and others will have to contend
with. Consequently, traditional spacefaring
countries will probably find it much harder to
set the space agenda and shape outcomes to
their desired preferences.

system), and consequently, space power is
essential for Europe now and in the future.

The new space order is becoming genuinely
global and multipolar with growing strength in
emerging economies and a growing
specialization in various parts of the world
leading to greater overall system complexity.
Legitimacy is expected to remain in the
foreseeable future the hard currency of
international space relations, possibly the most
important asset to ensure long-term success of
specific initiatives. Needless to say, unilateral
action will always be an option for
spacefarers, notably in the context of national
objectives. Yet spacefaring countries do not,
by and large, work in isolation. But the search
for agreement in defining the international
space agenda might prove more complicated,
and thus, in the new space order, partnerships
and cooperation will become more important
in confronting many of the challenges of the
international system. International leadership
and cooperation will be necessary to face
global challenges (e.g., climate change and to
engage in long-term exploration of the solar

There is nothing preordained in the future
shape of the space context and in Europe’s
place therein. It is a matter of political
decision, drawing on Europe’s comparative
strengths and ambitions, and the ability to
nurture and use space power more efficiently.
A scenario of relative decline in the global
“space hierarchy” will lead Europe to lose its
flexibility in choosing between cooperative
options and autonomy for cooperation, as well
as remain the preferred option for partnerships
among other states. Today, given the
benchmark of Europe’s S&T prowess, Europe
continues to be viewed as the space partner of
choice by existing and emerging space
powers, as well as by new entrants in the
space sector. For this to persist,
multilateralism for Europe may prove as much
a necessity as a choice. Working with partners
needs, nonetheless, to be turned more
explicitly and consistently into a vehicle for
achieving effective multilateral solutions for
giving Europe more visibility and clout.

The rise of new space actors is reshaping the
space landscape. The U.S., Russia, and
Europe’s preeminence cannot be taken for
granted. The center-of-gravity for space
activities is already starting to shift from West
and East to the South, and the expected rise of
new space actors will inevitably challenge
Europe’s position in the global “space
hierarchy.” Those global developments will
entail fundamental changes to the distribution
of resources and influence with the emergence
of new players forging closer ties at the
regional level, leading to a shift of power and
influence. The role and position of Europe in
this emergent space context will evolve.
Europe will still have a great impact on space
affairs, but it might have less power in such a
multipolar space context than it has enjoyed in
the last decades.
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The management of international cooperation
must change as the geography of space
develops new peaks around the globe; if
Europe is not positioned to exploit potential
links with emerging space actors, it will face
significant opportunity costs. But to enable
Europe to best exploit its partnerships and
opportunities, a better realization of the
benefits of space power and clear policy
commitments will be needed to be able to
shape the directions of those partnerships in
the directions of its own preferences.
Space Power and Europe
Europe is now the second largest civilian
power in space in terms of its consolidated
budget. Collectively, it maintains launcher,
satellite manufacturing, and research facilities
in the whole spectrum of space activities
except
for
human
spaceflight.
The
combination of European capabilities coming
from different European actors – European
members states, ESA, and the EU – provide
Europe with the status of a major space
actor. 43 Europe possesses collectively critical
technical assets (e.g., independent launch site,
versatile launch vehicle fleet, diversified
spacecraft, solid industry, and dynamic
universities) and non-technical assets, such as
high visibility in international organizations,
like in the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS),
International
Telecommunication
Union
(ITU), and United Nations Conference on
Disarmament (CD), which are all necessary
elements to exercise space power. 44
43

Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe in the 21st
Century,” European Space Policy Institute Perspectives 21,
May 2009, http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/
Perspectives/espi%20perspectives%2021%20.pdf (accessed
January 2010).
44
Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe, in the Need for a
Conceptual Framework,” paper presented at the 59th
International Astronautical Congress, Glasgow, Scotland, 29
September - 3 October 2008.

European space programs are successful to
date and European citizens embraced spacebased services and support into many aspects
of their everyday lives. Europe has achieved a
number of impressive results (e.g., world class
launch services and telecommunications
industry,
and
numerous
scientific
achievements, such as the farthest landing on
an object in our Solar System). Space is now
enabling many activities of the European
economy and is a critical building block of
Europe’s information infrastructure. It could
therefore be concluded that because of this
relevance and the pervasiveness of space
activities a clear understanding of space power
exists in Europe.
They are enormous shortcomings in Europe’s
ability to understand, develop, and exercise
space power. 45 There is no mention of space
power in policy or strategy documents. A
sound understanding of the nature and
exploitation of space power is, however,
critical for Europe in the unfolding new space
order as Europe’s technical lead could be
rendered less important, even where it does
not shrink, and because of the expected
dilution of its voice in international fora due to
the changing space context. If Europe wishes
to retain its space power now and in the
future, it must better protect its interests in
space.
Europe currently enjoys a leading position in
the global “space hierarchy,” but this might
not last, and Europe’s ability to exercise space
power could decrease over time. To maintain
a leading space role and to be able to exercise
space power, Europe must foster more
“political will” and develop associated
policies and strategies. This further needs to
be complemented by a series of programmatic
elements facilitating policy implementation.
Access to space, a competitive industrial and
45

Ibid.
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space services base, global navigation satellite
systems (GNSS), space exploration, utilitarian
space activities, space science, Space
Situational Awareness (SSA), and Space
Traffic Management (STM) are important
building-blocks covering the whole spectrum
of space activities as underlined in the
European Space Policy that will allow to
improve Europe’s ability to translate its space
clout into greater global influence. 46 These
programmatic elements in combination
provide Europe with greater diplomatic,
economic, military, and cultural tools that
enable Europe to face the challenges presented
by the evolving new space order.
So far in Europe, space activities are justified
from the point of view of their use for
scientific research, technological advance, and
economic gains. The time is ripe for a change
in the thinking on space and Europe needs to
become more aware of the political
dimensions of the use of space. Decisions
should not be based only on costs and benefits
in financial, technological, and economic
dimensions, but should also include the
political dimension of space, including space
power. Space power is also an increasingly
important component to Europe’s national
powers, but often unnoticed. While the uses of
space assets as military enablers are
recognized in Europe, relatively no attention is
given on how space assets can be used as
elements of foreign policy and as tools of
diplomacy.
European space assets are underestimated and
untapped for diplomatic use, and space power
in Europe is often an underappreciated factor.
Europe needs to better appreciate how its
space assets and activities can be used to
directly support its diplomatic goals. Space
affairs should be better used by policy-makers
in Europe to achieve greater diplomatic
46

Ibid.
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advantage, particularly as a projection of soft
power. Exercising space power could, for
instance, allow Europe to influence the
drafting of international regulations, and take
the lead in strategic areas, such as
environmental research and space exploration;
it could affect as well
Space affairs the development of
are a highly global standards and
47
symbolic norms. A formalized
representation utilization of space
power could also allow
of power and Europe to remain a
… national center-of-gravity
in
standing… international relations
by attracting the best
partners to cooperate not only in space, but in
other domains, therefore increasing the
capabilities and possibilities of European
projects.
Space will play a growing role in determining
influence,
prosperity,
technological
achievements, and security in the global
environment of the 21st Century. If Europe
does not contribute significantly to space, it
abdicates a role as a major actor in world
politics. Influence on the future of space, such
as in the area of space governance, will be
wielded only by those who have real space
assets and ambitions. The challenge of space
can be met only with a common European
effort. Space affairs should also be raised to
the highest political level in Europe – heads of
State and Government – to initiate major
breakthroughs.
Quantitative and qualitative jumps in
European space efforts are required to respond
to the challenges outlined herein and harness
the benefits that lie ahead. Exercising greater
47

Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe in the 21st
Century,” European Space Policy Institute Perspectives 21,
May 2009, http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/
Perspectives/espi%20perspectives%2021%20.pdf (accessed
January 2010).
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space power allows Europe to protect its own
interests and strengths, while meeting the
challenges of the multipolar space order
currently emerging. Europe’s presence in
space should translate into comparable
influence, which has not always been the case.
Europe has thus to realize that space power
can provide support for a host of its activities
and is a tool to serve its interests, including in
the domain of foreign policy and soft power
projection.
Conclusions
The unprecedented changes in the last decades
have made the world an integrated and
complex system in which space is an integral
element. From its inception during the Cold
War, space activities are driven by
opportunities to serve national interests in the
global context. With the changing geopolitics
of space and the unfolding new space order,
linked in particular to the internationalization
and globalization of space activities, it is
perceived that capacity in space technology
has faded as a geopolitical factor as well as an
element of national power, especially as space
systems are more common and widespread.
Nonetheless, competencies in space activities
are not becoming irrelevant to a country’s
international political position. On the
contrary, almost all developed countries, and
an increasing number of developing countries,
feel it necessary to participate in space
activities and develop for economic, military,
or prestige reasons independent space
capabilities. Space assets can help to directly
achieve national objectives, and because of the
close relationship between space assets and
national power many states seek to improve
and advance their space capabilities.
In this context, Europe should avoid being
surpassed in the emerging new space order by

making use of space activities to maintain, and
even advance, its position in the global “space
hierarchy.” Europe should not create the
impression that it is only a follower and lose
its credibility as a reliable partner in space.
Space affairs are a highly symbolic
representation of power and will undoubtedly
continue to be a persuasive method of
demonstrating national power to the rest of the
world.
The emerging space order will help to
determine the structures and functions of the
international system in the next decades.
Space power will thus be key and it is very
important that this is understood, so that it
may be taken advantage of in the most
desirable and feasible way. The broader
geopolitical implications of the space domain
are directly dependent on how effective can
space power be in the “means-ends” world of
international relations. Europe needs to realize
and develop its space
potential
Europe power
because what is at
currently
stake is the future
enjoys a agenda-setting power
leading of Europe in the
position in the overall international
global “space system beyond space
hierarchy” but affairs, its ability to
the priorities
this might not shape
and timing of events,
last… and its ability to
attract
the
best
partners to be able to fully benefit from
opportunities
wherever
these
support
European space objectives and wider
European policy goals.
European governments must accept the fact
that Europe’s future role and influence in
world politics and in global markets may
largely depend on Europe’s capacity and
willingness to use space to develop the
necessary technology and to build the required
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industrial infrastructure. Europe cannot afford
to remain vague about its objectives in the
new space order. A strategic reflection on the
values, interests, and goals of Europe’s space
power in the context of its relations with other
countries is needed.
There are many impediments the European
space community must overcome to create an
environment where space power is valued,
accepted, and institutionalized. In particular,
European space stakeholders have not, up-tonow, addressed the task of developing an
integrated strategy for harnessing the benefits
of space power on the international scene. The
nexus between common values and common
interest must be better articulated and in
Europe they are all too often disjointed. In
order for space power to reach its full
potential in Europe and provide greater
benefits, space must be recognized as a
domain with direct and indirect implications
for Europe, particularly at the foreign policy
level, which is in a strategic sense no different
from land, sea, and air mediums.
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Europe and Security Issues in Space:
The Institutional Setting
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In the current timeframe, the relevance of
discussions on the existing use of space for
national security purposes and the potential of
it to be used for non-peaceful purposes are
clearly increasing. 1 As a consequence, it
becomes more important to address the role of
Europe as a geopolitical, albeit far from
monolithic, entity in this context.
From this perspective, the present paper
analyzes some of the fundamental institutional
parameters shaping the European presence in
the space security domain, focusing on the
two key players in space, which are truly
European, the European Space Agency (ESA)
and the European Union (EU). 2 Interestingly,
the starting point for both entities was that the
security domain was a “no-go” area, a starting
point that only over the last two decades has
begun to erode. That is why, in addition the
Western European Union (WEU), Europe has
a certain role in this context, precisely from

the security perspective rather than from the
space perspective. 3
Even the European Community, as the most
tightly developed “pillar” of the EU, could not
be considered a supranational entity let alone a
federal state. In all cases therefore, the
individual
member
states
of
those
organizations are still relevant as players in
their own right. These states continue to be
essential to determining the shape of European
actions and approaches in the field of space
issues, and this is even truer for the security
domain.
The resulting complicated institutional
landscape represents the backdrop against
which, as well as a set of crucial parameters
within which, European policies in the area of
space are developed. This applies to the space
security domain, whether one takes a broad
approach as with Space Situational Awareness
(SSA) and the handling of space debris, or a
more limited one, focusing on international
terrorism or the handling of export controls
over dual-use sensitive goods. 4

1

Note that the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter, Outer Space
Treaty or OST) only requires states to refrain from orbiting or
otherwise placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit, as
well as to undertake activities in exploring and using outer
space “for the benefit and in the interests of all countries.”
The phrase of “peaceful purposes” is only applied explicitly
to the Moon and other celestial bodies.
2
ESA was established by means of the Convention for the
Establishment of a European Space Agency (hereafter, ESA
Convention); and the EU, as an overarching institutional
structure encompassing in particular the European
Community, was established by the Treaty on European
Union.

3

The Western European Union was established by means of
the Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration
and Collective Self-Defense, Brussels, entered into force 25
August 1948.
4
See Frans von der Dunk, “A European “Equivalent” to
United States Export Controls: European Law on the Control
of International Trade in Dual-Use Space Technologies,”
Astropolitics 7 (2009): 110.
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The European Space Agency
The starting point for understanding the
present and potential role of ESA in the wider
context of European space security
discussions is provided by the general
institutional structure of the Agency. ESA,
headquartered in Paris, France, but with
additional establishments in a handful of other
European countries, currently counts eighteen
member states. 5 Thus, it clearly constitutes an
intergovernmental organization in the classical
public international legal sense of the word.
Given the complexities of European
integration, ESA has, as of yet, no formal
relationship with the EU beyond a number of
cooperative agreements, of which the
Framework Agreement is the most generic
and broad one. 6 The Framework Agreement
does establish a joint EU-ESA Space Council,
but this Council’s competences remain
confined to “the coordination and facilitation
of cooperative activities” under the
Agreement, and thus present a forum for
consultation and coordination of joint
activities, not a means to impose such joint
activities upon one or the other party. 7 From
the same perspective, the joint EU-ESA
European Space Policy of April 2007 is a
5

The list of member states comprises: Austria, Belgium, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom. In addition, non-European Canada is a longstanding cooperating partner under a special agreement,
whereas Hungary, Romania, and Poland qualify as European
Cooperating States under another special agreement.
6
Framework Agreement Between the European Community
and the European Space Agency (hereafter Framework
Agreement), entered into force 28 May 2004. See further
Stephen Hobe, et al, A New Chapter for Europe in Space,”
Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht I: 54 (2005): 342-344.
7
Article 8(1), Framework Agreement. See also Article 2(1),
providing for cooperation to take place “with due regard to
their respective tasks and responsibilities;” Article 4(1),
calling for “compliance with its own prerogatives, legal
instruments, and procedures” of each party; and Article 5,
detailing the way joint initiatives could be undertaken.

political commitment to develop a coordinated
policy, not for establishing legal obligations
between the two parties regarding cooperation
activities, either in general or in particular, and
the high-level space policy group plays its role
in exactly that context.
The Framework Agreement increased
coordination and cooperation in policy matters
and may well lead to the establishment of
proper legal commitments of one party to the
other, and/or official resignation of certain
legal competences in deference to the other’s
competences at some point in the future.
Presently, however, ESA is neither an agency
of the EU nor legally subject to the extended
legal regime developed on the basis of the
European Community (EC) Treaty – and it
does not even count the same European states
as members – e.g., ESA member states
Norway and Switzerland are not members of
the EU and eleven EU member states as of yet
are not member states of ESA.
ESA has two main organs. First, there is the
Council, consisting of representatives of the
sovereign member states, often at Ministerial
level, and acting as the supreme body of the
organization. The Council is tasked to lead:
the annual work plans of the Agency; the
annual general budget of the Agency; each
program budget; the financial regulations and
all other financial arrangements of the
Agency; decisions on the admission of new
member states; and all other measures
necessary for the fulfillment of the purpose of
the Agency within the framework of the ESA
Convention. 8 In other words, the Council, and
thereby ESA, has not, at the highest level, the
formal competence to draft space policies – it
is only charged with “elaborating and
implementing a long-term European space
policy” by means of the exercise amongst
8

See Article XI(5), ESA Convention.
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others of such competencies as enumerated
above. 9
Second, the ESA Director General (DG)
together with other ESA staff does not
constitute a policy-making organ formally
speaking. The DG is tasked to manage the
Agency and execute any such programs “in
accordance with the directives issued by the
Council” as well as being entitled to submit
proposals for future programs and projects. 10
As to that latter competence, the actual impact
the DG may have on the formulation of
programs and projects, and perhaps informally
and/or indirectly of policies, depends upon a
number of interlocking factors of a non-legal
nature. Yet that impact would be subject to
confirmation and a form of high-level control
by the Council as enshrined in the latter’s
competencies and thus by ESA member states
jointly.
ESA’s general aims and purposes are
summarized by the ESA Convention “to
provide for and to promote, for exclusively
peaceful purposes, cooperation among
European States in space research and
technology and their space applications, with a
view to their being used for scientific purposes
and for operational space applications
systems.” 11 For good reason, ESA has often
been described as a vehicle for member states
to both serve their individual space policy
needs, where applicable, and try and establish
a European space policy. Formally speaking,
as discussed, the Council in using its
competencies decides more on programs and
projects, even if at a high-level, and thus gives
substance and shape to policies largely
emanating at the member state level.

The key to further understanding the proper
role of ESA in the shaping of European
policies and regulations relevant to space
security therefore lies in the way in which
ESA space programs are developed. Program
development, generally speaking, can be one
of three kinds.
Firstly, there are the “mandatory activities,” in
which all ESA member states are obligated to
participate in. To approve a relevant proposal,
to undertake an ESA program, and to establish
it as a mandatory activity, a simple majority of
the member states is required. However, the
level of resources to be made available for that
program requires unanimity, which allows
individual states to exert considerable power
on the overall process of making a program
happen or not. 12
Mandatory activities concern the execution of
basic
activities,
such
as
education,
documentation, studies of future projects,
research work, and scientific programs
including satellites and other space systems.
To the extent follow-up activities on the
ground are concerned, ESA should “collect
relevant information and disseminate it to
Member States, draw attention to gaps and
duplication, and provide advice and assistance
for the harmonization of international and
national programs.” 13 Further to the
mandatory character of the participation of all
member states in these scientific, non-space
activities, the financing of such activities once
properly agreed is taking place through a predetermined scale of respective contributions. 14

12

See Ibid., Article XI(5.a), sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii).
Ibid., Article V(1.a), sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii). See
further Kevin Madders, A New Force at a New Frontier:
Europe’s Development in the Space Field of Its Main Actors,
Policies, Law and Activities from its Beginnings up to the
Present (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 189, 223-235.
14
See Ibid., Article XIII(1).
13

9

Ibid., Article II(a).
See Ibid., Article XII(1.b).
11
Ibid., Article II.
10
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Secondly, ESA member states may agree on
“optional activities” – again by a simple
majority. 15 The optional character then
manifests itself by way of an opt-out clause, as
it is provided that “all Member States
participate apart from those that formally
declare themselves not interested in
participating therein.” 16 This results in the
clear possibility for a member state, if it
considers it not to be in its own interests,
including security interests, to abstain from
participation in ESA optional activities.
Optional activities also result in a different
schedule for financing. Whereas the formula
here is an opt-out from the standard rule of
financing in proportion to the average national
income over the most recent three years for
mandatory programs, 17 in actual practice
things turn out to work differently. Normally,
individual member state contributions are
decided from the ground up, i.e., each state
promises as following from its own particular
measure of interests in such activities to
contribute a certain percentage to the proposed
budget of a certain program. Once the
proposed optional program reaches a certain
threshold in terms of promised financing it is
formally accepted as an ESA optional
program.
Optional activities concern in particular the
space programs, as opposed to preparation for
them and their after-mission interpretation and
usage: “the design, development, construction,
launching, placing in orbit, and control of
satellites and other space systems; and the
design, development, construction, and
operation of launch facilities and space
transport systems.” 18 Over the years, in
15

See Ibid., Article XI(5.c), sub-paragraph (i).
Ibid, Article V(1).
17
See Ibid., Article XIII(2).
18
Ibid., Article V(1.b). See further Kevin Madders, A New
Force at a New Frontier: Europe’s Development in the Space
Field of Its Main Actors, Policies, Law and Activities from its
16

monetary terms, programs with an optional
character have made up 80% to 85% of the
activities developed by ESA itself, as opposed
to 15% to 20% being mandatory in nature. 19
Many of the details of how programs are
developed and executed follow from what is
labeled “the industrial policy which the
Agency is to elaborate and apply” as part of
the broader aims and objectives under Article
II of the ESA Convention, and Annex V,
which elaborates that generic industrial
policy. 20
These cornerstones of ESA industrial policy
are implemented by means of the
“geographical distribution” approach, to
“ensure that all Member States participate in
an equitable manner, having regard to their
financial contribution.” 21 The result of that
approach, further elaborated in Annex V to the
ESA Convention, is often labeled “fair
return,” “industrial return,” or “juste retour.”
Under juste retour, each member state should
roughly see its investment in a particular
program “returned” in the form of contracts
for its space industry, preferably for the very
program at issue, in the alternative as
compensated by contracts in other programs. 22

Beginnings up to the Present (Cambridge University Press,
1997), 189-195, 235.
19
See Kevin Madders cited above, 189.
20
Ibid., Article VII(1).
21
Ibid., Article VII(1.c).
22
See Ibid., Articles II, IV, and Annex V. While the ideal
“overall return coefficient” [Article IV(3)] implies that every
Euro contributed by a member state should be matched
exactly by a Euro’s worth of contract value for a company
from that member state under a contract by the Agency, there
are a number of complicated arrangements in place to allow
for considerable flexibility. See further Madders, 384-8.
Moreover, due to pressure from the EU in recent years, which
views this system with some suspicion, as it may easily have
anti-competitive effects within the European market, the
general application of the concept has become more relaxed
still.
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The dichotomy between mandatory and
optional activities has, throughout the decades
of ESA operations, been shown to work as a
remarkably
pragmatic
and
workable
compromise. It allows at the same time
respect for the need for states to maintain their
sovereign independence in choosing to
contribute to and participate in actual space
programs – on an á la carte-basis as it were –
and serving the need for some coherence in
ESA programs, in order for ESA to provide
any added value in terms of real cooperation
and an efficient pooling of resources.
The ESA Convention mentions a third
category of activities, one not as such
conjured up by or within the framework of the
Agency itself, but undertaken upon the
specific request of third parties, namely
“operational activities.” 23 As a consequence,
these activities are not financed by the normal
budget of ESA, but paid for, in principle on a
full-cost, not-for-profit basis, 24 by the state,
organization, or entity requesting such
services. 25

23

See Ibid., Article V(2).
Such a monetary reimbursement could of course be
(partially or completely) waived to the extent ESA considers
other interests to merit the provision of such service without
(full) reimbursement, and/or ESA considers itself de facto
reimbursed by in-kind compensation. For example in the
context of the International Space Station (ISS), it is common
practice that the partners exchange services and goods as
much as possible on a closed-purse, no-exchange-of-funds
basis. See Article 15(5), Agreement among the Government of
Canada, Governments of Member States of the European
Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of
the Russian Federation, and the Government of the United
States of America concerning Cooperation on the Civil
International Space Station, Washington, entered into force
27 March 2001.
25
In the past, ESA has provided such services for individual
states, other international organizations, such as the European
Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites
(EUMETSAT), established by the Convention for the
Establishment of a European Organization for the
Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites entered into force 19
June 1986, as amended 14 July 1994, and entered into force
27 July 1994, and private companies, such as Arianespace.
24
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ESA Involvement
in Space Security Issues
While as of yet not addressing to any specific
extent the actual or possible role of ESA in
shaping European space security issues, in
general terms, the possibility to become so
involved at various levels depends on the
interest of individual ESA member states. In
particular, the major investors in ESA and
ESA programs – France, Germany, Italy, the
United Kingdom, and Spain – need to possess
the political will and wherewithal in having
ESA become so involved.
Article II of the ESA Convention underscores
this point, stressing that ESA activities should
be for “exclusively peaceful purposes.” To
start with, the general discussion during the
Cold War on the precise meaning of “peaceful
purposes” is important to consider as this
phrase was – with the same addition of
“exclusively” – found in the outer space
treaties. 26 Here, European states were inclined
to occupy the middle ground between the
liberal United States (U.S.) interpretation that
peaceful purposes included military purposes
as long as of a defensive nature and the stricter
Soviet interpretation that any military use of
outer space was prohibited under that concept.
The word “exclusively” constitutes an
interesting addition here; prima facie it
suggests that without that addition ESA would
also be entitled to act not for peaceful
purposes. If that were to be true, however, the
phrase “peaceful purposes” without that
addition would be devoid of any meaning –
essentially stating that ESA would be entitled
to conduct activities for peaceful purposes
whilst leaving it open to also conduct non26

See Article IV, Outer Space Treaty, also Article XI referring
to “peaceful exploration and use;” and Article 3(1),
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter Moon Agreement),
entered into force 11 July 1984.
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peaceful activities, since the addition of
“exclusive” would be considered necessary to
close the door on the latter option.
In other words: the addition of “exclusively”
does not effectively add anything to the legal
obligation, and should rather be understood as
a politically-driven confirmation of an
obligation already existing as regard to
“peaceful obligations,” to make sure no
misunderstanding would arise on the scope of
ESA’s activities. ESA did not wish to
antagonize the U.S. by contradicting its liberal
interpretation, yet at the same time was not
willing to allow any uncertainty regarding the
legal inability of ESA to get involved in
military and security-related space projects.
Copying the adverb “exclusively” from the
space treaties and inserting it in the ESA
Convention precisely achieved both results
simultaneously.
Following the Framework Agreement, even as
this agreement did not refer in any manner to
space activities with a security, defense,
and/or military component, ESA has gradually
adopted a more liberal interpretation. 27 At
least the word “security” is no longer taboo
now: an ESA Security Agreement, ESA
Security regulations, and an ESA Security
office were established, as was an ESA
security classification system with an “ESA
Secret” label where handling of relevant
classified information was moved from the
member states to ESA itself.
But as ESA re-interpreted “peaceful purposes”
in 2003 to mean it could unambiguously be
involved in military and defense related
security activities, the aforementioned
institutional structure remains in operation.
ESA programs could only become a reality
27

See European Space Agency Council, “Position Paper on
ESA and the Defense Sector,” ESA/C 153 (1 December
2003): 7-8.

following a majority vote by the member
states in the ESA Council on the program plus
unanimity on the financing, and this would
ensure that no ESA project would see the light
of day unless member states were satisfied it
would not unduly interfere with their
sovereign security concerns, including
compliance with their own understanding of
“peaceful purposes.” Only with the projects of
Galileo and Global Monitoring for
Environment and Security (GMES) to be
discussed below, that started to change
fundamentally, due as well to the role of the
EU with these projects – and then still only so
far as those member states allowed.
Further to that, ESA from the beginning could
not completely escape from the inevitable
relationship between space activities and the
issue of security. Satellite-based Earth
observation can without difficulty encompass
“spying,” the difference between launching a
missile and launching a payload is often
negligible from the technical perspective and
the high-technology character and global
scope of much of human spaceflight
endeavors inevitably causes it to have
important security angles. As such, the ESA
framework has had to deal with securitysensitive aspects of its “exclusively peaceful”
mandate.
For example, in deviation from the normal
requirement to exchange data on programs,
until the aforementioned recent establishment
of an ESA Secret label, ESA member states
were not required “to communicate any
information obtained outside the Agency” if
such communication would present a threat to
its national security, would be inconsistent
with its agreements with third parties, such as
non-ESA partners in space cooperation
ventures, or would be inconsistent with the
terms and conditions under which it had
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obtained the information at issue in the first
place. 28
Along similar lines, a fundamental
technology-transfer control limitation was
built into the ESA Convention. If technology
or products developed in the context of ESA
activities are to be transferred to non-ESA
member states, a special authorization regime
to be adopted by a two-thirds majority of
member states in the ESA Council is required,
ensuring that such authorization will not be
lightly provided. 29
In more general terms, not only the
implementation of new programs, but also the
admission of new member states to the
Agency requires a unanimous vote in favor by
the incumbent member states in the ESA
Council. 30 This is a common provision in the
charters of intergovernmental organizations,
but in the present context it serves to
scrutinize any potential new member from the
perspective of security risks, since once such a
state becomes a member it would be entitled
to the default paradigm of free flow and
exchange of relevant information on ESA
programs, technology, and products. 31 For
similar reasons, unanimity in the ESA Council
is required before ESA may cooperate and
conclude relevant agreements with other
intergovernmental organizations, non-EU
governments, and other non-ESA member
state institutions. 32
A final example of ESA’s involvement in
security issues concerns the development of
the Ariane launcher. The single-most securitysensitive space sector is the production and
operation of launch vehicles, in view of the
28

Article III(1), ESA Convention.
See Ibid., Article XI(5.j).
30
See Ibid., Articles XI(5.k), XXII.
31
See Ibid., Article III in extenso.
32
See Ibid., Article XIV(1).
29
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very thin lines among a vehicle for launching,
an explosive payload against a terrestrial
target, and a vehicle for delivering a peaceful
payload in orbit. Not accidentally, this area
was the first to be subject to international,
albeit largely voluntary, arrangements – the
Missile
Technology
Control
Regime
(MTCR) 33 – to try and curb the proliferation
of relevant technologies outside the circle of
former Western allies.
As long as the Ariane launcher development
project was an (optional) ESA program, the
exclusively peaceful requirement of Article II
of the ESA Convention precluded any Ariane
vehicle being used for military or other
security-related missions, under the European
interpretation discussed before. Once the
Ariane vehicle, however, had achieved
operational status, i.e., could start to be used
for regular flights on a commercial basis, ESA
had to outsource operational and marketing
activities, as ESA was also limited by its
Convention to research and development
(R&D), even if those terms were sometimes
stretched considerably. 34
In the case of Ariane, a separate private and
commercial entity was established in 1980
called Arianespace. 35 Arianespace is a French
company with international shareholding as
well as ties with ESA and the ESA member
states, but nevertheless operating on its own
behalf in the emerging global commercial
33
Agreement on Guidelines for the Transfer of Equipment and
Technology Related to Missiles (hereafter MTCR), done 16
April 1987. Also, See Elisabeth S. Waldrop, “Integration of
Military and Civilian Space Assets: Legal and National
Security Implications,” Air Force Law Review 55 (2004):
189-90; and Frans von der Dunk, “A European “Equivalent”
to United States Export Controls: European Law on the
Control of International Trade in Dual-Use Space
Technologies,” Astropolitics 7 (2009). All current 18 ESA
member states are among the 34 state parties of the MTCR.
34
Article II, ESA Convention.
35
Statuts de la Société Arianespace (Arianespace Statute), 26
March 1980.
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launch services market. Its operations,
however, from the international space law
perspective, remained under control of the
ESA member states, by way of a complicated
international legal structure with three
documents at the core: the Arianespace
Declaration, 36 the Arianespace Convention, 37
and the Centre Spatial Guyanais (CSG)
Agreement. 38 Under the first two documents,
Arianespace is obliged to operate strictly for
peaceful purposes. 39
Yet as a private French company, Arianespace
remained under French governmental control.
For example, prior to the MTCR, for the
purpose of adhering to the Coordinating
Committee on Multilateral Export Controls
(CoCom) rules, 40 i.e., the North Atlantic

36

Declaration by Certain European Governments Relating to
the Ariane Launcher Production Phase (hereafter
Arianespace Declaration), entered into force 15 October 1981,
renewal as of 4 October 1990, entered into force 21 May
1992.
37
Convention between the European Space Agency and
Arianespace (hereafter Arianespace Convention), signed 24
September 1992.
38
Agreement between the French government and the
European Space Agency with respect to the Centre Spatial
Guyanais (CSG) (hereinafter CSG Agreement). See excerpts
of French version in ESA Bulletin 80 (November 1994): 67.
39
See Articles I.1.2(a), I.1.6(a), Arianespace Declaration,
ESA/C(80)8, 11 January 1980; Articles 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3,
Arianespace Convention, ESA/C(80)WP/8, rev.4, 18
November 1980; further see John Kriger, Arturo Russo, and
Lorenza Sebesta, A History of the European Space Agency
1958-1987: Volume II: The Story of ESA, 1973 to 1987, ESA
History Study Reports, SP-1235 (ESA Publications, 2000);
and Gabriel Lafferranderie and Harry Tuinder, “The Role of
ESA in the Evolution of Space Law,” Journal of Space Law
22 (1994): 103.
40
CoCom was established in 1949 as a joint organization of
the member states of NATO, Japan, and Australia, to prevent
the sale of weapons and technology to the Soviet Union and
its communist allies. CoCom was disbanded in 1994,
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the
concurring de facto end of the Cold War, which inter alia
resulted in the opening up in principle of Russian and Eastern
European markets. See Michael Lipson, “The Reincarnation
of CoCom: Explaining Post-Cold War Export Controls,” The
Non-Proliferation Review 6 (1999): 33-51.

Treaty Organization (NATO) regime 41 for
controlling
security-sensitive
exports,
Arianespace fell under French governmental
control.
Thus, even the areas where the exclusively
peaceful mandate for ESA could not as such
avoid a possible entanglement in security or
military issues, control mechanisms and
procedures were in place. These mechanisms
and procedures ensure that the potential
threats to the security of individual member
states emanating from such entanglement
continue to be addressed without substantially
infringing their sovereignty.
The European Union
The involvement in space and space policy
issues, including space security, of the EU, as
the successor at a political, if not completely
at the legal level, of the European Community,
stems from a completely different background
compared to that of ESA. The Community,
then Union became involved in European
space activities and related policy issues
primarily as a regulator, and has only recently
become a player in its own right, even a
policy-maker – but this remains a secondary
role.
In spite of efforts to arrive at a European space
driven
by
the
European
policy, 42
Commission’s perception that space is a key
sector to the future of Europe, in this area (as
41

NATO was established by the North Atlantic Treaty,
entered into force 24 August 1949.
42
See White paper: Space: a new European frontier for an
expanding Union – An action plan for implementing the
European Space policy, COM(2003) 673 final, of 11
November 2003; Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament – European Space
Policy – Preliminary Elements, COM(2005) 208 final, of 23
May 2005. See further Stephen Hobe, et al, “A New Chapter
for Europe in Space,” Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht
I: 54 (2005): 340.
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in many others) the ultimate prerogative of
giving substantial shape to space policies by
implementing actual programs and projects
rests with the individual, sovereign member
states. As referred to earlier, a joint Space
Policy has been accepted recently, in 2007.

follow-on legislative measures. 47 The treaties
also provided these organs with extensive
legal competences, which they then used to
jointly extend the scope of EU law immensely
– by drafting and enunciating what is
commonly called “secondary EU law.”

This is clearly only a first step for the EU,
whereas the second, more important step of
being in charge of implementing such a space
policy, of being able to force unwilling or
conflicting national authorities in terms of
their own space policies, and of developing its
own space projects on its own behalf, is only
beginning to be undertaken with Galileo.
Currently, the first contracts for building of
the Galileo satellites and deployment of the
system have been signed.

Secondary EU law is composed of
Regulations, Directives, and Decisions. 48
Regulations are essentially laws on a
European level: they are phrased in general
terms and apply comprehensively, at least as
far as indicated or expressly provided for by
the Regulations themselves. The same
qualification as law applies to Directives to
some extent, namely as far as the required end
result is concerned: each state is free,
however, to reach that end result in whatever
way it sees fit, prior to a given deadline.
Finally, Decisions also provide binding law,
but only upon those entities to which they are
explicitly or implicitly directed. In each case,
they would override, wherever applicable,
national law or regulation to the contrary.

A distinct and partly supranational legal order
has by now emerged, where in many instances
the EU can in law override the interests,
policies, and even legislation of individual
member states, yet in the last resort all that is
still based on a number of treaties between
sovereign states. Together these treaties form
a body of primary EU law, inter alia creating
the main Union organs, officially referred to
as: the Council (of Ministers),43 the European
Commission, 44 the European Parliament, 45 the
European Court of Justice, 46 and most recently
augmented by a European Council comprised
of heads of state and government entitled to
develop policies – but based on consensus,
and without being formally entitled to guide

43

See Articles 227-243, Treaty Establishing the European
Community as Amended by the Treaty of Lisbon Amending
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community (hereafter Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union), entered into force 1 December 2009.
44
See Articles 244-250, Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union.
45
See Ibid., Articles 223-234.
46
See Ibid., Articles 251-281: meanwhile renamed Court of
Justice of the European Union.

At the same time, they are strictly legal
instruments, designed and only to be used to
implement and enforce higher-level policies,
policy interests, and approaches as agreed by
the EU with the Council, representing the
interests of the individual member states,
generally in a key role, not to develop and
determine them. Not even the Treaty of
Lisbon, the successor of the ill-fated effort to
achieve a Constitution for Europe, 49 which
had been hailed as the first document
providing the EU with formal competence in
matters of space and space activities, was to
fundamentally change this situation. In
consequence, the Union still pools together the
47

Ibid., Articles 235-236: see Articles 13(1), 15, Treaty on
European Union as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon.
48
See Ibid., Article 288.
49
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Rome, done
29 October 2004 and not entered into force.
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regulatory efforts of the member states for
specific purposes indicated in the relevant
treaties and essentially limited to those – even
as it established its own distinct legal order; a
sui generis-construction, which may be
referred to as a supranational “half-way
house” between an international organization
and a federation-like structure. At present,
twenty-seven European states 50 have thus
subjected themselves to a very extensive set of
rights and obligations towards each other in
the framework of the EU. As pointed out, this
concerned a group of European states different
from those interested in space and investing
therein to become member of ESA.
The European legal framework was initially
built through signature and ratification of the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
Treaty, 51 the European Atomic Energy
Community (EAEC) or Euratom Treaty, 52 and
the European Economic Community (EEC)
Treaty 53 all in the 1950s, as duly amended by
subsequent treaties in later years. Such treaties
included, in addition to the various accession
treaties allowing for new member states to
join the EC, then Union, the Single European
Act of 1986, 54 the Treaty on European Union
of 1992, 55 the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, 56
50

The list of member states comprises: Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
51
Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community, entered into force 23 July 1952.
52
Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community, entered into force 1 January 1958.
53
Treaty of Rome, or Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community (hereafter EEC Treaty), entered into
force 1 January 1958.
54
Single European Act, entered into force 1 July 1987. One
major result of the Single European Act was the integration of
the main institutions of the Communities concerned, in
particular the European Commission and the Council of
Ministers.
55
Treaty on European Union, entered into force 1 November
1993.

the Treaty of Nice of 2001, 57 and the Treaty of
Lisbon of 2007. Of these, as we shall see for
our space related topic, the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty of Lisbon are
the most important.
The European Union Legal Framework,
Economic Activities, and Outer Space
The essential elements of the Union’s legal
order referred to above present the EU with its
own measure of competencies and jurisdiction
– over a wide range of economic or economyrelated activities. Depending upon certain
circumstances and legal preconditions, they
can be directly applied not only to the member
states themselves, but also to private persons
and entities resorting under the domestic
jurisdictions of these member states. In
addition, in a number of cases the rights and
obligations directly applicable to individual
citizens and legal entities can also be claimed
directly by those entities. Bypassing domestic
jurisdictions of member states, the Court of
Justice can be called upon in a number of
instances by those concerned to judge upon
the legality of EU as well as national actions.
The existence of this body central to the EU
legal order represents an essential measure of
supranational adjudication.
As such, to what extent do the Union and its
legal framework affect the space sector?
Special as space is and distinct from and
outside specific member state involvement,
how would or could the EU expand such

56

Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European
Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities
and Certain Related Acts (hereafter Treaty of Amsterdam),
entered into force 1 May 1999.
57
Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union,
the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and
Certain Related Acts (hereafter Treaty of Nice), entered into
force 1 February 2003.
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impact to the extent considered necessary for
the European greater common good?
The answers to these questions lie in
understanding how the aforementioned
competencies and jurisdictions are applied to
concrete issues – the application has to be
made by explicit primary EU law, secondary
EU law (much more common), or from EU
law no other conclusion can be drawn other
than such applicability was implied. This is
captured by the notion of “subsidiarity,” 58
which means that unless the competence to
legislate on a certain issue has unequivocally,
even if only implicitly, been transferred to the
Union’s organs the relevant power should still
be deemed to rest with the national
governmental authorities. If doubt arises
whether an issue could be regulated more
effectively and logically at the European level
or at the national level, the presumption under
subsidiarity is that the national level should
prevail.
In practice, only to the extent that spacerelated activities are unequivocally covered by
provisions in primary or secondary EU law,
can any competence to legislate with respect
to them be exercised by EU organs. Space
activities, however, only constitute one among
many topics from the Union’s perspective.
Hence, they were hardly mentioned explicitly
in primary EU law and not in any appreciable
detail in secondary law. As we shall see, space
has only recently achieved some presence and
prominence in that context. 59 Concomitantly,

81

EU competencies and jurisdiction have been
generally acknowledged in the economic
domain, applying to all economic activities
proper, i.e., without overriding public
interests, such as those relating to military,
social, or cultural issues being behind those
economic activities. Consequently, space
activities do at least fall within the EU legal
order to the extent that they may be
considered economic activities.
From such a perspective, the general
application of EU law to economic activities is
the main instrument for Union involvement in
the space sector so far. Here, the central and
most comprehensive aim of EU economic
integration is the creation and maintenance of
a common market. 60 Effectively, the Internal
Market, being one side of the common market,
was established as of 1993 following the entry
into force of the Treaty on European Union. 61
This regime, in turn, is based upon several
freedoms: the freedoms of movement of
goods, persons, services, and capital; 62 an antitrust regime combating anti-competitive
behavior of governments (state aid) and
companies (collusive conduct and abuses of
dominant
positions)
alike; 63
and
national
harmonization
of
relevant
legislation. 64
Turning back to space activities from the
perspective of how policies take shape within
the EU, the Union’s organs, in particular the
Commission, have over time obtained some
freedom to draft, or at least prepare, European

58

Articles 5(1) and 5(3), Treaty on European Union as
Amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. The latter thus extended the
scope of application of the subsidiarity principle from the
Community’s actions (where it applied since 1993 under
Article 5, EC Treaty as amended by the Treaty on European
Union) to all actions taken in the name of the Union.
59
For an excellent recent account of EU involvement in
European space activities, see Imgard Marboe, “National
Space Legislation: The European Perspective,” Nationales
Weltraumrecht – National Space Law (2008), 31-46; Further,
see Kevin Madders, A New Force at a New Frontier:

Europe’s Development in the Space Field of Its Main Actors,
Policies, Law and Activities from its Beginnings up to the
Present (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 566-584.
60
See Articles 3, 4(2.a), Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union.
61
Articles 13-19, Single European Act.
62
See Articles 28-37, 45-66, Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union.
63
See Ibid., Articles 101-109.
64
See Ibid., Articles 114-118.
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policies, through such varying non-binding
instruments as Resolutions, White Papers, and
Green Papers. 65 Yet, even with the 2007 EUESA Space Policy the boundaries of that
freedom are always those provided by the
body of EU law, and the political will of the
totality of EU member states to use their
prerogatives, in particular through the
Council, to allow any such policy initiative, to
condition or control it, or even to obstruct it.
Certainly, once a policy initiative is translated
into new EU law, the Council of Ministers in
its interplay with the Commission, the
European Parliament, and the Court of Justice
are able to control such a process to a large
extent. 66
European Union Involvement
in Security Issues
It should not be a surprise that as a
consequence of the above discussion, at least
until as recently as two decades ago, the
European organs were given very little room
to address military, defense, and security
issues, whether specifically in terms of space
or more generally speaking. Although the EC,
then Union, as indicated originated in a
65

The earliest such document relevant for space activities was
“Towards Europe-wide systems and services” – Green Paper
on a common approach in the field of satellite
communications
in
the
European
Community,
Communication from the Commission, COM(90) 490 final,
of 20 November 1990. For further discussion of the
development of an EU-driven space policy, see Gunther
Verheugen, “Europe’s space plans and opportunities for
cooperation,” Space Policy 21 (2005), 93-95; Thomas Reuter,
“The Framework Agreement between the European Space
Agency and the European Community: A Significant Step
Forward?,” Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht 53 (2004),
56-65; Kevin Madders and Walter Thiebaut, “Carpe diem:
Europe must make a genuine space policy now,” Space Policy
23 (2007): 7-12; and Nicolas Peter, “The EU’s emergent
space diplomacy,” Space Policy 23 (2007): 97-107.
66
See Articles 293-294, Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, providing the basis for the complicated
decision-making processes formally applicable to the
development of EC law.

completely different context and for rather
different purposes than ESA, essentially the
same limitations to EC/EU action in the field
of security followed from the established aims
of its activities and institutional structure. As
to the former, the aims of the EC were
summed
up
exhaustively
in
the
aforementioned Article 2 of the EC Treaty,
which throughout history has been updated to
take into account new developments requiring
a European-level competence – and so far had
always excluded a reference to military,
defense, and security issues. The only
conclusion can be that this domain as a
generic area has not yet been included within
the EU competence. 67 Only with the Treaty of
Lisbon that has changed to some extent, as we
shall see.
Even though the European Commission as a
truly European organ has in principle the right
to initiate policy and legislative developments,
and the European Parliament as another truly
European organ has considerable competence
in both as well, at
Cooperation on the end of the day
military and this supranational
security competence only
issues…does extends precisely to
those
domains
take place, but falling within the
ultimately, EU sphere as
Europe states determined, until
still preferred to very recently, by
rely on Article 2 of the EC
themselves for Treaty. Extending
the scope of that
national sphere in any
security. formal
sense
requires the consent
of the Council of Ministers representing the
67

Note that the aforementioned subsidiarity principle
specifically calls for either explicit or implicit (but then from
a logical perspective irrefutable) transfer of competence to the
EC/EU level, as argued on the basis of subsidiarity before
such competence may be assumed.
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member states, or in cases of fundamental
enlargement of EU competence even new
treaties.
From the perspective of security issues, the
point of departure for European entities was
the fundamental lack of reference to
competencies in that area until fairly recently.
Security being so closely related to questions
of state sovereignty, the fact remains that in
the last resort the sheer survival of the state as
a relevant entity is at stake, and in spite of the
long history of political, economic, social, and
cultural integration since the Second World
War European member states have not been
willing to subject themselves in any
fundamental sense to a supranational entity.
Cooperation on military and security issues,
and the conduct of joint military exercises
does take place, but ultimately, Europe states
still preferred to rely on themselves for
national security.
Over the last two decades, however, partly as
a consequence of the end of the Cold War, the
demise of the Soviet Union, and the
fundamental reshaping of the geopolitical
landscape, the perspective on European
security started to change. The undeniable
success of the EU in economic terms –500
million inhabitants constituting the largest
single economic block in the world –
strengthened European self-consciousness
about a major role for Europe also in the
geopolitical arena. At the same time, the lack
of political and security-related coherence has
become painfully clear, in particular in the
context of the demise of Yugoslavia and the
ensuing civil wars, where only NATO and the
U.S. turned out to be able to restore some
measure of peace, and essentially by sheer
military force.
The ambitions of the EC thus started to
address the involvement of Europe in such
security domains, and it started to move
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carefully into that direction, and as it turned
out in some respects taking ESA along to the
extent these ambitions involved, or were
focusing on, outer space and space activities.
Essentially, the EC took a three-pronged,
staged approach: firstly, by transforming itself
formally into a EU; secondly, by starting to
address in earnest the issue of international
trade in security-sensitive goods and
technology; and thirdly, by undertaking space
projects jointly with ESA that inevitably
touched upon the security domain.
European Union Entrance
into the Space Security Arena
The renaming of the Community as the Union
in-and-of-itself was an expression of the
ambition of the member states, and of the
European institutions, most prominently the
Commission, to broaden European integration
beyond the more economically-oriented
domains. More to the point, the Treaty on
European Union effectively did extend the
scope of European integration as it had arisen
on the basis of the three treaties of the 1950s,
re-christening the EEC Treaty as the EC
Treaty, and by adding two more “pillars” of
the EU to the three Communities that had
been merged into one Community (those
pillars of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) and of Police and Judicial
Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM)
respectively). 68
Of course, it is the CFSP pillar, which
concerns us here, established by means of
Articles 10A through 28 of the Treaty on
68

The first pillar was now that of the European Community,
based not only the EC Treaty (Title II, Treaty on European
Union), but also on the ECSC and EAEC Treaties (Titles III,
resp. IV, Treaty on European Union). For the second, CFSP
pillar, see Title V, Treaty on European Union; for the third,
PJCCM pillar (originally labeled Justice and Home Affairs
(JHA)), see Title VI, Treaty on European Union.
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European Union. 69 This is where, with the
entry into force of the Treaty on European
Union in 1993, for the first time as far as the
EC/EU framework was concerned, issues of
security – the use of the words “defense” and
“military” were still judiciously avoided –
could be addressed. At least the word
“security” is prominently present in the text
now.
The CFSP, however, is a straightforward
intergovernmental construction and operates
completely outside
the established legal …gradually, the
structure of the European
Union
with
its institutions…as
supranational
compared to the
features. There is at
group of
best a marginal role
for the European sovereign states
Commission in its making up EU
context as supposed membership, are
guardian of the involving
overarching
themselves in
European interest.
issues of
For example, the
Commission “may security…
refer to the Council
any question relating to the common foreign
and security policy and may submit proposals
to the Council” as well as request the
convening of an extraordinary Council
meeting. 70 As a consequence of the Treaty of
Lisbon, the role of the Commission to “give
its opinion particularly on whether the
enhanced cooperation proposed [by EU
member states] is consistent with Union
policies” 71 may have been relocated to the
69

Note that the Treaty of Lisbon amended also the Treaty on
European Union, so that in the consolidated version of the
latter as per 1 December 2009, Title V now comprises
Articles 21-46.
70
Article 30(1), see also (2), Treaty on European Union as
amended by the Treaty of Lisbon.
71
Article 27c, Treaty on European Union, as inserted by the
Treaty of Nice.

Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union; it was not changed fundamentally. 72
Yet in principle, “Decisions under this Title
shall be taken by the Council acting
unanimously” and there is no formal
entitlement for the Commission to anything
other than being kept informed and allowed to
offer its opinion. 73
As a result, there also was no role for the
elaborate legislative, adjudicative, and
enforcement jurisdiction of the European
Parliament or the Court of Justice, which was
developed in the context of the EC Treaty.
The European Parliament, for instance, can
make itself heard on similar terms as the
Commission, but does not have any formal
say in the outcome of whatever legally
binding decisions would result from the
deliberation process. Even post-Lisbon, the
cooperation under the CFSP is essentially
cooperation between the member states with
the Commission in an unofficial mediating
role except where the existing acquis
communautaire (the total body of EU law
accumulated thus far) is threatened. Those
issues remain exclusively reserved for national
governments to deal with as they see fit to the
extent beyond having allowed for such
concepts as the European Security and
Defense Policy (ESDP), now Common
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and EU
Battle Groups to be developed. 74
As referred to before, security at the European
level has had distinct historical roots. To start,
international cooperation in the areas of
defense and security had always been dealt
72

See Article 329(2), Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union.
73
Article 31(1), Treaty on European Union as Amended by
the Treaty of Lisbon.
74
See Articles 326-334, Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union. For example, the CSDP is the domain of the
Council of the European Union, representing the member
states under the Lisbon Treaty, not the European Commission.
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with in the context of NATO or the WEU. As
a consequence of the shifting paradigms, the
WEU is now being integrated into the EU
structures as part of the intergovernmental
CFSP. That integration turns out to be a slow
process. It started in 1999 with a first level of
integration of WEU functions into the EU
framework, and has meanwhile led to the
handing over of the WEU satellite center at
Torrejon, Spain to become the EU Satellite
Center, jointly with a European Institute of
Security Studies in 2002. Yet these transfers
have not been finalized – and some doubt
whether such integration will be ever
complete. 75 The integration described here
does not ipso facto subsume the WEU within
the EU’s institutional structures.

the specific military domain, the erstwhile
main focus of the WEU. 77

Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, the Treaty on
European Union referred to the role of the
WEU in somewhat ambiguous terms. Security
policies in the context of the CFSP pillar
“shall not prevent the development of closer
cooperation between two or more Member
States on a bilateral level, in the framework of
the Western European Union (WEU) and
NATO, provided such cooperation does not
run counter to or impede that provided for”
through the CFSP. 76 The clauses that have
replaced this one as per the Treaty of Lisbon
do not mention the WEU in any specific terms
and as a consequence of dealing with
essentially the same subject matter might be
argued to have effectively emptied the WEU
of all meaning. Yet any implementation
thereof still hinges crucially on member state
agreement to any substantive implementation
of the common and foreign security policy in

The second inroad the Union started to make
into the realm of security concerns the risks
inherent in today’s voluminous global trade
relations. These risks deal with proliferation of
security-sensitive dual-use goods, technology,
and know-how to states or non-state entities
that would result in harming European
interests.

In short, in this institutional domain of
European involvement in space security,
slowly but gradually, the European institutions
properly speaking, as compared to the group
of sovereign states making up EU
membership, are involving themselves in
issues of security in a broad sense. It seems
inevitable that this process increasingly will
also involve more clearly outlined military
and defense issues.
The European Union
and the Trade Aspects of Security

In a sense, this was the most logical and
obvious
starting
point
for
the
Community/Union to get involved with the
security domain, as international trade and the
potentially trade-distorting impact thereof on
the EC Internal Market had belonged to the
EC’s competencies for a considerable time.
And indeed, already long before the
establishment of the EU and the CFSP pillar,
the Community had drafted a first legislative
document on export controls, the 1969
Regulation 2603/69. 78

75

See Ralph Folsom, Principles of European Union Law
(2005), 25. Formally, the WEU still is its own
intergovernmental self, though now essentially dormant; the
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon has not yet led to
decisions to disband the WEU.
76
Article 17, Treaty on European Union as Amended by the
Treaty of Nice.

77

See Articles 42 and forward, Treaty on European Union as
Amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, inter alia also providing
for an (in legal terms equally limited) role of the European
Defense Agency.
78
Regulation of the Council establishing common rules for
exports, (EEC) No. 2603/69, of 20 December 1969.
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These
developments
were
given
a
considerable boost by several developments in
the 1990s. First, there was the aforementioned
creation of the Union and the CFSP – leading
to such further EC law as Regulation
3381/94 79 and Decision 94/942/CFSP 80
drafted under the Treaty on European Union,
even as these documents were far from
comprehensive in scope. Second, the changing
geopolitical
landscape
caused
the
81
aforementioned CoCom/MTCR-regime to be
widened in scope, most notably leading to the
establishment
of
the
Wassenaar
Arrangement 82 encompassing all dual-use
sensitive technologies and related products
and know-how in the mid-1990s. Third, the
limited progress, as compared to the ambitions
of the then-Commission, of development of
European security policy, including but not
limited to space, in terms of a European Space
Strategy on the basis of the CFSP made the
European institutions more aware of the
limited areas where progress could more
easily and readily be expected, namely
international security and international trade.

from the formally non-binding MTCR and
Wassenaar regimes, while working towards a
harmonization of the ways and means by
which individual member states would
implement and apply those international
obligations and guidelines. 84 As the
Regulation itself phrases it: its aims are to
develop an “effective common system of
export controls on dual-use items [which] is
necessary to ensure... the international
commitments and responsibilities of the
Member States, especially regarding nonproliferation, and of the European Union,”
through “a common control system and
harmonized policies for enforcement and
monitoring” as “a prerequisite for establishing
the free movement of dual-use items inside the
Community” – the most fundamental
justification for EU institutions to address the
issue of international trade in dual-use
goods. 85

The result was of all this was Regulation
1334/2000 83 providing a baseline framework
for implementing in a binding European
context the international obligations resulting

84

79

Council Regulation setting up a Community regime for the
control of exports of dual-use goods, No. 3381/94/EC, of 19
December 1994.
80
Council Decision on the joint action adopted by the Council
of the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union
concerning the control of exports of dual-use goods,
94/942/CFSP, of 19 December 1994.
81
Currently, 19 out of the 27 EU member states – Cyprus,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia are missing – are participating in the MTCR.
82
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies
(hereafter Wassenaar Arrangement), effective 12 July 1996.
Currently, 26 out of the 27 EU member states – only Cyprus
is missing – as well as all 18 ESA member states are
participating in the Arrangement.
83
Council Regulation setting up a Community regime for the
control of exports of dual-use items and technology, No.
1334/2000/EC, of 22 June 2000.

The Regulation itself has been amended on
average almost once a year since by later
instruments of EC law, 86 but still remains the
An extended analysis of Regulation 1334/2000 and the
framework built upon it can be found in Frans von der Dunk,
“A European “Equivalent” to United States Export Controls:
European Law on the Control of International Trade in DualUse Space Technologies,” Astropolitics 7 (2009): 110-124.
85
See Paragraphs (2), (3), Preamble, Regulation 1334/2000,
and Article 1.
86
This concerns Council Regulation amending Regulation
(EC) No. 1334/2000 with regard to intra-Community transfers
and exports of dual-use items and technology, No.
2889/2000/EC, of 22 December 2000; Council Regulation
amending Regulation (EC) No. 1334/2000 with regard to the
list of controlled dual-use items and technology when
exported, No. 458/2001/EC, of 6 March 2001; Council
Regulation amending and updating Regulation (EC) No.
1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of
exports of dual-use items and technology, No. 2432/2001/EC,
of 20 November 2001; Council Regulation amending
Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a Community
regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and
technology, No. 880/2002/EC, of 27 May 2002; Council
Regulation amending and updating Regulation (EC) No
1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of
exports of dual-use items and technology, No. 149/2003/EC,
of 27 January 2003; Council Regulation amending and
updating Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a
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key document in the present context. Its main
body provides for the basic regime whereas
the Annexes, through their regular updates,
take account of new developments regarding
the subject matter itself as following inter alia
from the Wassenaar Arrangement updates. In
particular, Annex I entitled “List of Dual-Use
Items and Technology,” and thereby listing all
items subject to the regime created by the
Regulation, was amended time and again to
keep track of ongoing technical, practical, and
political developments. 87
Dual-use items as covered by the Regulation’s
regime are broadly defined as all “items,
including software and technology, which can
be used for both civil and military purposes,” 88
whereas export comprises normal export of
goods, but extends to “transmission of
software or technology by electronic media,
fax, or telephone to a destination outside the
Community,” 89 and “exporter” is equally
broadly defined. 90 Since such a definition of
dual-use items clearly could encompass more
or less all space technology, the broad sweep
ratione materiae of the European regime in
terms of space activities becomes clear
immediately.

Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use
items and technology, No. 1504/2004/EC, of 19 July 2004;
Council Regulation amending and updating Regulation (EC)
No 1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control
of exports of dual-use items and technology, No.
394/2006/EC, of 27 February 2006; Council Regulation
amending and updating Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000
setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of
dual-use items and technology, No. 1183/2007/EC, of 18
September 2007; and Council Regulation amending and
updating Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a
Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use
items and technology, No. 1167/2008/EC, of 24 October
2008.
87
Annex I, Regulation 1167/2008; further see Article 3,
Regulation 1334/2000.
88
Article 2(a), Regulation 1334/2000.
89
Ibid., Article 2(b), sub-paragraph (iii).
90
See Ibid., Article 2(c).

87

Technology itself is also defined in such broad
terms, albeit not in the main body of the
Regulation itself, but by Annex I: “specific
information necessary for the ‘development,’
‘production,’ or ‘use’ of goods” further
elaborated in that “this information takes the
form of ‘technical data’ or ‘technical
assistance,’” whereby the latter “may take
forms, such as instructions, skills, training,
working knowledge, and consulting services
and may involve the transfer of ‘technical
data,’” and these may in turn “take forms,
such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models,
formulae, tables, engineering designs and
specifications, manuals and instructions
written or recorded on other media, or devices,
such as disk, tape, read-only memories.” 91
The core element of the regime developed on
the basis of the Regulation concerns the
authorization process and procedures, which
remains a prerogative of the EU member
states, but should conform to the parameters
as provided by the Regulation’s regime. The
point of departure, in any event, still is
national authorization.
Firstly, such an authorization is required for
export of the dual-use items as defined and
listed in Annex I. 92 Secondly, the obligations
of a prospective exporter are not limited to
screening an exhaustive list and then abiding
by its terms, as there are scenarios under
which an exporter would be obliged to comply
with the control and authorization mechanisms
provided by the Regulation, also where the
items concerned as such are not listed in
Annex I. 93
91

Annex I, Regulation 1167/2008.
See Article 3(1), Regulation 1334/2000; and introductory
paragraph, Annex I – List of Dual-Use Items and Technology,
Regulation 1167/2008.
93
The three scenarios concern: (1) potential involvement of
the item concerned in the context of weapons of mass
destruction; (2) export to a state subject to an arms embargo
imposed by the European Union, the Organization for
92
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As national sovereignty of member states is
still the baseline, the Regulation does not take
away the possibility for a prospective exporter
to be confronted with requirements for
authorizations imposed by member states
under national laws and regulations outside of
the system of the Regulation properly
speaking. 94 In such cases, the Regulation only
imposes upon the member state adopting or
maintaining relevant legislation a duty to
inform other member states as well as the
Commission. 95
With regard to these national authorization
regimes, the Regulation only further imposes
the requirement that they should allow for
three types of authorizations: individual,
global, or general, with the latter being valid
throughout the Community. 96 While leaving
the choice to the national member state
authorities regarding which type of
authorization to use in a certain case, a few
specific limits are imposed by the Regulation
in that regard. 97
Next to that, as the cornerstone of actual
harmonization, the Regulation introduces the
concept of the Community General Export
Authorization
(CGEA). 98
The
CGEA
explicitly constitutes an exception to the
sovereign discretion of member states as for
all items not covered by it; any authorization

shall be granted – or refused – by the member
state where the exporter is located. 99
The CGEA’s scope is essentially limited in
three ways. One, ratione materiae only items
as defined by Annex II – with the exception
moreover of those mentioned in Part 2 thereof
– require a CGEA as opposed to a national
authorization, which still covers the bulk of
items listed in Annex I. 100 Two, however,
ratione personae the CGEA covers such
exports only to the extent the target
destination is Australia, Canada, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, or the U.S. 101
Three, further exceptions to applicability of
the CGEA occur in more limited scenarios. 102
Thus, Regulation 1334/2000 in conjunction
with follow-up Regulations created a complex
interlocking system of European-wide and
national authorizations. That system required
European-wide authorizations instead of
national ones in varying measures for the
export of the items listed in a few interlocking
Annexes to other EU member states, a limited
set of close political allies of other states and
destinations, otherwise leaving the individual
sovereign discretion of the member states
intact.
Nevertheless, presenting a kind of European
equivalent to U.S. export controls, the
Regulation and the regime built upon it
99

Ibid., Article 6(2).
See Annex II, Regulation 1167/2008; Part 1 of Annex II
simply provides in full “This export authorization covers the
following items: All dual-use specified in any entry in Annex
I of the present Regulation except those listed in Part 2
below.”
101
See Ibid., Part 3.
102
See Ibid., Articles 1, 2, and 3, Annex II. These three
scenarios concern: (1) (once again): potential involvement of
the item concerned in the context of weapons of mass
destruction; (2) (once again) export to a state subject to an
arms embargo imposed by the European Union, the OSCE, or
the United National Security Council; and (3) where the
relevant items are to be exported to a destination within a
customs free zone or free warehouse.
100

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the United
Nations Security Council; and (3) export without national
authorization or in violation of a national authorization; see
Articles 3(2), 4(1), (2), (3), and (4), Regulation 1334/2000.
94
Article 4(5), Regulation 1334/2000.
95
See Ibid., Article 4(6).
96
See Ibid., Article 6(2).
97
See further Frans von der Dunk, “A European “Equivalent”
to United States Export Controls: European Law on the
Control of International Trade in Dual-Use Space
Technologies,” Astropolitics 7 (2009): 122-4.
98
See Article 6(1), Regulation 1334/2000.
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represents a careful, detailed, and politically
noteworthy foray of the EU into the security
domain, including space security in view of
the inherent dual-use of most space activities,
hardware, and technology. The establishment
of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in
2004 103 may also turn out to contribute to
further fundamental EU inroads in legal and
political terms in the European security
domain, albeit that Agency falls under the
competencies specifically of the Council of
the European Union, not of the Commission.
As with the development of the CFSP pillar,
this development took place without the
involvement of ESA – although ESA’s role in
the European space endeavour under the
Regulation’s regime was recognized to the
extent that export controls on launchers and
launch-related items otherwise applicable
would essentially be waived for items “that
are transferred on the basis of orders pursuant
to a contractual relationship placed by the
European Space Agency (ESA) or that are
transferred by ESA to accomplish its official
tasks” or “that are transferred to a Statecontrolled space launching site in the territory
of a Member State, unless that Member State
controls such transfers within the terms of this
Regulation” – noting here that European
launches usually take place from Kourou,
French Guyana, which is French territory. 104
European Union - European Space
Agency Cooperation
The most recent angle from which the EU, this
time in close cooperation with ESA, was
venturing into the space domain, was the
103

See Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004
on the establishment of the European Defense Agency; also,
see Article 42(3), Treaty on European Union as Amended by
the Treaty of Lisbon.
104
Part I, Annex IV, Regulation 1167/2008, sub-paragraph (1)
resp. (4).
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development of two European “flagship
projects,” Galileo and GMES. Both concerned
major programs aiming at launching and
operating a system of satellites as the core part
of an infrastructure to be used for practical
downstream terrestrial applications. It may be
added that perhaps soon a third project is to
follow, i.e., the joint development of European
SSA capabilities, which will also have a
substantial, and probably even more profound
impact on security issues in space for Europe.
Galileo,
initiated
by
the
European
Commission, is the second-generation,
European-owned and European-operated
global satellite navigation system currently
being developed to be operational by 2013. 105
Its key features, as compared with the
currently operational satellite navigation
systems, the U.S. Global Positioning System
(GPS) and the Russian GLONASS (Global
Navigation Satellite System), have been listed
as being an internationally-operated system
controlled by civilians and providing for 27,
plus three spare, satellites in medium Earth
orbits (MEO). The satellite signals should be
augmented world-wide and should be
105

Council Resolution on the European Contribution to the
Development of a Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS), of 19 December 1994; Communication from the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament –
Towards a Trans-European Positioning and Navigation
Network: including A European Strategy for Global
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), COM(1998) 29 final,
of 21 January 1998; Galileo – Involving Europe in a New
Generation of Satellite Navigation Services, of 10 February
1999, COM(1999) 54 final; Council Resolution on the
involvement of Europe in a new generation of satellite
navigation services – Galileo-Definition phase, of 19 July
1999; Commission Communication to the European
Parliament and the Council – On GALILEO, of 22 November
2000, COM(2000) 750 final; Council Regulation setting up
the Galileo Joint Undertaking, No. 876/2002/EC, of 21 May
2002; Council Regulation on the establishment of structures
for the management of the European satellite radio-navigation
programs, No. 1321/2004/EC, of 12 July 2004; and
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the further implementation of the European satellite
navigation programs (EGNOS and Galileo); No.
683/2008/EC, of 9 July 2008.
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available in principle for usage by many
transport as well as non-transport applications.
These satellites should furthermore provide,
apart from an Open Service similar to GPS
and GLONASS Open Services, three types of
enhanced services, for which users one way or
another would have to pay, of which the
Public Regulated Service (PRS) is of
importance for the current discussion, plus
search and rescue services additional to the
existing
COSPAS-SARSAT
Program
[International Satellite System for Search and
Rescue]. 106
Galileo has undergone various delays and a
number of changes of direction over the last
years, most notably discarding for the time
being the Public Private Partnership (PPP)
approach in financing, building, and operating
the system. The EU Council of Ministers by
means of a Resolution of 8 June 2007
unequivocally concludes in this regard “that
the current concession negotiations have failed
and should be ended.” 107 However, the
Resolution, as well as ensuing political
discussions within Europe at the highest level,
left little doubt that the European stakeholders
are determined to make Galileo happen and to
replace the private investments that are now
no longer expected with public investments
one way or another; indeed, public investment
has been achieved through the transfer of
unused Common Agricultural Funds. 108 The
most recent result of that determination so far
106

The COSPAS-SARSAT currently is a four-state satellite
system available to aircraft, ships, other vehicles, and persons
in distress for the purpose of sending emergency signals and
alerting rescue services; see International COSPAS-SARSAT
Program Agreement, entered into force on 30 August 1988.
107
Item 2, Council Resolution on GALILEO, 2805th Transport,
Telecommunications, and Energy Council Meeting,
Luxembourg, 6-8 June 2007.
108
Items 4-7, Council Resolution on GALILEO, 2805th
Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council Meeting,
Luxembourg, 6-8 June 2007; respectively Council of the
European Union, 2828th Council Meeting, Economic, and
Financial Affairs, Brussels, 13 November 2007, 14534/07
(Presse 251), at 18.

has been Regulation 683/2008 on the further
implementation of EGNOS (the regional
forerunner to Galileo currently operational)
and Galileo itself. By now, two test satellites
are operational: the GIOVE-A, built by Surrey
Satellite Technology, launched December
2005, and the GIOVE-B, built by Galileo
Industries and launched April 2008. 109
From several perspectives, including the
geopolitical one, Galileo is a major success
already prior to its proper deployment. Ever
since the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
became the first non-European partner to join
the project at the highest level, 110 many such
states have expressed their interest in doing so
and some concluded similar agreements. 111
Though, with the transition from the Galileo
Joint Undertaking (GJU) to the European
GNSS [Global Navigation Satellite System]
Supervisory Authority, as well as the funding
problems, these cooperative developments
have largely stalled, in the case of the PRC
even leading to a severe curtailing of the
actual level of cooperation. 112
Such involvement of non-EU, largely nonEuropean, countries had for the first time
raised major issues related to European
security issues, which the Commission had to
cope with. Notably, the Cooperation
Agreement with the PRC specifically did not

109

The first four in-orbit validation phase satellites for Galileo
are planned for launch by November 2010.
110
By becoming a member of the Galileo Joint Undertaking
(GJU), the precursor to the European GNSS Supervisory
Authority (GSA); see Cooperation Agreement on a Civil
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) – Galileo
between the European Community and its Member States and
the People’s Republic of China, of 30 October 2003; Doc.
Council of the European Union, 13324/03.
111
For example; see Cooperation Agreement on a Civil Global
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) between the European
Community and its Member States and the State of Israel, of 2
June 2005.
112
Space News 12 June 2006.
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include access by the PRC to the PRS. 113 The
PRS is the Galileo-service most akin to the
GPS Precise Positioning Signal. PRS will be
encrypted and physically protected, and only
accessible to a limited group of users – in
principle all governmental organs, some
hybrid service providers in areas key to
modern society, and also in terms of security,
such as energy and telecommunications
networks.
Also, the Agreement with the PRC touched
upon the issue of export control of securitysensitive space hardware and technology in
the context of Galileo cooperation. It notably
provided that “Exports by China to third
countries of sensitive items related to the
Galileo program will have to be submitted for
prior authorization by the competent Galileo
security authority, if the authority has
recommended to the EU Member States that
these items be subject to export
authorization.” 114 In any event, parties
reserved the right to apply applicable laws and
regulations in the context of EU-PRC
cooperation on Galileo as a safety precaution
in case key security issues would be perceived
to be at stake. 115 Regulation 683/2008, the
currently ruling legal document on Galileo,
provides on this issue that any additional
contributions by member states, third states, or
intergovernmental organizations can only be
arranged subject to dedicated agreements,
allowing a similar degree of control over
security matters. 116
Being developed under EU leadership, with
ESA as developer and procuring agency, the
113

On the other hand, see Article 4(2), Cooperation
Agreement on a Civil Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS) – Galileo between the European Community and its
Member States and the People’s Republic of China.
114
Ibid., Article 8(4).
115
Ibid., Article 5(1).
116
See Articles 4(4), (5), and 6(3) and (4), Regulation
683/2008.
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Regulation further outlines the envisaged
approach to Galileo, including the system of
governance that should apply to the
operational phase. Important for our current
topic is that the European GNSS Supervisory
Authority,
established
by
Regulation
1321/2004, is to fulfill the key role inter alia
in security accreditation and operation of the
Galileo security center. 117 In this respect, the
Supervisory Authority will operate under the
umbrella of the Commission, which takes it
upon itself to “manage all questions relating to
the security of the systems, duly taking into
account the need for oversight and integration
of security requirements in the overall
programs.” 118
As already has become clear, and in spite of
the civil governance structure to be developed
for Galileo, security issues will have to be
faced. Firstly, the possibility of potential
adversary use of its signals would still have to
be dealt with; someone has to take decisions,
in the worst case, to effectively shut down
parts of the system, when Galileo signals
threaten to be used by states or non-state
actors against the security interests of Europe
and European states. 119
Secondly, as referred to before, the envisaged
PRS, while painstakingly avoiding any
reference to military or defense, was modeled
in many respects on the GPS Precise
Positioning Signal. Whilst the PRS is
officially to be made accessible to all
117

See Article 16, Regulation 683/2008.
Ibid., Article 13(1). See further Article 13(2)-(5), as well as
Article 14 on the general governance of Galileo for security
purposes.
119
This was essentially taken care of by involving a “Galileo
security center” in the overall governance scheme for the
Galileo system, as well as specific security-related
regulations; see 16th preamble paragraph, Articles 7, 13, 14,
and 16, Regulation 683/2008; also see Council Joint Action
on aspects of the operation of the European satellite radionavigation system affecting the security of the European
Union, 2004/552/CFSP, of 12 July 2004.
118
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governmental services, debate has already
arisen about whether such governmental uses
should not also include the use by the military
of respective member states. To those familiar
with Western political history over the last
half century, it will come as no surprise that
France is most adamant in seeing no obstacle
to such use, whereas the United Kingdom, at
least until recently, was most adamant in
emphasizing that such military uses were
never contemplated, and should not be
contemplated, or at least be vigorously
pursued, now.
The other flagship project, GMES, is of more
recent date, and consequently has not yet
evolved to such an extent as Galileo, in
particular, as relevant to the present
discussion, in terms of an attendant legal and
governance framework to handle to security
aspects. 120 At the same time, it now seems
certain, with the launch of the Sentinel 1
satellite for GMES scheduled for 2011 (the
first Earth observation satellite for GMES)
that it will actually precede an operational
Galileo system to space. GMES is to become
the pan-European contribution to the Global
Earth Observation System of Systems
(GEOSS), representing a global effort to
enhance environmental protection with the
help of satellite technology.
Nonetheless, GMES represents the next step
for space security issues in Europe since this
project for the first time did prominently refer
to the concept of security – interestingly, in
the process extending its scope, as GMES was
originally meant to stand for Global
Monitoring for Environmental Security,
120

See further Council Resolution on the launch of the initial
period of global monitoring for environment and security
(GMES), of 13 November 2001; Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council –
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES):
Establishing a GMES capacity by 2008, COM(2004) 65 final,
of 3 February 2004.

before the latter part was changed to
Environment and Security. Security as
understood here gradually came to be
interpreted beyond the concept of “civil
security” so as to encompass more
“traditional” military and defense issues of
security. 121
GMES, being tasked to provide Europe with
its own independent and comprehensive
satellite Earth observation infrastructure for
generation of data and information on a
comprehensive range of subjects, will bring
the inclusion of defense, security, and military
matters into the broader civil European
governance structures. Like Galileo, this
impacts both the EU and ESA in terms of their
traditional domain having explicitly excluded
military, defense, and security issues.
Establishment of a coherent SSA flagship
project will no doubt move such developments
one step further again.
The Treaty of Lisbon
The developments regarding the increasing
involvement of the EU in the space security
domain are converging with the latest
European achievement, which is the entry into
force of the Treaty of Lisbon as of 1
December 2009. The increasing growth of the
Union – adding twelve new member states in
the time span of a mere three years (20042007) – was calling for a further
rationalization of the governance structure,
where a Commission having at least one
Commissioner of every member state and the
possibilities for small numbers of member
states to block legislative development in the
Council were threatening to make further
121
See further on this Frans von der Dunk, “A European
“Equivalent” to United States Export Controls: European Law
on the Control of International Trade in Dual-Use Space
Technologies,” Astropolitics 7 (2009).
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progress of the Union as a whole increasingly
difficult. Also, the calls for more involvement
at a European level in global issues of
sustainable development, poverty, climate
change, and last, but not least, the new
security issues and a consequent revival of
ideas to extend the scope of supranational
policy-making and law-making did not go
unheard.
As mentioned, the first effort after the Treaty
of Nice of 2001 to take a step forward in
European integration was the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe agreed
upon in Rome in 2004 – but this effort failed.
This was not in the least because the inclusion
of the word “Constitution,” and its presumed
corollaries of a “European anthem” and an
official “European flag” as symbols of the
perceived ambition to create a European
“super-state” with certain democratic lacunae,
triggered nationalist sentiments sufficiently to
make the treaty fail in the referenda held in
France and the Netherlands. An additional
factor blocking the required EU-wide
acceptance was the rather unwieldy and
“juridical-technical” nature of the document
that the combination of the various updating
treaties with particular the original EC Treaty
had become.
While the Treaty of Lisbon, to many a scaleddown and more realistic version of the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe, took
close to two years between acceptance of the
final text and entry into force, 122 in the end it
did succeed in becoming the key document
122

The Treaty of Lisbon was voted down in Ireland by a
referendum the first time around, and managed a favorable
vote the second time only after considerable wheeling and
dealing and a number of cosmetic changes; and even after the
Treaty had passed that hurdle, in particular Poland and the
Czech Republic were serious candidates to block the entry
into force of the Treaty – acceptance of the Treaty of Lisbon,
as of any other fundamental treaty in the EC and EU context,
had to be unanimous as between the twenty-seven member
states in order to lead to entry into force.
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underlying the European Union. Among many
other things, it also tried to further enhance the
position of Europe as an entity in its own right
in space and security, and consequently the
space security domain.
The Treaty of Lisbon and Security
As far as the security-side to the equation is
concerned, at least the principle of “security”
was partially transferred from the Treaty on
European Union to the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, and
included a reference to “defense” at the same
time. The first treaty was the one document
part of the Treaty of Lisbon where the EC
legal order and the key roles of Commission,
Parliament, and Court were not engaged; the
other, effectively the old EC Treaty as
amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, was the
second such document where EC law and
Commission,
Parliament,
and
Court
competencies did apply.
So, in matters of security, now “The Union
shall have competence, in accordance with the
provisions of the Treaty on European Union,
to define and implement a common foreign
and security policy, including the progressive
framing of a common defense policy.” 123
However, the actual implementation of such
policies refers back to the Treaty on European
Union, to wit its second pillar where the
intergovernmental structures reside. Also,
Article 4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union makes reference to shared
competence between the Union and EU
member states in the “area of freedom,
security, and justice.” 124 Note, that “security”
is inserted in the text between “freedom” and
“justice,” whereby the term “security” may
123

Article 2(4), Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union.
124
Ibid., Article 4(2.j).
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arguably be somewhat confined to civil
security.
What the actual effect will be of this partial
“transfer” of the security domain into the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, will depend on the future usage that
the Union’s institutions may seek to make of
these clauses. On one hand, the shared
competence of Article 4(2) essentially means
that “the member states can in principle only
exercise their competences to the extent that
the Union has not exercised its competence, 125
which in turn means the Union’s institutions
can, following Article 288 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, adopt
Regulations, Directives, and Decisions.
On the other hand, Article 2(4) ensures that
any action of the Union in this domain will
have to follow the rules of the Treaty on
European Union in its version as consolidated
by the Treaty of Lisbon. Here, the Union may
now “define and pursue common policies and
actions” among others to “safeguard its
values, fundamental interests, security,
independence and integrity; … preserve
peace, prevent conflicts, and strengthen
international security in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the United Nations
Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki
Final Act, and with the aims of the Charter of
Paris, including those relating to external
borders,” objects clearly at least potentially
involving
security,
including
military
decisions. 126 To what extent such policies and
actions may comprise juridical or legislative
action, and also to what extent such policies
would essentially remain an empty shell

without actual follow-on juridical or
legislative action, may be disputed, but in
principle these would not be subject to the
democratic controls of the European
Parliament, and therefore remain within the
exclusive domain of democratic controls of
relevant national parliaments, and by the same
token would fall outside the jurisdiction of the
Court of Justice.
Furthermore, it is the European Council, a
special version of the Council of Ministers
comprising the Heads of State of the member
states, hence still first and foremost
representing their individual member states’
interests, 127 which shall now, further to Article
21 of the consolidated Treaty on European
Union, identify the
…at least the strategic interests and
principle of objectives of the
“security” was Union and take
relevant decisions by
partially unanimity, inter alia
transferred from in the area of
the Treaty on common foreign and
policy. 128
European security
Union to the The role of the
is
Treaty on the Commission
limited to the right to
Functioning of propose
external
the European actions other than
Union… those for the area of
common foreign and
security policy, which is the domain of the
occupant of the newly created High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, a special official which is,
although Vice-President of the Commission,
directly appointed by the European Council. 129
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Stephen Hobe, et al, A New Chapter for Europe in Space,”
Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht I: 54 (2005), 347.
126
Article 21(2), Treaty on European Union as amended by
the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union
and the Treaty Establishing the European Community
(hereafter Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European
Union), Lisbon, entered into force 1 December 2009.
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See further Articles 235-236, Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union.
128
See Article 22(1), Consolidated Version of the Treaty on
European Union.
129
See Ibid., Articles 18(1) and (2), and 22(2); further Article
30.
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Article 24(1) of the consolidated version of the
Treaty on European Union echoes the
aforementioned provision of Article 2(4) of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, in allotting to the Union “all areas of
foreign policy and all questions relating to the
Union’s security, including the progressive
framing of a common defense policy.” This
common foreign security policy, however, is
subject to specific rules and procedures,
requiring unanimous agreement by the
European Council and alternatively the
Council of Ministers, but “the adoption of
legislative acts shall be excluded” and (with
one exception not relevant here) “the Court of
Justice of the European Union shall not have
jurisdiction
with
respect
to
these
130
provisions.”
In sum, in all of Title V of the consolidated
version of the Treaty on European Union,
entitled “General Provisions on the Union’s
External Action and Specific Provisions on
the Common Foreign and Security Policy”
and comprising Articles 21 through 46, the
Commission is referred to no more than eight
times, in a manner that can be described as
being on the fringe of the actual decisionmaking processes. From the same perspective,
the European Parliament is referred to a mere
seven times, the Court of Justice of the
European Union exactly once. By contrast, the
European Council has been mentioned 19
times, the Council of Ministers as such no less
than 74 times, and the term “Member States”
occurs 58 times in this Title. There is no better
way to directly visualize the different roles of
the first three, the “truly European
institutions,” as compared with the latter two
institutions where the individual member
states’ interests are most prominently
defended, in the context of security under the
Common Foreign and Security Policy.
130

Ibid., Article 24(1). See further Articles 28 and 31.
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It remains to be seen how the political
landscape, both within the European Union
itself and from a more geopolitical
perspective, will evolve and whether this
might, under certain circumstances, allow for
an increasingly larger role for the EU
institutions in security issues.
The Treaty of Lisbon and Space
In regard to outer space, the Treaty of Lisbon
was hoped for to present at least a courageous
step forward. When its failed predecessor, the
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe,
was being negotiated and drafted, it had
included two novel provisions offering a key
to considerably enlarging Europe’s role in
space.
Firstly, that Treaty provided in Article I-14
that “In the areas of research, technological
development, and space, the Union shall have
competence to carry out activities, in
particular to define and implement programs;
however, the exercise of that competence shall
not result in Member States being prevented
from exercising theirs.” 131 This clause was
part of the Article providing for the scope of
shared competence between the Union and its
member states, but the last part has led
commentators to conclude that this was not so
much a normal shared competence, but rather
a “parallel competence.” 132 In other words,
individual member states would retain
sovereign discretion to draft and implement
their own national policies and legislation in
this area.

131
Article I-14(3), Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe.
132
Stephen Hobe, et al, “A New Chapter for Europe in
Space,” Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht I: 54 (2005),
346-347.

96

Frans von der Dunk/Europe and Security Issues in Space: The Institutional Setting

Secondly, specifically on space it was
provided:
1. To promote scientific and technical
progress, industrial competitiveness,
and the implementation of its
policies, the Union shall draw up a
European space policy. To this end, it
may promote joint initiatives, support
research
and
technological
development, and coordinate the
efforts needed for the exploration and
exploitation of space.
2. To contribute to attaining the
objectives referred to in paragraph 1,
European laws or framework laws
shall
establish
the
necessary
measures, which may take the form
of a European space program.
3. The Union shall establish any
appropriate relations with the
European Space Agency. 133

By many, this was considered to represent the
first true acceptance of a competence in space
for the Union, even if only shared or parallel.
This, however, overlooked the fact that
already since 1994, with the adoption of the
Satellite Directive, 134 the Union had exercised
a fundamental competence to regulate satellite
communications as part of the broader
telecommunications sector in the context of
the European Internal Market. From that
moment on, for example, the Commission had
adopted more Regulations, Directives, and
Decisions to deal with specific aspects of
commercial satellite communications 135 and
133

Article III-254, Treaty establishing a Constitution for
Europe.
134
Commission Directive amending Directive 88/301/EEC
and Directive 90/388/EEC, in particular with regard to
satellite communications, 94/46/EC, of 13 October 1994.
135
For example: Commission Directive amending Directive
90/387/EEC with regard to personal and mobile
communications, 96/2/EC, of 16 January 1996; Commission
Directive amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the
implementation of full competition in telecommunications
markets, 96/19/EC, of 13 March 1996; Decision of the
European Parliament and of the Council on a coordinated
authorization approach in the field of satellite personal
communications systems in the Community, No. 710/97/EC,

had handed down Decisions enforcing the
general competition regime in the sector.136 It
also overlooked a similar regulatory
involvement in the satellite navigation area,
beginning with the Regulation setting up the
Galileo Joint Undertaking in 2002. 137
More precisely, therefore, entry into force of
the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe would have meant a first
comprehensive competence in terms of scope,
not
being
indirectly
deduced
from
competencies in telecommunication and
transport fields (e.g., note that Galileo was
presented first and foremost as a tool for transEuropean transport networks, and still
essentially resides with the Commission’s
Directorate on Transport and Energy). This

of 24 March 1997; Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council on a common framework for general
authorizations and individual licenses in the field of
telecommunications services, 97/13/EC, of 10 April 1997;
Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the selection and authorization of systems providing mobile
satellite services (MSS); No. 626/2008/EC, of 30 June 2008.
136
For example: Commission Decision relating to a
proceeding pursuant to Article 85 of the EC Treaty and
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (IV/34.768 – International
Private Satellite Partners), No. 94/895/EC, of 15 December
1994; Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be
incompatible with the common market and the functioning of
the EEA Agreement (IV/M.490 – Nordic Satellite
Distribution), No. 96/177/EC, of 19 July 1995; Commission
Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EC
Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (IV/35.518 –
Iridium), No. 97/39/EC, of 18 December 1996; Commission
Decision declaring a concentration to be compatible with the
common market according to Council Regulation (EEC) No
4064/89 (IV/M.1564 – Astrolink), of 25 June 1999;
Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be
compatible with the common market according to Council
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (IV/M.4465 - Thrane and
Thrane/Nera), of 21 March 2007; Commission Decision
declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common
market and the EEA Agreement (COMP/M.4403 –
Thales/Finmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space & Telespazio), of
4 April 2007; Commission Decision declaring a concentration
to be compatible with the common market according to
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (IV/M.4709 – Apax
Partners/Telenor Satellite Services), of 20 August 2007,
137
Council Regulation setting up the Galileo Joint
Undertaking, No. 876/2002/EC, of 21 May 2002.
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was not generally considered to be subject to
dispute, and even as the Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe was running into
trouble, this clause was expected to survive. 138
As it turned out, by way of an unpleasant
surprise for the supporters of European space
cooperation, the Treaty of Lisbon did take one
fundamental step backwards here. The Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union as
per the Treaty of Lisbon in relevant part firstly
faithfully copies Article I-14 of the Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe that
was stated above. 139
Secondly, however, the Treaty now provides:
1. To promote scientific and technical
progress, industrial competitiveness,
and the implementation of its
policies, the Union shall draw up a
European space policy. To this end, it
may promote joint initiatives, support
research
and
technological
development, and coordinate the
efforts needed for the exploration and
exploitation of space.
2. To contribute to attaining the
objectives referred to in paragraph 1,
the European Parliament and the
Council, acting in accordance with
the ordinary legislative procedure,
shall
establish
the
necessary
measures, which may take the form
of a European space program,
excluding any harmonization of the
laws and regulations of the Member
States.
3. The Union shall establish any
appropriate relations with the
European Space Agency.
4. This Article shall be without
prejudice to the other provisions of
this Title. 140
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Note that paragraphs 1 and 3 are identical to
paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article III-254 of the
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe,
and that paragraph 4, though not present in the
latter, does only confirm the default
relationship. Thus, paragraph 2 is the key
difference here.
First, it replaces the reference to European
laws and framework laws (the new names
proposed by the Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe for Regulations and
Directives) with a more complicated formula,
which in essence still refers to EC secondary
law. 141 Second, a clause is now added
excluding from any such EU competence the
possibility to use Regulations, Directives, or
Decisions for the purpose of harmonizing laws
and regulations of EU member states.
Consequently, the EU competence on space is
now limited to adopting secondary EU law
that either (1) establishes a space project or
space program and presumably takes care of
its financing through EU budgets, or (2)
applies the freedoms of movement of goods,
services, persons and capital as well as the
competition regime to the space sector, as the
remaining key pillars of the Internal Market
not covered by the last clause of paragraph 2.
With regard to the latter, moreover, with the
exception
of
areas
of
satellite
telecommunications and satellite navigation
where the leadership role of the Commission
and also in the legislative domain is generally
accepted and already has led to secondary EU
law being adopted, actual adoption of
Regulations, Directives, or Decisions may run
into problems. Any existence of member state
regulation on any such topic – as part of the
exercise of member state competence, left

138
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139
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140
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unhampered under Article 4(3) of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union –
might be expected either to exclude ipso facto
a right for the EU institutions to adopt
secondary EU law, or lead to sufficient
opposition in the Council to preclude such
adoption in practice.
Still, the combined force of existing
competencies in the satellite communication
and satellite navigation fields, the clauses of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, and the subsidiarity principle vis-à-vis
the inherently global domain of outer space
may well lead to increasing activity of the EU
institutions in the space domain. Once the
Council would be convinced that it is in the
overarching interest to do so, the framework
briefly outlined above certainly would allow
this to happen.
Conclusions
From the above analyses of the often
painstaking and complicated processes of
European integration, it may be concluded that
the involvement of key intergovernmental
entities in Europe, including the European
Union and ESA, in space security is rapidly
evolving at least on a political and visibility
level, even as such involvement is crucially
shaped by the institutional structures and the
roles of the member states in delineating
relevant competencies. The outside reality that
space activities are almost always inherently
security-sensitive or even simply developed
from security needs has caught up with the
principled prohibition in the relevant
documents (for the European Union at least
until the Treaty on European Union) to
become fundamentally involved in security
issues. The European flagship projects,
Galileo and GMES, may be seen as clear
indicators that indeed a gradual acceptance of
the inevitability of involvement of the Union

and the Agency into the field of space security
has started to occur.
This process so far has been largely an
indirect one, bringing many factors together –
the
increasing
entanglement,
even
convergence, of ESA and the EU, the gradual
swallowing of the WEU by the latter (where
perhaps that process is most advanced with
respect to the space part of the WEU), the
double perspective of security and space from
which the Union is addressing space security,
the joint development of the flagship projects,
the specific focus on international trade in and
exports of security-sensitive technology, and
trying to cope with potential Internal Marketdistorting consequences of national licensing
regimes on export control. The process is
further driven by the political will of the
Union to be in Europe’s driver’s seat with
regard to global developments, such as
concerning the Wassenaar Arrangement and
the MTCR, but also Space Situational
Awareness and other space security-related
issues.
The failed Treaty Establishing a Constitution
for Europe and the successful Treaty of
Lisbon from that perspective together
represented the extent to which the EU and its
leading institutions, first of all the
Commission, were able to move along that
path so far, and establish a first measure of
legislative and regulatory coherence on the
European front. The results, as analyzed, are
rather mixed and certainly do not overcome
many of the complications, sometimes
perhaps even inconsistencies, arising as a
result from the manifold angles from which
issues of space security are addressed in
Europe.
For example, in spite of the increasing
cooperation of the Union and ESA in matters
of space policy, and now even projects, a fullfledged integration of ESA into the Union
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does not seem to be plausible for now. Issues,
such as the conflicting approach to the
financing of space industry in the context of
European space projects, with ESA largely
still forced to adhere to the “fair return”
concept and the Union insisting on open and
competitive procurement, will therefore
continue to require ad-hoc solutions, as was
achieved for example for Galileo. In that
sense, institutionally speaking, Europe has not
yet moved fundamentally beyond the
Framework Agreement. This is not to
diminish the value and importance of what has
been achieved.
To paraphrase the most famous quote in space
history, it may not be the giant leap hoped for,
but it is a small step forward opening up the
prospect of more steps in the same direction.
Security is also high on the agenda in Europe,
space is increasingly playing an indispensable
role in that context, and the flagship projects
may well turn out to prove that the best way to
deal with these issues would be by allowing
more space for integrated decision-making at
a European level, in which case both the
European Union and ESA will be
indispensable players – or at the very least
indispensable vehicles for the sovereign
member states to ensure their individual
interests would not unduly obstruct the
overarching European interests in security,
space, and in space security.
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The United States (U.S.) is opening a new
dialogue with China on cooperation in space
that includes human space flight. The
announcement appeared in the Joint Statement
issued by U.S. President Obama and Chinese
President Hu in Beijing, China on 17
November 2009. The two leaders also agreed
“the two countries have common interests in
promoting the peaceful use of outer space and
agree to take steps to enhance security in outer
space.” 1 These are significant shifts in U.S.
civilian and military space policy. The U.S.
ended cooperation in space with China more
than a decade ago 2 and consistently refused to
discuss Chinese concerns about security in
outer space.
In January 1999, a Select Committee of the
U.S. House of Representatives chaired by
Representative Christopher Cox issued its
Report on U.S. National Security and
Military/Commercial Concerns with the
People’s Republic of China (PRC). The report
claimed “The PRC (China) has stolen or
otherwise illegally obtained U.S. missile and
space technology that improves the PRC’s
military and intelligence capabilities.”3 The

Cox Commission concluded many of the
alleged illegal transfers of American space
technology occurred in the wake of “the
Reagan administration’s decision to permit
satellite launches in the PRC” and that the
factors that led to the Reagan decision, which
was
left
unaltered
by
subsequent
administrations, were “no longer applicable.” 4
The U.S. Congress and the Executive branch
responded by enacting highly restrictive
export control laws and regulations that ended
U.S. - China cooperation in commercial
satellite launches and prevented cooperation in
civilian space exploration. 5
Just a few months later, in March 1999, the
Chinese government refused to support a
program of work at the United Nations (UN)
Conference on Disarmament (CD) because it
did not include negotiations on the Prevention
of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). 6
The United States repeatedly opposed opening
such a discussion, insisting on many occasions
during the last ten years “there is no arms race
in outer space” and therefore no need to

p. xii, http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/hr105851
(accessed January 2010).
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http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-jointstatement (accessed November2009).
2
Primarily consisting of U.S. government permission to allow
commercial space activities, such as satellite launch services,
consulting and satellite and component purchases.
3
Select Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives,
Report on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial
Concerns with the People’s Republic of China Volume III,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1999.

4
5

Ibid. p. xxiv.

Joan Johnson-Freese, “Becoming Chinese: Or, How U.S.
Satellite Export Policy Threatens National Security,” Space
Times, January/February 2001. Also, see Joan JohnsonFreese, “Alice in Licenseland: U.S. Satellite Export Controls
Since 1990,” Space Policy 16: 3 (2000).
6
Statement by H. E. Mr. Li Changhe, Ambassador for
Disarmament Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, 27 May
1999, Geneva, Switzerland, http://www.nti.org/db/china/
engdocs/lichangh_0599.htm (accessed December 2009).
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discuss space security issues in the CD. 7 In
June 2009, the U.S. and China agreed to form
an ad-hoc committee in the CD to discuss
PAROS. The change in the U.S. position on
space in the CD is consistent with the
agreement in the U.S. - China Joint Statement
to “take steps” on space security.
These shifts in U.S. civilian and military space
policy towards China are supported by the
head of the U.S. Strategic Command, General
Kevin Chilton. Just before President Obama’s
trip to China, the general told reporters that
China was “on a fast track to improving
capabilities,” that space was “a competitive
domain” and that the United States needed “a
forum that provides an open dialogue between
our nations.” 8 General Chilton hopes the new
dialogue with China will help the United
States “understand exactly what China’s
intentions are.” 9 The chief coordinator of U.S.
military activities in space admitted “where
they are heading is one of the things that a lot
of people would like to understand better.” 10
General Chilton’s open-minded approach to
Chinese intentions is at odds with many U.S.
analysts of China’s space programs, who
claim to know that Chinese investments in
space, including the large sums spent on their
human space flight program, are guided by
military objectives. The head of U.S. Strategic
7

The most notable among these was the statement of the
Delegation of the United States of America to the Conference
on Disarmament on 13 June 2006, which states: “The Cold
War is over, Mr. President, and there is no arms race in outer
space. Thus there is no – repeat, no – problem in outer space
for arms control to solve.” The statement was delivered by
John Mohanco, then the Deputy Director of the U.S. State
Department’s Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security
Affairs,
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/
speeches06/13JuneUS.pdf (accessed December 2009).
8
Phil Stewart, “U.S. Eyes Intent of China’s Space Programs,”
Reuters 3 November 2009, http://www.reuters.com/
article/scienceNews/idUSTRE5A25XG20091103 (accessed
December 2009).
9

Ibid.
Ibid.

10

Command is likely aware of the limited value
of many existing U.S. assessments of Chinese
intentions in space, which often lack
credibility because they are based on
questionable information from a small set of
poorly evaluated Chinese sources. 11 The
unwarranted concern generated by U.S.
analysts over the comments of Chinese
General Xu Qiliang on 1 November 2009 is a
good example. Xu was discussing general
trends in the development of military space
technology in the context of comments on the
60th anniversary of the People’s Liberation
Army Air Force (PLAF). American press
accounts, took highly edited fragments of
Xu’s full remarks out of context, making it
appear the head of the Chinese Air Force said
war in space was inevitable, which he did
not. 12
The new willingness to talk about cooperation
in space is a welcome sign that both the U.S.
and China recognize the undesirable
consequences of maintaining the post-Cox
Commission status-quo. If the bilateral
dialogue on space is to succeed, both sides
need to be prepared to manage the inevitable
11
Gregory Kulacki, “Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Technology in
Chinese Open-Source Publications,” Union of Concerned
Scientists, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 9 June 2009,
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security
/international_information/us_china_relations/anti-satelliteasat.html (accessed December 2009).
12
Analysts are made to appear to sanction the inaccurate
interpretation that Xu’s remarks exposed hitherto
unpublicized Chinese plans for space warfare. See Colin
Clark, “China Declares Space War Inevitable,”
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009 /11/04/china -declares-spacewar-inevitable (accessed December 2009). The original story
clearly indicates Xu was referring to longstanding public
Chinese discussions of trends in the militarization of outer
space, not plans for space war or space weaponization. See
“China’s PLA Eyes Future in Space, Air: Air Force
Commander,” Xinhua General News Service, Beijing, China,
1 November 2009, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/200911/02/content_4099975.htm (accessed December 2009). An
extended Chinese language account of the full press
conference from which the quotes in the prior source are
derived
is
available
at
http://news.mod.gov.cn/
headlines/2009-11/01/content_4099571.htm.
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difficulties and frustrations of continued
miscommunication and misunderstanding. For
example, the United States and China began a
similar dialogue on nuclear weapons nearly
twenty years ago, but the participants still
argue over the meaning of basic concepts, like
deterrence. 13 China’s nuclear weapons experts
have an institutionalized aversion to the use of
the Chinese word for deterrence “weishe.”
Elder Chinese leaders do not want them to use
deterrence to describe the purpose of Chinese
nuclear weapons because they associate the
concept with the “nuclear blackmail” they
believe China experienced at the hands of the
Americans in the 1950s. 14 Today, younger

13
The Committee on the U.S. - Chinese Glossary of Nuclear
Security Terms, composed of members of the U.S. National
Academy of Science Committee on International Security and
Arms Control (CISAC) Policy and the Chinese Scientists
Group on Arms Control (CSGAC) negotiated for months over
the inclusion of the term “limited deterrence” in their EnglishChinese, Chinese-English Nuclear Security Glossary. The aim
of the glossary is to “reduce the likelihood of
misunderstanding, and to remove barriers to progress in
exchanges and diplomatic, cooperative and other activities
where unambiguous understanding is essential.” CISAC and
CSGAC have been meeting for almost twenty years. In the
end, the two sides agreed to disagree, saying it was “a term
used by some scholars to describe a form of deterrence.
However, there is no consensus on the definition.” This may
seem a small matter, but some of the scholars they refer to in
the definition argue that China is in the process of changing
its nuclear posture from a “minimal” to a “limited” deterrent.
This change could have grave implications for U.S.
perceptions of Chinese intentions regarding the alert status
and possible use of their nuclear weapons. Committee on the
U.S. - Chinese Glossary of Nuclear Security Terms, National
Research Council, “English-Chinese, Chinese-English
Nuclear Security Glossary,” The National Academies Press,
Washington, D.C., 2008, http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?
record_id=12186 (accessed January 2010).
14
This was the unanimous response from a panel of eight
leading Chinese experts on nuclear strategy: Duan Zhanyuan,
Second Artillery of the People’s Liberation Army; Fan Jishe,
China Academy of Social Sciences; Guo Xiaobing, China
Institute of Contemporary International Relations; Hu Yumin,
China Institute of International and Strategic Studies; Li Bin,
Tsinghua University; Sun Xiangli, China Academy of
Engineering Physics; Teng Jianqun, China Institute of
Intemational Studies; and Yang Mingjie, China Institute of
Contemporary International Relations. These experts were
responding to a question on the Chinese aversion to the term
“deterrence” from James Acton at a workshop sponsored by
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Chinese analysts are beginning to use the
word “deterrence” the same way their
American counterparts do. Ironically, this
accommodation to the American nuclear
vernacular is producing more confusion. Some
American analysts, mistakenly according to
the Chinese, are interpreting changes in their
use of terminology as a sign China is changing
its nuclear posture. 15
The American side should prepare for the
upcoming dialogue with China on space by
learning more about the history of the Chinese
space program. Familiarity with the choices
China made in the past, as well as how and
why those choices were made, should help the
American participants be more effective in
meeting whatever objectives they set for the
talks. The best way to determine where China
might be heading is to understand more about
where they have been.
The 1980s: The Formative Decade for
Contemporary Chinese Space Policy
China’s contemporary space capabilities,
including the anti-satellite (ASAT) interceptor
tested in January 2007 and their human space
flight program, were made possible by a 1986
leadership decision to make an initial 10
billion Chinese Yuan (or Renminbi, RMB)
investment in seven key areas of advanced
technology, including aerospace. 16 This

the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and
Tsinghua University held at Tsinghua University.
15
A description of the ongoing debate among scholars can be
found in Stephanie Legge, “Going Beyond the Stir: The
Strategic Realities of China's No-First-Use Policy,” NTI Issue
Brief, December, 2005, http://www.nti.org/e_research
/e3_70.html (accessed December 2009). Legge notes the
origins of the linguistic roots of the suspected Chinese posture
change in Alastair Iain Johnson, “China's New Old Thinking:
The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security
20: 3 (1995-1996).
16
Gregory Kulacki and Jeffrey Lewis, “A Place for One’s
Mat,” American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge,
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decision was a direct result of a personal
appeal to Deng Xiaoping by Chinese scientists
who were closely associated with China’s
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile
programs. 17 That appeal was contained in a
letter written in response to U.S. President
Ronald Reagan’s 23 March 1983 speech
announcing the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI). 18
Influential Chinese defense community
scientists were not writing to Deng because of
a concern about the possibility of a future
military conflict with the United States. The
contents of their letter and the state of U.S. China relations at the time it was written make
this clear. The United States and China were
cooperating in efforts to contain the Soviet
Union, and the United States was providing
intelligence, technology and training to the
Chinese military. President Reagan received a
warm welcome in what he described as the
“so-called Communist China” during his visit
in April 1984. Reagan proclaimed, “My visit
to China has convinced me that our future is
bright,” and “America is on the edge of a new
era of peace, prosperity and commerce.” 19
While the two nations were not allies, U.S.
and Chinese mutual threat perceptions were
low. The year the letter was sent to Deng
Xiaoping Time magazine made him their

Massachusetts, 2009, pp.23-24, http://www.amacad.org/
publications/spaceChina.aspx (accessed December 2009).
17
The scientists were Wang Daheng, Chen Fangyun, Wang
Ganchang and Yang Jiachi. An excellent English language
summary of their contributions to China’s nuclear and
ballistic missile programs is contained in Evan A.
Feigenbaum, China’s Techno-Warriors: National Security
and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the
Information Age (Stanford University Press, 2003): 154–157.
18
Xiaohua Fan, The Inside Story of Chinese Space PolicyMaking (China Literature and History Publishing House,
2005): 262 - 269.
19
Robert A. Jemian, Laurence I. Barrett and Evan
Thomas,“An Opening to the Middile Kingdon,” Time 14 May
1984,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,955255, 00.html (accessed November 2009).

“Man of the Year.” Time noted “his
continuing reform of China and Marxism
holds more promise for changing the course of
history than anything else that occurred during
1985.” 20
The Chinese scientists who persuaded Deng
Xiaoping to commit a large block of the
nation’s limited technical and fiscal resources
to an ambitious space program believed that
SDI was “not just a military program, but a
far-reaching political striving to preserve
American superiority.” 21 The military
implications of SDI were not the “real
objective” behind a program they saw as an
effort to “push forward new advanced
technologies
and
national
economic
22
The Chinese leadership,
development.”
attentive to the concerns of their scientific
advisers, wanted to ensure China kept pace in
the international competition for technological
and economic power. Military space
capability was a secondary concern. This was
reflected in the “Outline for National High
Technology Planning” that codified the
scientists concerns into national policy. 23 The
20

George J. Church, “Deng Xiaoping,” Time 6 January 1986,
http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/personoftheyear/archive
/stories/1985.html (accessed November 2009). It was the
second time Deng received high praise from Time, which
named him “Man-of-the-Year” in 1978 for “leading onequarter of mankind quickstep out of dogmatic isolation into
the late 20th Century and the life of the rest of the planet.”
From the Time archive, “Person of the Year,” Time 1
January1979,
http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/
personoftheyear
/archive/stories/1978.html
(accessed
December 2009).
21
Xiaohua Fan, The Inside Story of Chinese Space PolicyMaking (China Literature and History Publishing House,
2005): 262-269. Two of the four authors of the letter detail
their political, economic and technological motivations for
investments in space in an article entitled: “The Science of
Technology and Our National Aerospace Technology
Development,” Journal of the Chinese Academy of Science 4
(1986), shortly after they transmitted their letter to Deng
Xiaoping. The article can be found in Yang Jiachi, The
Selected Works of Yang Jiachi (China Astronautic Publishing
House, 2006): 102-109.
22
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23
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Outline placed a priority on civilian and dualuse applications: a priority that continues to
guide Chinese high technology investments,
including aerospace investments, according to
language in the current Chinese national
plan. 24
During Reagan’s visit, Deng expressed
frustration that the U.S. was unwilling to
provide China with access to space
technology. 25 Six year’s earlier, U.S.
President Carter’s National Security Advisor,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, brought what he
described as “the most high powered
science/technology delegation ever sent by the
United States to a foreign country” when he
visited China in 1978 for negotiations leading
to the establishment of diplomatic relations. 26
NASA Administrator at that time, Robert
Frosch, was a member of that delegation.
Deng Xiaoping took the occasion to ask the
United States for help developing China’s first
communication satellite. Their own effort had
stalled and Deng wanted to jump start a long
distance education effort designed to address
the catastrophic damage to Chinese secondary
and higher education caused by the Cultural
Revolution of 1966-1976. 27
The Carter administration was willing to sell
China a satellite, but China wanted help
overcoming the specific technical difficulties
inhibiting progress on their existing
communications satellite program. It had been
a top Chinese national technology policy
24

An English Language copy of the complete document is
available on-line at http://www.cstec.org/uploads/files/
National%20Outline%20for%20Medium%20and%20Long%
20Term%20S&T%20Development.doc (accessed December
2009).
25
Jeff Gerth and Eric Schmidt, “The Technology Trade: A
Special Report; Chinese Said to Reap Gains In U.S. Export
Policy Shift,” New York Times 19 October 1998.
26
Richard Masden, China and the American Dream: A Moral
Inquiry (University of California Press, 1995): 134.
27
Xiaohua Fan,. The Inside Story of Chinese Space PolicyMaking (China Literature and History Publishing House,
2005): 199-201.
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priority since September of 1977. 28 The
willingness of the Carter administration to
provide technological assistance to China was
encouraging and the immediate need pressing,
so Deng took the extraordinary step of making
a direct personal appeal to the United States
against the wishes of his scientific advisers.
They wanted to do it on their own. Fortunately
for them, the negotiations broke down.
Afterward, Deng and China’s aerospace
leaders came to believe that China could not
rely on the U.S. for meaningful assistance in
developing their own space technology. They
went ahead with the communication satellite
on their own. There were repeated setbacks
and delays, but these proved to be invaluable
learning experiences. 29 China eventually
succeeded
in
placing
their
first
communications satellite into space on 16
April 1984, ten days before Reagan arrived in
China. 30 Deng may have been expressing
frustration when he chided Reagan for not
providing more access to American space
technology, but he may also have been trying
to let him know China could succeed without
it.
China’s
disappointment
in
American
reluctance to share advanced space technology
has a historical precedent in the Soviet
Union’s hesitant assistance to China’s nuclear
28
Chinese General Zhang Aiping, the Director of the
Committee on Science, Technology for National Defense
(CSTND) first expressed his intention to make it a priority
during a meeting of the Chinese Academy of Space
Technology (CAST) in June 1975. Jisheng Li, Far Road to
Heaven: Record of Rocket and Satellite Launches (Central
Party School of the Chinese Communist Party Publishing
House, 2005): 151.
29
Carter’s NASA Administrator Robert Frosch felt that the
lesser risk was in helping China with their own
communications satellite, since that would probably mean
they learned less than if they did it themselves. Moreover, in
his view there were no great secrets in the comsat
(commercial satellite) business that cooperation would risk
compromising. Personal communication with the author.
30
Xiaohua Fan,. The Inside Story of Chinese Space PolicyMaking (China Literature and History Publishing House,
2005): 224-232.
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and ballistic missile programs– assistance
abruptly canceled shortly after it began.
Chinese leaders call attention to this precedent
when they compare the human spaceflight
program to their earlier effort to develop
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. 31
Although in practice human spaceflight has
shown little military value, the common
denominator between the two programs
(nuclear weapons/ballistic missiles and
spaceflight) is that in both instances the
Chinese were forced to master the
technologies on their own, or at least without
substantial foreign assistance. The comparison
is meant to be an object lesson for the Chinese
in the continuing importance of indigenous
technological development, even in this era of
globalization and interdependence. This
understanding of the importance the current
leadership attaches to their space program is
consistent with the concerns expressed in the
past by the letter-writing Chinese scientists
who got it started. Those scientists understood
how technologically deficient China was in
comparison
to
the
world’s
most
31
Many American observers see the connection in military
terms and describe the Chinese human spaceflight program as
a “military run” program. One example, among scores of
others, was an editorial published in The Dallas Morning
News shortly after China put their first person in space. The
editorial was accompanied by a picture of military officers
surrounding the Shenzhou V space capsule. Standing at the
front of the capsule were Chinese astronaut Colonel Yang
Liwei and Chinese President Jiang Zemin, both dressed in
their military uniforms. The editorial notes: “It is important to
observe that Beijing’s space program is not run by the
Chinese equivalent of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, but by the People’s Liberation Army.
Following the taikonaut’s return to Earth, the countr’s science
and technology minister called the event a “glorious
achievement” as significant as China’s explosion of its first
atomic and hydrogen bombs. The comparison is telling.” See
“Red Star Rising: Space Venture Makes China a True
Competitor,” Dallas Morning News 17 October 2003. A
similar assessment of the military character of China’s human
spaceflight program appeared on the eve of U.S. President
Obama’s visit to China: See Gordon Chang, “The Space Race
Begins. Should the U.S. and China Cooperate,” Forbes.com,
http://www.forbes.com/2009 /11/05/space-arms-race-chinaunited-states-opinions-columnists-gordon-g-chang.html
(accessed December 2009).

technologically advanced nation, the United
States., which they imagined was about to
invest hundreds of billions of dollars in a new
generation of space-related technologies.
At the same time, China made a diplomatic
push for international restrictions on the
military use of space technology. In March
1985, Chinese Ambassador Hu Xiaodi
delivered China’s first official position paper
on the peaceful use of outer space to the CD.
It stated “China fully subscribes to the
objective of the non-militarization of outer
space and the exclusive use of outer space for
peaceful purposes.” Non-militarization was
understood to mean “both space weapons with
actual lethal or destructive power and military
satellites of all types from limited and
prohibited.” China was willing to postpone
discussions on a ban on all military uses in
lieu of an immediate effort to ban the
“development,
testing,
production,
deployment and use of any space weapons”
including “all devices or installations either
space, land, sea, or atmosphere-based, which
are designed to attack or damage spacecraft in
outer space, or disrupt their normal
functioning or change their orbits.” 32
Had the United States, China and the other
members of the CD negotiated such a
prohibition, the research and development
(R&D) effort that produced the ASAT
interceptor China tested in January of 2007,
and other suspected Chinese counter space
technologies, would have been legally
proscribed. In the absence of an agreement,
Chinese concerns about ASAT weapons
gradually evolved from observations and
analysis of foreign ASAT systems to
32

See China’s Basic Position on the Prevention of an Arms
Race in Outer Space Conference on Disarmament, CD/579,
19 March 1985 in Jeffrey Lewis, The Minimum Means of
Reprisal: China’s search for Security in a Nuclear Age (The
MIT Press, 2007): 209-210.
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diplomatic efforts to restrain them, and
eventually to R&D programs of their own.

produced their ASAT interceptor in the mid1980s. 37

China had been watching the development of
U.S. and Soviet ASAT systems since the early
1970s. 33 By the end of the decade, they noted
then that while the Soviet Union seemed to be
farther ahead in ASAT technology, U.S. R&D
on missile defense had also produced
capabilities that could be used to “track,
approach,
discriminate
and
destroy”
satellites. 34 These early observations led
China’s defense aerospace experts to
anticipate, several years before Reagan’s SDI
speech, “technological breakthroughs… in
infrared sensing, adaptive optics, lasers,
precision
guidance,
micro-computing,
aerospace, particle beam and other weapons
that will lead to a fundamental change in
strategic defenses.” 35 China’s scientists also
predicted these technological changes would
“undermine arms control efforts between the
United States and Soviet Union that restrict
the development of missile defense and ASAT
systems.” 36 This early connection between
missile defense and ASAT technology is a
persistent theme in Chinese discussions about
the two technologies that continues today. The
ASAT interceptor China tested in 2007 uses
the same basic technologies as those used in
U.S. missile defense interceptors. China
appears to have begun the R&D program that

By the end of the1980s, China had committed
to a long-term R&D effort that would
eventually lead to the acquisition of the
civilian and military space capabilities they
are bringing on-line today. China expressed
“strong interest” in international negotiations
to control the military use of space
technology, including all types of ASAT
weapons, but also set about developing the
same military space capabilities they sought to
have controlled. 38 When China made these
commitments, neither the technologies nor the
negotiations to control them appear to have
been specifically intended to resolve concerns
about a possible military conflict with United
States. For understandable reasons, many
Americans do not see it that way today.

33

Gregory Kulacki, “Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Technology in
Chinese Open-Source Publications,” Union of Concerned
Scientists,
9
June
2009,
http://www.ucsusa.org/
nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/international_informat
ion/us_china_relations/anti-satellite-asat.html
(accessed
December 2009).
34
Ji Shipan and Li Minghu, “Kongjian Zhanzheng yu Jiguang
Wuqi: Dandao Daodan Fangyu de Fazhan Qushi” (Space
Warfare and Laser Weapons: Trends in the Development of
Missile Defense),” Xiandai Fangyu Jishu (Modern Defense
Technology) 3 (1979): 1-31.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid.

Historical Perspective
on American Perceptions
of Chinese Intentions in Space
American perceptions of Chinese intentions in
space have a history of their own that is
disconnected from the history of China’s
space programs. When Ronald Reagan agreed
to allow China to launch U.S. commercial
communications satellites in September of
1988, U.S. threat perceptions of China were
even lower than they had been when he visited
China four years earlier. Time magazine made
fun of a Chinese military “whose power and
prestige have been diminished by Chinese
leaders determined to de-emphasize military
37
Gregory Kulacki and Jeffrey G. Lewis, “Understanding
China’s Antisatellite Test,” The Nonproliferation Review 15:
2 (2008).
38
The Chinese wanted to ban all military uses of space. This
was a much stronger arms control measure than what China
and Russia are currently proposing. Links to the UN
documents on the current Chinese-Russian proposal can be
found on-line at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/
paros/osdocuments.html.
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might in favor of agricultural and industrial
reform.” 39 The U.S. security concern at the
time was Chinese missile sales. Reagan
administration officials, including Defense
Secretary Frank Carlucci, were “fully
satisfied” their discussions with Deng
Xiaoping had resolved those concerns.
Sanctions imposed in the wake of missile sales
to Iran were lifted, and the U.S. continued to
provide assistance and equipment to the
Chinese military. 40
Less than a year later American threat
perceptions changed dramatically after the
Chinese military used lethal force to repress
anti-government demonstrations throughout
China in June of 1989. What is known in the
United States as the “Tiananmen Massacre”
was
a
massive
nationwide military The best way to
campaign to put
determine
down protests in
major
cities where China
throughout China. may be
Televised images of heading is to
the violence in understand
Beijing
on
the more about
evening of June 3
where they
and
the
early
morning of June 4 have been.
horrified
the
American public. CNN reporter Mike Chinoy,
who was responsible for getting those images
out of China, later called it the defining
moment in American perceptions of China. 41
39

Michael S. Serrill, Sandra Burton and Jaime A. FlorCruz,
“China Sprucing Up the Troops.” Time 11 July 1988,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,967873,0
0.html (accessed 29 November 2009).
40
See Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. and China Mark 10 Years of
Ties,” New York Times 16 December 1988; “China Assures
Carlucci On Mideast Arms Sales; Peking Seen Curbing
Missile Supply Role,” New York Times 8 September 1988;
and “U.S. to Lift Sanctions Against Beijing; Chinese Agree to
Accept Peace Corps,” New York Times, 10 March 1988.
41
Mike Chinoy, “Speech Before the Los Angeles World
Affairs Council,” 18 April 1997, http://www.lawac.org/

Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping was instantly
transformed from Time magazine’s reformminded “Man-of-the-Year” into the “Butcher
of Beijing.” In the next few years, the fall of
the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet
Union left China as the only major nation
ruled by a communist party. Over the next
decade, Americans developed “a picture of
China solely as a country of brutal dictators,
beleaguered dissidents and corrupt dealmakers intent on using its economic clout and
its military might to dominate its neighbors
and challenge the United States for regional
supremacy.” 42
Changing American perceptions of China did
not bring a halt to U.S. commercial satellite
launches from China until 1998. Initially this
may have been due to the temporary shortage
of U.S. launch capacity created by the loss of
the Space Shuttle Challenger in 1986. Later in
the next decade, the Clinton administration
continued to permit the launches because it
believed the policy encouraged China to keep
the promise not to sell missile technology it
made just before President Reagan authorized
them. 43 Republican opponents on Congress,
however, began to define Chinese space
programs as a grave threat to U.S. national
security and charged President Clinton “sold
to a Chinese Military Intelligence front the
technology that defense experts argued would
give Beijing the capacity to blind our spy
satellites and launch a sneak attack.” 44
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(accessed November 2009).
42
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November 2009).
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This claim was made in May 1998, when
China had 14 satellites in orbit including ten
communication satellites, mostly of foreign
manufacture, that were used primarily for
television, phone and fax services. China also
had one weather satellite and one scientific
satellite. 45 Also, China’s space investments,
and the Chinese military’s space work force,
were developing the human spaceflight
program, which had yet to launch the first
experimental capsule and would not put an
astronaut into space for another five years.
Even though China had mastered the use of
recoverable reconnaissance satellites and was
developing
experimental
positioning
satellites, 46 they had no demonstrated counter
space capabilities. Yet the “Space Pearl
Harbor” narrative quickly emerged as the
consensus interpretation of Chinese intentions
among U.S. analysts. In January 2001, the
supposed Chinese threat was highlighted in
the Report of the Commission to Assess U.S.
National Security Space Management and
Organization– a Congressional commission
chaired by Donald Rumsfeld until Presidentelect George W. Bush nominated him to serve
as Secretary of Defense. The Space
Commission report claimed: “China’s military
is developing methods and strategies for

45

The communications satellites were: Apstar 1, 3 and 4 (APT
Satellite); Asiasat 1, 2, 3S, and Asiasat G (Asia Satellite
Telecom); Dongfanghong 3R (China Telecom Satellite
Broadcasting); Sinosat-1 (Sino Satellite Communications);
and the Chinastar-1 (Zhongwei 1) built by Lockheed, owned
and operated by China Satellite Communications. The
weather satellite was the Feng Yun 2B (China National Space
Administration), and the scientific sateliite was the Shijian 4
(CAST). See Aviation Week & Space Technology 148: 2
(1998): 141-147; and Aviation Week & Space Technology
154: 3 (2001): 167-176. Also, see the Union of Concerned
Scientist Satellite Database, which is available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security
/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html
(accessed January 2010).
46
This includes the FSW recoverable satellite program which
was used for a variety of experiments as well as photo
reconnaissance, the Ziyuan imaging satellites developed in
cooperation with Brazil and the Beidou positioning satellites.
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defeating the U.S. military in a high-tech and
space-based future war.” 47
Prominent American analysts of China’s
military modernization program believed
these methods and strategies were inspired by
concerns within the Chinese military about the
American use of space technology in the 1991
Gulf War. 48 One of the most frequently was
Mark Stokes, whose 1999 U.S. Army War
College publication on Chinese strategic
modernization was cited frequently by
American analysts. Stokes called the supposed
Chinese preoccupation with military space
technology “China’s Gulf War Syndrome.”
He described it “a rude awakening for the

47
Report of the Commission to Assess U.S. National Security
Space Management and Organization, 11 January 2001,
p. xiv and p. 22, http://www.fas.org/spp/military/commission/
report.htm (accessed January 2010).
48
The claim appears in many American analyses. Some of the
more prominent are James A. Lewis, China as a Military
Space Competitor, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, August 2004, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/
040801_china_space_competitor.pdf (accessed January2010);
Phillip Saunders, Jing-dong Yuan, Stephanie Lieggi and
Angela Deters, China’s Space Capabilities and the Strategic
Logic of Anti-Satellite Weapons, Center for Non-proliferation
Studies, July 2002, http://cns.miis.edu/stories/020722.htm
(accessed January 2010); David O. Meteyer, The Art of
Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space
Weapons, INSS Occasional Paper 60, USAF Institute for
National Security Studies, USAF Academy, Colorado, August
2005; Mark A. Stokes, “Space, Theater Missiles, and
Electronic Warfare: Emerging Force Multiplier for the PLA
Aerospace Campaign, “presented at Chinese Military Affairs:
A Conference on the State of the Field, 26-27 October 2000,
Fort McNair, Washington DC, Aerospace I Panel; and Mary
C. FitzGerald, “China’s Evolving Military Juggernaut,” in
China’s New Great Leap Forward: High Technology and
Military Power in the Next Half-Century, Hudson Institute,
2005. The assertion was also a focal point of a review of
China’s space program presented by Dean Cheng of the
Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) at the Henry L. Stimson
Center on 3 March 2005. A somewhat less definitive
agreement with this consensus appears in Joan JohnsonFreese, “Strategic Communication with China: What Message
about
Space?”
China
Security
2
(2006):
51,
http://www.wsichina.org/attach/china_security2.pdf#search='
Strategic%20Communication%20with%20China:%20Space
(accessed January 2010).
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CMC [China’s Central Military Commission]
and the military-industrial complex.” 49
However, the history of China’s space
program reviewed earlier in this paper
demonstrates that Stokes was mistaken. There
is ample documentary evidence that the
defense scientists who ran China’s “military
industrial complex” anticipated the military
applications of space technology the U.S.
demonstrated in the Gulf War more than a
decade before that war started. 50 They
petitioned the Chinese government for the
funding to develop their own military space
capabilities five years before it started. And at
the time these senior figures in China’s
“military industrial complex” wrote their
petition to the most influential military
decision-maker in the CMC, Deng Xiaoping,
the U.S. was assisting the development of
Chinese military capabilities. Mutual threat
perceptions were low and the probability of a
U.S. - China military conflict was remote.
The mistake Stokes makes in interpreting
Chinese thinking about space is revealing, and
it is one that is repeated by American analysts
who cite Chinese publications without
considering their historical, institutional and
social context. The claim that China was
acquiring the capability to launch a “Space
Pearl Harbor” is based on American
interpretations of the selected quotations of
Chinese military personalities culled from
Chinese military publications and press
interviews.
The
quotations
used
to
demonstrate Chinese intent that appear in the
49

Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization:
Implications for the United States, Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College, September 1999, p. 12.
50
Gregory Kulacki, “Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Technology in
Chinese Open-Source Publications,” Union of Concerned
Scientists, 9 June 2009, http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_
weapons_and_global_security/international_information/us_c
hina_relations/anti-satellite-asat.html (accessed December
2009). This study is based on over 1,500 source articles over a
four-decade period.

Space Commission Report, in the Stokes’
study and in many other U.S. analyses of
China’s space programs are not from the
scientists who work in the aerospace
community and advise the senior leadership of
the Chinese “military-industrial complex.”
The quotations are from a very different set of
Chinese authors writing for publications with
a different purpose and a different audience.
The Gulf War was a global media
phenomenon that carried the now iconic
televised images of “smart bombs” to
hundreds of million of Chinese viewers for
whom television itself was advanced
technology. In the wake of this media event, a
new and very different group of Chinese
authors began writing about military space
technology for a new audience. The authors
were not aerospace
…China made experts or strategists
a diplomatic writing for Chinese
leaders, but nonpush for experts writing for
international average
Chinese
restrictions on readers who were,
the military use like many others all
of space over the world,
technology. rudely awakened by
the images of modern
warfare they saw on
television. Their articles were part of a
political campaign meant to reassure both
soldiers and officers that the Chinese
leadership was aware of the changing nature
of modern military technology and would take
steps to prepare the PLA to respond to these
developments, but without saying in a detailed
or authoritative way how it would respond. 51
American analysts were confusing Chinese
military space policy with Chinese military
propaganda. This confusion is still a problem
today.
51

Ibid.
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Lesson for Policy Makers:
Let the Scientists Do the Talking
The dialogue on cooperation and the peaceful
use of outer space President Obama and
President Hu agreed to begin in their Joint
Statement of November 17, 2009 will not last
for long if both sides continue to be suspicious
of the other’s intentions. Before the dialogue
begins in earnest, and
before any agreement China had
on cooperation is been watching
signed, both sides
the
should take steps to
correct past mistakes. development

of the U.S. and

Chinese
military Soviet ASAT
propaganda on space system since
may not be an the early
indication of the
1970s.
intentions
driving
Chinese space policy,
but it is a cause for concern. Repeated
unsettling statements from military officers
published in Chinese newspapers, magazines
and journals have the same effect on U.S.
policy-makers as the rhetoric from the U.S.
Air Force about “space dominance” has on
Chinese policymakers. Because Chinese
leaders are unwilling to censure their military
propagandists and American leaders cannot
prevent U.S. space hawks from advocating
visions of space dominance to Congress,
policy-makers in both nations find it difficult
to navigate the maze of heated rhetoric that
drives their respective domestic debates over
the merits of cooperation and negotiation.
Mutual reassurances of peaceful intentions
issued regularly by the Chinese Foreign
Ministry and the U.S. Department of State are
routinely dismissed by both governments as
the wishful thinking or disingenuous decorum
of diplomats. In the United States, this
perception was strongly reinforced by the
Foreign Ministry’s apparent lack of
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knowledge about the Chinese ASAT test in
2007, which some ministry functionaries
originally dismissed as U.S. government
slander. 52 The U.S. State Department
enforcement of discriminatory U.S. legal
restrictions on space cooperation with China is
interpreted by many Chinese space scientists
and engineers as a sign of persistent U.S.
hostility towards China’s efforts to join the
international community of spacefaring
nations. 53 This explains, in their view, why
China is not treated on an equal basis with
other less-developed Asian space programs,
specifically those of Japan, India, Malaysia
and South Korea, which all have cooperative
relationships with NASA.
A look back at the record of Chinese decisions
about space suggests that neither the PLA nor
the Foreign Ministry has played a decisive
role in the formation and direction of Chinese
space policy. The limited historical materials
available on Chinese space policy, from the
decision to launch China’s first satellite in the
early days of the People’s Republic to current
Chinese plans to build their own space station,
suggest that China’s scientists guided Chinese
space policy and convinced the Chinese
political leadership to make the investments
necessary to carry it out. Since this is the
audience most likely to influence Chinese
policymakers, a dialogue on cooperation and
negotiations on space between U.S. and
Chinese scientists is more likely to produce
credible, productive and sustainable outcomes
than a dialogue between military officers or
diplomats. This is also what we have observed
in the bilateral dialogue on nuclear weapons
policy.
52

David E. Sanger and Joseph Kahn, “U.S. Tries to Interpret
China’s Silence Over Test,” New York Times 22 January
2007.
53
Interviews with Chinese space scientists and engineers
conducted by author in China during the course of managing
the China Project of the Union of Concerned Scientists
between 2002 and 2009.
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The publications of both militaries suggest
they will have difficulty discussing space with
the nation they believe to be their most likely
adversary in a future military conflict. This is
especially true of Chinese military
publications because of their propaganda
function. Military to military exchanges
should begin with less controversial and less
technologically complex problems. Adding
space to that agenda is more likely than not to
derail it. Diplomats will be inclined to see
discussions on space as a vehicle for
addressing other problems in the bilateral
relationship, or to hold the discussions hostage
to those problems if they become worse. The
Clinton Administration’s use of licensing
procedures for sensitive space technology as a
bargaining chip in a diplomatic effort to
constrain Chinese missile sales is an
instructive example of how this common
diplomatic practice can go awry.
Conclusions
The history of American perceptions of China
suggests that U.S. Congressional concerns
about technology transfer will continue to be
the most volatile and disruptive factor in U.S.
- Chinese relations in space. The new dialogue
on cooperation will be more likely to produce
sustainable programs if it is conducted by
individuals who can apply their scientific
competencies to the problem of preventing the
exchange of technologies the United States
wants to protect and the Chinese want to
acquire. Given the substantial gap in their
respective national capabilities, many
cooperative space endeavors, including human
spaceflight, are likely to result in transfers of
technology and expertise from the United
States to China. Having scientists organize
and conduct the discussions could help both
parties identify and assess the relative costs
and benefits of specific technology transfers
early in the process. This could help avoid

inappropriate expectations that could provoke
Congressional opposition and undermine
progress.
The history of China’s space programs
suggests that a U.S. - China dialogue on the
peaceful uses of outer space is more likely to
diminish mutual threat perceptions if scientists
are at the table. Contemporary Chinese space
policy is the product of a reaction to a U.S.
plan for national missile defenses that Chinese
scientists misread as a new Apollo program.
The objective of their subsequent investments
in space was to keep China from falling too
far behind the pace of the global space
technology leader, primarily because of the
imagined economic consequences. If the
science delegation Zbigniew Brezinski
brought to China in 1978 had been charged
with beginning a long-term scientific dialogue
about space technology with their Chinese
counterparts, it is possible the four anxious
scientists who wrote to Deng Xiaoping would
have been better informed about the politics of
missile defense in the United States. They
might have been able
Contemporary to see that SDI was
Chinese space more science fiction
policy is the than science. They
might have been able
product of a to predict that it
reaction to a would
be
U.S. plan for immediately scaled
national missile back and eventually
defenses that terminated.

Chinese
scientists
misread as a
new Apollo
program.

Had there been an
on-going relationship
between Chinese and
American scientists
in 1983, the history
of China’s space
program, as well American perceptions of
Chinese intentions in space, might have taken
a radically different course in a healthier
direction. In planning a new relationship with
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China in space, this historical perspective
suggests it would be in the best interest of the
United States to consider the long term. The
U.S. Congress and Executive should avoid
making the dialogue on space a hostage of
unrelated troublesome contentions in the
bilateral relationship. They should use
cooperation to build relationships between
Chinese and American scientists and
engineers who share an interest in the peaceful
exploration and utilization of outer space.
Once
established,
this
cross-cultural
community of space scientists and engineers
could help reduce miscommunication and
misunderstanding, especially during moments
of crisis. Dialogue and cooperation may not
produce a bilateral consensus on space
security or space policy, but it can establish
the reliable channels of communication to the
Chinese aerospace community that General
Chilton said the United States Government
needs to better assess Chinese intentions in
space.
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Space Situational Awareness
Workshop
The goal of the Space Situational Awareness
(SSA) Workshop is to bring together
stakeholders interested in space situational
awareness. This includes practitioners, users
of data, representatives of industry and the
military,
the
scientific
community,
international organizations, and the satellitetracking community. These stakeholders
discuss how needs are changing with SSA,
what improvements in SSA capabilities can be
achieved in the near-term to medium-term,
and how various stakeholder communities
might better interact to draw on each other’s
strengths.
The first workshop was held in 2006. It was
co-sponsored by the World Security Institute’s
Center for Defense Information. A workshop
report can be found at: http://www.cdi.org/
PDFs/SSAConference_screen.pdf.
The second workshop was hosted by Inmarsat
in 2007 and was co-sponsored by the World
Security Institute’s Center for Defense
Information
and
the
Secure
World
Foundation. A summary of the discussions
that took place at the workshop held in 2007
was published in Space and Defense 2: 1
(2008).
The third workshop was held in 2009. This
workshop was hosted by Intelsat and was cosponsored by the World Security Institute’s
Center for Defense Information, the Secure
World Foundation, and the George C.
Marshall Institute. A summary of the 2009
workshop was published in Space and
Defense 3: 2 (Winter 2009).

Areas of focus at the 2009 workshop included:
• National and international perspectives
on SSA.
• Challenges of the space environment.
• Governance issues related to safe and
responsible behavior in the space
environment.
• State of SSA data sharing and the U.S.
Commercial and Foreign Entities
(CFE) Program.
• Concepts and capabilities for improved
SSA data sharing.
• New opportunities in SSA.
Summer Space Seminar
The Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense
Studies organizes the Summer Space Seminar
to advance two principal goals: (1) to foster an
education and interest in the interdisciplinary
areas of space with the intent to develop space
professionals; and (2) to develop a network of
relations across civil, commercial, and
military space professionals that will likely
emerge from the participants. The first
Summer Space Seminar was held in 2007.
This seminar exposes participants to the
breadth and depth of space activities in the
civil, commercial, and military areas. The
relationships among these areas are explored
across a number of perspectives – participants
are exposed to the technology and science of
space activities, followed by discussions on
the political, legal, economic, and social
aspects that influence the development and
application of the various civil, commercial,
and military space activities. The emphasis is
on exchanges among the participants.
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The Summer Space Seminar is directed
toward bringing together a broad group of
future space professionals to lay a foundation
for a future space policy community in the
military, civilian government, and private
sectors. Participants in the program include
students from the U.S. Air Force Academy,
U.S. Naval Academy, U.S. Military Academy,
George Washington University, and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The seminar serves as a useful forum for
further professional development given that
several of the participants worked, or are
currently employed, as space professionals.
During the seminar, a great deal of learning
and socialization takes place among the
participants to meet the goal to inform and to
build connections between future space
professionals.
Asia, Space, and Strategy Workshop
In 2006, the Eisenhower Center for Space and
Defense Studies held its first Asia, Space, and
Strategy Workshop. This effort brought
together U.S., Canadian, and European experts
and policy makers from the military, civilian
government, universities, think-tanks, and
private sectors to discuss the implications of
current and future Chinese space policy and to
investigate areas of possible Sino-U.S.
cooperation in space. Beginning in 2007, an
invitation was extended to include Chinese
academics in the discussions. Chinese
participation has increased each year since
then, with four attendees from China at the
2009 workshop in Vancouver, Canada.
The fourth workshop of 2009 was broadened
to include other space powers in the AsiaPacific region. For the first time in the
workshop series, representatives from
Australia and Japan took part. The workshop
focused on common interests that spacefaring

countries of the Pacific Basin have in the
creation of a stable, predictable, and mutually
beneficial environment in space. Workshop
topics in 2009 ranged from: economic and
political goals for the use of space; improving
the safety and stability of the space
environment;
deterrence
and
defense
concepts; and arms control and verification. A
summary of the 2009 workshop was published
in Space and Defense 3: 2 (Winter 2009).
National Space Forum
The Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense
Studies organized and held its fourth annual
National Space Forum from 1-2 September
2009 in Washington, DC. Panels at the Forum
discussed security issues and space.
Specific topics of discussion included:
• An assessment of security challenges
and threats in the space domain.
• The role of space deterrence in
national policy.
• The potential for new approaches to
arms control and verification.
• The improvement of international
cooperation with allies in Asia and
Europe.
• The role that China plays in space.
• The implementation of national space
policy in the Obama Administration.
The Forum concluded with discussions on
how to integrate often competing interests into
a more cohesive policy and, more importantly,
to improve the chances that such a policy can
be effectively implemented. Forum panels
represented a number of points of view from
security, civil, and commercial space.
Proceedings of the National Space Forum
2009 were published in Space and Defense 3:
2 (Winter 2009).
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Transatlantic Space Cooperation
Workshop
In 2008, the Eisenhower Center for Space and
Defense Studies established the Transatlantic
Space Cooperation Workshop. This workshop
series brings together a community of scholars
and experts from the United States and
Europe, including the European Union (EU),
European Space Agency (ESA), and NATO,
to share lessons learned, debate, and network
on joint priorities in civil, security, and
commercial space.
The first workshop was held in Brussels,
Belgium in June 2008. Participants in this
workshop examined U.S., European, and EU
security space priorities and considered
NATO’s space role. Discussions began with
an opening panel where senior U.S., EU, and
NATO officials briefed participants on current
security space priorities before participants
explored issues more in-depth. The goal of the
workshop was to educate senior leadership
from the U.S., EU, and NATO on
philosophies and strategies for collective
space security and deterrence in the 21st
Century. The workshop was successful in
initiating
dialogue
on
harmonizing
transatlantic security space strategies.
The second workshop was held in Berlin,
Germany during September 2009. The 2009
workshop fostered dialogue regarding the
potential for greater cooperation across the
Atlantic to make the most efficient use of
capabilities where possible across civil,
security, and commercial space. A summary
of the 2009 workshop was published in Space
and Defense 3: 2 (Winter 2009).
Issues discussed at the 2009 workshop
included:
• Developments over the past year in
transatlantic space cooperation.

•
•
•
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Joint priorities in protection of critical
space infrastructure.
Transatlantic cooperation on Earth
observations for security and stability.
Future
avenues
for
advancing
transatlantic cooperation.
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